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8IN T R O D U C T IO N
The field o f enquiry
This study is located within the discipline o f theology, and more particularly within 
that sector o f the discipline known as missiology. Missiology has had, within a 
number o f European universities, a distinguished history. Thus, for example, chairs 
o f missiology (or mission studies) have been created since the middle o f the 
nineteenth century in Germany, the Netherlands, the Nordic countries, the United 
Kingdom and the Vatican. Initially, academic interest in the subject was the result o f 
the modern mission movement, from the end o f the 18th century, which accompanied 
the colonial enterprise o f a number o f European nations, and was inspired in part by 
the particular spiritual awakenings o f the 18th and 19th centuries in Europe and the 
United States o f America.
In more recent times, missiological studies have incorporated a broader spectrum o f 
specialist interests, such as the inculturation and contextualisation o f the Christian 
message, dialogue with world religions and ideologies, a preferential option for the 
poor, justice for the marginalised and oppressed, reconciliation and peace, the 
integrity o f creation. The expansion o f the discipline is due in large part to the 
incorporation into the discourse o f participants from the global South,1 who have 
insisted that the burning issues o f their context are taken seriously by all parts o f the 
universal church.2 G obal communications and ease o f travel have facilitated a more 
direct conversation between Christian scholars from diverse locations across the 
world. This is ülustrated, in part, by the number o f people doing post-graduate 
studies in subjects allied to missiology in European and North American universities, 
the quantity o f nationals from Africa, Asia and Latin America teaching in Western 
academic institutions and the increase in the number o f specialist institutions 
dedicated to the study o f mission. Largely due to certain sensitivities surrounding the 
notion o f mission in a pluralist world, chairs in missiology have in some cases been 
given other titles — World Christianity, Contextual Studies, Interreligious Studies and 
Ecumenical Studies.3 Nevertheless, the study o f mission, perhaps for different 
reasons in different places, is high on the agenda o f churches in the North and the 
South, the East and the West.
Since the end o f the 1960s, a world-wide academic body o f teachers o f mission has 
existed — the International Association o f Mission Studies. This sponsors inter­
national assemblies every four years, publishes a peer-reviewed journal, Mission Studies, 
facilitates specialist study groups and encourages regional associations to undertake 
their own specific programmes. Other complementary organisations4 also exist that,
1 It is also referred to as ‘the majority world.’
2 See, Timothy Tennent, ‘The Emergence o f  a G obal Theological Discourse’ in Theology in the Context of World 
Christianity (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2007).
3 See, Viggo Mortensen, ‘Teaching Missiology in a Secular University’ in Tormod Engelsviken, Ernst 
Harbakk, Rolv Olsen and Thor Strandenaes (eds), Mission to the World: Communicating the Gosped in the 21st 
Century(Essays in Honour of Knud Jorgensen) (Oxford: Regnum Books International, 2008), pp. 405-418.
4 Such as The Ecumenical Association o f Third World Theologians (EATWOT), the Council for World 
Mission and Evangelism (CWME) o f the World Council o f  Churches and the Lausanne Committee for 
World Evangelisation (LCWE).
9broadly speaking, are interested in exploring the implications for the church’s mission 
o f the challenges o f 21st century life around the globe — such as, globalisation, 
violence, the environment, poverty and development, interreligious dialogue, 
migration, refugees, indigenous churches, evangelisation and re-evangelisation, and 
reverse mission.
The recent convocation in Edinburgh (2-6 June, 2010) o f an international gathering 
o f mission practitioners and scholars to commemorate the 100th anniversary o f the 
1910 Edinburgh Conference Hlustrates the interest in and vibrancy o f mission 
reflection and action from across the world church. Every major Christian tradition 
was well represented in terms o f delegates, session leaders and speakers — the 
Orthodox churches, the Catholic Church, Protestant churches associated with the 
World Council o f Churches, Evangelical Christians, allied to the World Evangelical 
Alliance and the Lausanne Movement, and Pentecostals. Perhaps, never before has 
there been such a representative gathering o f Christians assembled together for 
consultation. What brought them to the conference was a mutual interest in the past, 
present and future o f Christian mission. The study groups which preceded the 
conference and which produced substantial reports5 tackled themes o f vital concern 
for mission understanding in the 21st century, such as Other faiths, Post-modernities, 
Power, Christian Unity, Spirituality and the position o f women in mission.
Missiology, then, is an intellectual discipline that aims to reflect critically on the 
theoretical foundations, context and the practise o f the churches’ life and work, in the 
light o f the missio Dei.6 It aspires to engage normatively with these aspects o f mission 
by formulating adequate criteria for the discernment o f good and bad mission 
thinking and action. Christian mission may be understood as the church’s pursuits ad 
extra, in fidfilment o f the calling it believes it has received from its divine head. In 
particular, mission implies the communication o f the transforming good news o f 
Jesus Christ through the church’s life o f service, proclamation and testimony Mission 
happens at the frontiers between different beliefs and values, where the Christian 
message challenges and is challenged by alternative interpretations o f reality.7 
Missiology seeks to answer a number o f basic questions about mission: how and why 
does the Christian faith cross frontiers? What drives it to be a missionary religion? 
Who is it that crosses the frontiers and what is their motivation? How does the study 
o f mission relate to other theological disciplines? To achieve its aims, missiology 
interacts with other disciplines, most notably anthropology, sociology, cultural 
studies, historical studies and the political sciences. These help to anchor its reflection 
in the description and analysis o f concrete situations. At the same time, it employs its
5 See, Daryl Balia and Kirsteen Kim (eds.), Witnessing to Christ Today, Vol. II (Oxford: Regnum Books 
International, 2010).
6 The emphasis on G od’s mission as a prerequisite for the mission o f  G od’s people came to the fore in 
mission thinking in the early 1950s; see, David Bosch, Transforming Mission: Paradigm Shifts in 'Theology of Mission 
(Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1991), pp. 389-393. One Old Testament scholar has recently claimed that the missio 
Dei is the primary hermeneutical key for understanding the broad sweep o f the Biblical narrative; see, 
Christopher Wright, The Mission of God: Unlocking the Bible’s grand narrative (Nottingham: IVP, 2006).
7 See, J. Andrew Kirk, What is Mission0 Theologiccl Explorations (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1999); 
Stephen B. Bevans and Roger P. Schroeder, Constants in Context: 1  Theology of Mission foa Today (Maryknoll: 
Orbis Books, 2005).
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own methodologies that indude biblical and theological foundations, historical 
interpretation, theories o f contextualisation and translation, field studies, the study o f 
religion and the ethics o f mission.
It can be seen from this discussion that missiology is a discreet discipline, closely 
allied to other disciplines, but with its own agenda and fields o f research. My subject 
o f study, which promotes an interaction between missiology and disciplines in the 
fields o f philosophy (such as epistemology and moral reasoning), the philosophy o f 
religion and theology, may appear unusual, because there is not much o f a tradition o f 
this kind o f exchange to build on. However, due to the inter-disciplinary nature o f 
missiology, it is legitimate to extend the dialogue into these relatively unexplored 
areas.
Epistem ology as a dialogue partner
Epistemology is a discipline o f studies that examines the convictions that people have 
about how and what it is possible to know. Inevitably, for life to proceed normally, 
everyone has to make claims about their ability to know with reasonable certainty that 
certain matters are as we describe them. Thus, for example, if a motorist is unfamiliar 
with the town in which I live and asks me for directions to a certain street, I can 
direct her, as long as I know exactly where the street is located and which is the best 
route to find it. Furthermore, if the motorist happens to be trying to find the street 
when there is heavy traffic around, and assuming I know a better alternative way, I can 
advise her to take the one uncongested by traffic.
Normally, the motorist would accept my help with gratitude, assuming that I had 
every right to be confident about my knowledge o f that particular place. However, 
she might have had some suspicions that I was playing a trick on her, pretending to 
possess a knowledge o f the locality that I did not have, because I was too proud to 
admit my ignorance. In which case, she might want to know how I am able to justify 
my belief that the directions given will result in her reaching her destination. The 
answer to this question coud  be that I just happen to have lived in that street for the 
last ten years and that, as a regular commuter to another town for work, I know how 
to avoid all the major traffic bocks. The motorist should then be satisfied that I do 
indeed know what I am talking about. However, though she has good reason to think 
that I am justified in my belief, my knowledge is not yet demonstrated to be true. 
Suppose that, literally that morning, workmen had come to mend a water leak 
underneath the very road that I had indicated was much freer o f traffic, and that, as a 
result, a diversion was in operation that took her back into the main flow o f vehicles, 
my knowledge o f the quickest route, though justified, w oud not be true.
This fairly common-place ^lustration o f knowing something to be as we have 
described it suggests that there are three elements involved in the process o f 
knowing: a belief; the justification, grounds or warrant for that belief, and the 
demonstration that the belief is not only justified, but also true. Thus, knowledge has 
been defined as ‘justified, true belief ’8 Justification deals with the reasons for holding
8 See the discussion in A.C. Grayling, ‘Epistemology’ in Nicholas Bunnin and E.P. Tsui-James, The Blackwell 
Companion to Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 38-63. This definition is not without its problems,
11
a particular belief, the evidence for making statements about some reality, what it is 
that authorises one to make truth claims. Knowing something is equivalent to 
ascertaining its status as true.
Epistemology is then dealing with a whole raft o f issues fundamental to daily living: 
“perception, the nature o f belief, the role o f imagery in memory and introspection, 
the variety o f mental properties figuring in self-knowledge, the nature o f inference, 
and the structure o f a person’s system o f beliefs.” 9 To return for a moment to the 
story o f the motorist, my general knowledge o f the quickest route to a particular 
address depends on the constant perception o f my surroundings being in accordance 
with a certain reality on the ground, good reasons for believing that my perceptions 
are accurate, a reliable memory o f the route held in my mind, the inference that on 
that day all my mental faculties are working smoothly, and that there are no grounds 
for thinking that I might be deceived.
O f course, when seeking to help someone by giving them directions, we do not 
reflect on all these matters. We do not test all our mental processes and abilities or go 
through a check-list o f our epistemic virtues as a normal thinking subject, we take 
them for granted until, or unless, some event causes us to question our putative 
knowledge o f some matter (for example, in this case, that we did not know about the 
road-works or that we have confused the names o f the streets, resulting in sending 
the poor motorist a long way from where she wishes to be).
So far well and good: we have been describing what might be called a common-sense 
view o f knowledge; one that serves us well in the everyday routine o f life. However, if 
we move on from the common-place question o f knowing how to go from A to B by 
car and ask some basic questions about our overall human experience, the theory o f 
knowledge may take on a more complicated look These questions relate to the scope 
o f our knowledge, not only about mundane matters (as, for example, how to mend a 
car engine or cook a crepe sujette), but about the meaning o f existence, the nature o f 
beauty, whether reality is given or invented, whether anything or anyone exists 
beyond the universe, about right and wrong action, about identity.
Perhaps the most basic existential questions are: who am I? Why am I here? How 
shoud I live? What happens when I die? And, why, apparently, do only human 
beings o f all creatures on earth ask these questions? To what extent, then, is it 
possible to have justified, true belief about these fundamental issues? It might be 
accurate to affirm that the major epistemological dilemma o f all time is whether it is 
possible to have justified true belief about the nature and meaning o f ultimate reality. 
The contention o f the papers in this collection is that crucial questions in the field o f 
epistemology are o f essential concern to the discipline o f missiology, for reasons that 
will be elucidated further on in this discussion. First, however, it is necessary to
especiaiy in establishing acceptable criteria for justification. Another difficulty is that there may be cases o f 
justified true belief which are not knowledge. Generdly they relate to instances where a justified belief is only 
true by coincidence. Nevertheless, the concept and reality o f knowing something (through common-sense 
experience) is an indispensable part o f  discourse. In the absence o f  a more adequate description, this one 
emphasises the necessary elements o f what counts as knowledge.
9 Robert Audi, Epistemology: a contemporary introduction to the theory of knowledge (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 
viii-ix.
12
review briefy the reasons for concluding that the state o f epistemological discourse in 
the cultural environment o f the West is in dire straits.
The nature o f the epistemological pre d icament
At the risk o f simplifying too much a complex and continuing debate, the pre­
dicament may be defined as how we humans may have access to knowledge o f 
ourselves which matches accurately our total experience o f life. The modern world 
believes, with demonstrable justification, that through the experimental sciences it 
knows certain truths about how the material world functions. There is, o f course, still 
a debate about whether we have direct access to an external world, or whether that 
access is mediated by the concepts o f the mind through which we interpret to our­
selves and to others what we perceive. Nevertheless, in spite o f a certain scepticism in 
some quarters about a direct correspondence between the thing observed and the 
observer,10 science is predicated on a philosophical realism that when we make a 
statement about a matter it is true, whenever what the statement says is true actually is 
the case, and we can know with a deep assurance that it is the case:11
“Prima facie, it seems obvious that the realist conception is the one we express 
with Drue’, when that predicate is applied to propositions, statements and 
beliefs. And nothing has turned up to disturb, or even qualify that obviousness. 
The realist conception remains in possession o f the field.” 12 
Moreover, the object o f observation exists independently o f the observer to the 
extent that, were there to be no observers, the object w oud still exist just as it does 
when observed by an intelligent being This account does not mean that observers do 
not see different aspects o f what they are observing (for example, in the subtle 
textures o f leaves turning colour in the autumn season). However, what they see 
actually is there; it is not just present in their imagination. When they describe the 
object o f perception (let us say a herd o f black and white cows in a field), they are 
describing the objects, not just what they perceive.
The methods o f science, then, assume that investigation and exploration happens 
because there is a given reality that can be known in itself by the person or team o f 
researchers seeking to understand that reality (for example, the way in which the body 
defends itself against rogue cells or how it heals itself after being damaged). The 
material world can be known: we can have true beliefs about natural processes and 
we can justify those beliefs on the basis o f the verification o f evidence.
So far there is little controversy about the possibility o f acquiring this type o f 
knowledge. The whole enterprise o f science continues to build accumulative 
knowledge on the premise that through empirical demonstration we may acquire an 
accurate understanding o f the functioning o f matter and organisms.13 However, there 
are some serious questions in epistemology that remain, which science pea se does not
10 See, Barry Stroud, ‘Skepticism and the Possibility o f  Knowledge’ in Linda Martin Alcoff (ed.), Epistemology: 
The BigQuestions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), pp. 363-365.
11 See, WHliam P. Alston, 1  Realist Conception of Truth (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 5-6.
121  Realist Conception, p. 188.
13 See, Christopher Norris, On Trnth and Meaning: Eanguage, Logic and the Grounds of Belief (London: Continuum,
2006), pp. 77-80.
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seem able to answer. Is science, qua science, able to elucidate the meaning and reasons 
for the experiences o f life that we believe we know about which are not encompassed 
apparently by the material world? Are there other sources o f knowledge which 
require assessment by other rational disciplines that transcend what scientific 
methods are capable o f delivering? Is it possible to gain knowledge o f beliefs that 
cannot be confirmed or denied by means o f scientific experimentation (for example, 
the belief that it is right not to tell lies or to steal other people’s possessions)?14 
The epistemological predicament is the result o f equivocation about the answer to 
these and other similar queries. Over a period o f time, beginning roughly from the 
end o f the 17th century, an intellectual consensus has descended on Western societies 
that postulates a sharp epistemological distinction between knowledge gained through 
experimental rational processes based on observation, the elaboration and testing o f 
hypotheses about the natural world and their confirmation or refutation and claims to 
know the truth about matters which are intrinsically not open to empirical validation. 
It is said that there is a radical distinction o f epistemic status between knowledge o f 
the natural world, where justified true belief about empirical data demands assent 
because demonstrable evidence cannot be gainsaid, and beliefs about a non-material 
world that have to do with such matters as the meaning o f human life, ethical values, 
the existence o f evil, suffering, cultural differences and the nature o f beauty.15 In the 
first case, knowledge based on testable evidence is universally available, is immune 
from reasonable doubt and entails universal assent. In the second case, claims to 
knowledge are based on individual or collective opinions. They spring from a range 
o f options about what may be the case about a transcendent ultimate reality; in the 
nature o f the case these do not command consent, because they are based on 
conjectures that cannot be confirmed or denied by universally compelling exami­
nation.
Scientifically-based knowledge, then, is open-ended, always revisable in the light o f 
fresh evidence empirically endorsed; every other kind o f knowledge springs from 
convictions that are based on beliefs about which we can never be assured o f their 
truth-value. Is the existence o f the universe due to the gratuitous creative act o f an 
eternally existing personal Spirit? Or, is it intrinsically impossible to know what may 
have happened at the beginning (if, indeed, there was a beginning)? The modern 
intellectual consensus says that we cannot know. As it is logically impossible to prove 
a negative, we cannot affirm the truth that God does not exist and did not create all 
matter ex nihih, nor can we assert that matter could not have come into existence by
14 People stdl attracted by some form o f logical positivism may make a strong distinction between facts and 
v^ues, in the sense that commitment to notions o f right and wrong is interpreted as a description o f a 
person’s expression o f approval or disapproval o f  a particular action. According to this view, the key to 
distinguishing ethical judgements is in the personal motivation to endorse or recoil from certain conduct; see, 
Hilary Putnam, The Collapse of the 9 art I  Value Dichotomy and Other Essays (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2002), pp. 35-38.
15 J. P. Moreland, in his essay, ‘The Image o f  God and the Failure o f Scientific Atheism,’ in Craig, William 
Lane and Meister Chad (eds), God is Great, God is Good: Why Believing in God is Reasonable and Responsible 
(Downers Grove: IVP, 2009), lists five recalcitrant features o f human experience that evade a plausible 
explanation on the basis o f scientific naturalism: consciousness and mental processes; free will; rationality; 
the self and intrinsic, equal v^ue.
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some kind o f spontaneous activity. So, what we believe wül be the result o f social and 
cultural factors such as family influences, education, the media and our circle o f 
friends. Putative knowledge o f a non-empirical world is at best justified belief; its 
truth value, however, is not ascertainable.
For the moment, we can leave a description o f the predicament at this point. We are 
dealing with deeply-rooted epistemological perceptions. We can safely say that, as 
translated into educational practice, for example, this narrative has gained a kind o f 
default position in Western societies. It is part o f an intellectual plausibility structure 
that undergirds all academically-respectable discourse. As we shall see later, there is 
much more to be said about this apparent dichotomy, this split in the faculty o f 
knowledge into two unequal parts. The reasoning is not quite so straightforward as 
the standard account makes it out to be. There are serious considerations which are 
ignored in a scientifically-driven environment which chooses to disregard the in­
completeness and partiality o f its outiook. These form part o f Christian mission in its 
dialogue with what has become an alternative system o f belief
The consequences of the epistemological predicament
The most obvious consequence is the disintegration o f a unified field o f knowledge 
that encompasses an understanding o f both the external world o f material objects, 
data and processes and a human being’s internal world where the uniquely human 
notions o f purpose, imagination, planning, conscience, consciousness, creativity, 
inter-personal relations and aesthetic appreciation are experienced as an undeniable 
part o f our self-awareness. For the first world, we believe we have good grounds for 
knowing with certainty the reality that is conveyed to us through our physical senses. 
For the second world, in trying to give a coherent and plausible explanation o f our 
own humanity, we are cast adrift on the sea o f diverse and often incompatible 
theories, whose truth, or otherwise, cannot be assessed by means o f a universally 
credible standard o f belief Here we enter the region o f religions, philosophies and 
ideologies: cgrand-narratives’ which claim to know the truth which wül comprehen­
sibly explain our experience. The problem is that there is no agreed way o f deciding 
between their various interpretations.
Western culture has accepted, promoted and now has to live with a fundamental 
sacred-secular divide. Whereas formerly the culture took for granted an under­
standing o f the world which included the communication o f knowledge from beyond 
the material, now it has, to use a phrase made current by Don Cupitt, Daken leave o f 
God.’ As the scientific enterprise achieved a kind o f exponential success in dis­
covering the workings o f the natural world, so the necessity o f a supreme being to 
help fill in the gaps o f knowledge diminished. The so-called ‘God hypothesis’ 
appeared to become increasingly tenuous. For many scientists and writers Darwin’s 
theory o f adaptation and mutation through natural selection seemed to give an 
exhaustive and adequate account o f how the different species (including homo sapient) 
came to be. It was put forward as a much more satisfactory alternative to the concept 
o f ‘intelligent design’ by an interventionist, non-material creator.16
16 See, Alister McGrath, The Foundations of Dialogue in Science and Religion (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), p. 174.
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Indeed, it was assumed that in order to safeguard the integrity o f the sciences from 
extraneous interference from metaphysical speculation it was necessary to begin with 
an assumption o f methodological naturalism.17 Scientists, working within the confines 
o f the natural world, cannot consider any explanatory hypothesis that accounts for 
the reality o f observation that is not intrinsically open to testable procedures 
recognised by normal scientific processes o f confirmation. So, any claim to a super­
natural explanation o f the existence o f life, biological diversity and increasing 
complexity has to be bracketed out o f the equation. Science can offer no opinion 
about such an explanation.
Now, in theory, this methodological naturalist stance does not rule out a theistic 
account o f the origin and development o f the universe. However, in practice, there is 
a certain impulse towards assuming that the tools o f investigation that science has 
honed over many generations are sufficient to supply us with all the knowledge we 
need in order to grasp fully the reasons for the whole o f our experience. This move 
from methodological naturalism to a form o f metaphysical naturalism is what Mikael 
Stenmark calls ‘scientific expansionism’.18 He describes scientific expansionists as 
those who
“argue that the boundaries o f science shoud be extended so that it includes 
values or value questions; but it must also be possible for them to claim that, 
for instance, all beliefs that can be known or even rationally maintained must 
and can be included within the boundaries o f science. Science sets on such an 
account the limits for what we possibly can know about reality; the only kind 
o f knowledge that we can have is scientific knowledge.” 19 
Stenmark believes that it is precisely in the area o f evolutionary biology that the 
greatest claims are being made for a scientific explanation o f the whole o f reality. He 
quotes, among others, Richard Alexander, Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Michael 
Ruse and Edward Wilson to the end that “the evolutionary epic provides us with a 
new mythology” , which can be called ‘scientific materialism.’ Not only will this new 
narrative be able to explain satisfactorily the evolutionary reasons for the old religion
— to give an objective sense o f absolute moral obligation, in order to counteract the 
unmitigating, inbred selfishness o f the urge to survive — but it will constitute a new 
unifying epistemological norm that will give wholly satisfactory (and accurate) 
accounts o f ontological realities.20 In other words, it will function as a quasi-religion, 
able to answer, within its own terms, our deepest existential questions.
The argument can be reversed. According to a scientific account o f rationality, which 
accepts as an axiom that nothing may be believed that is not demonstrable by appeal 
to well-grounded evidence, and seeing that religion cannot produce such evidence for 
its claims (i.e. evidence that will pass the test o f manifest corroboration or refutation), 
religion has to be located in the sphere o f myth, in its negative sense o f a human
17 See, Robert T. Pennock, ‘Naturalism, Evidence and Creationism: The Case o f Philipjohnson’ in Robert T. 
Pennock (ed.), Intelligent Design Creationism and its Critics: Philosophical, Theological and Scientific Perspectives 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001), pp. 77-95.
18 See, How to Relote Sciencs and Religion (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), pp. 5-9.
19 How to 'Relote, p. xi.
20 How to Relote, pp. 5-9, 30.
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created account o f existence designed to offer an explanation in areas o f life hitherto 
inexplicable. In other words, religion wül always suffer from a God-of-the-gaps 
syndrome. As scientific explanations expand, so the domain o f religion wül in­
creasingly shrink This phenomenon is precisely what is being witnessed to in the 
secular cultures o f the West; intellectual sophistication is incompatible with a belief in 
non-material entities and their presumed influence on the material world, which alone 
we can know that we know.
Now, if it were true that the only justified true belief that we were able to acquire is 
that which is ascertainable through the natural sciences, there would be no dis­
integration o f a unified field o f knowledge. Knowledge w oud simply be confined, by 
definition, to those matters empirically substantiated. A l other claims would be 
relegated to a nether region o f fantasy According to one’s predilection this region 
coud  be described either as useful fiction, having the pragmatic value o f helping 
human beings continue to cope with the seeming anomalies and absurdities o f life 
(such as the existence o f gratuitous violence, unmerited suffering, the meaning­
lessness o f toil and the inability o f possessions — either goods or human relationships
— to satisfy the deepest and most persistent o f human longings to be o f worth and to 
be loved) or it could be depicted as a dangerous delusion, based on false hopes and 
promises.
It is, o f course, the case that those who believe in the reality o f a divine presence who 
inhabits a non-material realm also believe that the material world, however well 
understood, can intrinsically never supply answers to uniquely human questions. 
According to this view, scientific materialism is built upon a number o f well- 
rehearsed fallacies: the two most important are the deontic, which seeks to deduce 
moral principles from statements o f fact, “an ülegitimate procedure, since premises o f 
one logical type (descriptive judgements) cannot give rise to premises o f another type 
(namely, prescriptions) “and the naturalistic, which “confuses natural properties, like 
musical accomplishment, with moral properties, like virtue.”21
Perhaps, even more important, the usual explanation given for religious belief — that 
its origin lies in the various needs that human beings seem to have for life in a 
civilised community (e.g. moral authority, a sense o f worth, hope in the future, the 
assurance o f being loved, justice, equality, an explanation o f evil, etc.) being projected 
outwards towards a self-created super-hero who supplies all these things (the genetic 
fallacy) — is not itself a scientific explanation. It is a matter o f conjecture built upon 
assumptions which are wholly beyond scientific methodology to prove or disprove. 
The problem with scientific materialism is that we ‘know’ (we have a justified rational 
certainty) that we experience these needs without, however, being able to account for 
them. The scientific expansionist claims do a great disservice to science; by claiming
21 J. Andrew Kirk, The Future of Reason, Science and Faith: Following Modernity and Post-modernity (Aldershot: 
Ashgate Publishing, 2007), p. 171. Hilary Putnam, who argues against the fact/v^ue split, maintains that the 
use o f ‘thick’ ethical concepts, like cruel, is more than mere description. To cal an action cruel, he thinks, 
already contains an ev^uative principle, present before the judgement has been made. In this sense, but only 
in this sense, the v^ue is contained within the description o f the fact. However, the v^ue has not been 
derived from the fact, see ‘The Entanglement o f Fact and Y ^ue’ (chapter 2), in The Collapse of the Fact/Value
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too much they are in danger o f creating disHlusionment among a public taught to rely 
on the supposed findings o f scientific research. All in all, then, as long as there is no 
credible source o f information that w oud explain our self-awareness, the dis­
integration o f the whole field o f knowledge remains.
The research question
The nature o f the epistemological predicament and its consequences is the context 
for the unfolding o f the research summarised in the articles that follow. The question 
that needs to be explored has to do with an authentic Christian response to a 
dilemma, which has a philosophical dimension but also existential significance. Can 
Christian mission in the 21st century be construed in such a way that it addresses an 
issue located mainly in the thinking mind? Is the problem o f justified true belief about 
every aspect o f life a valid frontier for the Christian message to cross? I f  it is, how 
shoud one begin to engage with the matter? The pieces o f writing selected for this 
dissertation attempt to locate the problem and then begin to offer a qualified 
rejoinder. They attempt to probe the implications for missiology o f a massive cultural 
shift that has taken place in the course o f the history o f the West over the last three 
hundred years. In this respect, they form one possible response to Lesslie Newbigin’s 
call to construct a coherent missiological approach to contemporary Western 
culture.22
The case to be investigate d
The articles explore the fruitfuness o f one particular hypothesis, firmly rooted in 
history, for a contemporary missiological engagement with the culture o f the West in 
the area o f epistemology. The hypothesis states that the main cause o f the episte­
mological predicament outlined above is the failure on the part o f Europe’s 
intellectual tradition to maintain a unified account o f knowledge that w oud h o d  
together a true perception o f both the external and internal worlds o f human 
experience. This failure arose, beginning in the latter part o f the 17th century, when 
the truth about the meaning o f human existence became divorced from the truth 
about the functioning o f the material environment in which human beings live and 
move and have their being
This separation o f two sources o f knowing may be expressed as a divorce between 
the word and world o f God. Within a Christian interpretation o f reality it was 
assumed that God as creator and redeemer spoke through both his special revelation, 
conveyed by specially chosen prophets and apostles through the Biblical message, and 
his general revelation conveyed in the complex and subtle workings o f the material 
creation. It was assumed, moreover, that these two revelations, though disclosing 
different aspects o f knowledge about the whole o f reality, nevertheless cohered. 
Finally, it was assumed that only as the two were maintained intact and inseparable 
would human beings have access to a firil body o f knowledge sufficient to live a
22 See, for example, The Gospel in a P lr ^ s t  Society (London: SPCK, 1989); Trrth to Tell: The Gospel as Public 
Tmth (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991); Trrth and Authority in Modernity (Y^ley Forge, PA: Trinity Press 
International, 1996), and many other writings.
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thoroughly fu ffled  existence. People can, on this account, only understand their true 
nature and destiny as they attend assiduously to both ‘books.’23 Each needs to be kept 
open and read for cross-referencing
In what might be called, perhaps rather dramatically, intellectual suicide, scientists and 
philosophers began to discard one o f the two books, in the belief (or hope) that the 
other w oud render all the knowledge necessary for a considered life. At the time, 
they began to believe that knowledge gained through scientific investigation would 
reveal a whole new world unimagined by any previous generation. The wave o f new 
discoveries helped to fuel the rising tide o f optimism that nothing w oud be beyond 
human beings powers o f discernment through the use o f the emerging scientific 
disciplines.
At the same time, a sense o f relief swept through the academic establishments o f 
Europe that for the first time in history humanity might be free from the doctrinaire 
teaching o f an authoritarian church. Now, through credible methods o f empirical 
research and a scientifically-trained use o f reason, all claims to truth coud be sifted to 
judge their credentials and their warrant. By and large the claims for the book o f 
G od’s word were found unconvincing or even misleading Humanity was entering a 
new stage o f ‘enlightenment’ urged on by Kant’s famous call, Sapere aude (‘dare to be 
wise’):
“Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the 
inability to use one’s own understanding without the guidance o f another. This 
immaturity is self-inccrred if its cause is not lack o f understanding, but lack o f 
resolution and courage to use it without the guidance o f another.” 24 
So, the book o f G od’s word was firmly shut and, to all intents and purposes, locked 
and the key thrown away
The Enlightenment seemed like a new dawning o f human understanding and 
endeavour, a new world emancipated from the old world o f superstition and fable. It 
was modernity in contrast to a pre-modernity that refected another era, another set 
o f presuppositions, a wholly different mentality.25 From this transitionary phase arose, 
either as a development o f or a reaction to the Enlightenment all the subsequent 
philosophical and cultural movements o f the West. However, having consciously 
abandoned the notion that truth may be discovered by paying attention to divine 
revelation, Western culture has been forced to hope against hope that somehow 
knowledge o f the imminent world will make up for the loss. As we have seen, that 
has proved not to be the case. Attempts to harness reason alone or to use the gift o f
23 The term is used by Francis Bacon in the Third Book o f  De Augmentis Scientarum (1623), in which he 
“draws a distinction between the revealed knowledge o f the divine and sensory or natural knowledge. He 
makes the distinction, not to suggest a radical divergence between them, but to point to the distinct methods 
by which knowledge in each case is to be appropriated”, see, The 'Future of Reason, pp. 37-40.
24 Immanuel Kant, ‘An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?’ in Hand Reiss (ed.), Kant’s Politiccl 
Writings (trans. ByH .B. Nisbet) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 54.
25 The process has been extensively explored by Charles Taylor, 1  Sem lr Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2007). I give a brief summary and analysis o f  the book in j. Andrew Kirk, ‘A Secular Age in 
mission perspective’ in a forthcoming edition o f  Trmsformation. The book by Richard Tarnas, The Passion of the 
Western Mind: Understanding the Ideas that have shaped our Worldview (London: Pimlico, 1991) also gives a 
penetrating account o f  the historical shifts in thinking that have led to the current epistemological impasse.
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language to discover the nature o f Being have foundered on the inevitably 
incompleteness o f knowledge based on the material world alone.26 
Having discussed the probable main historical causes for the current epistemological 
predicament, this dissertation also attempts to test the hypothesis that the Christian 
faith, based on the received understanding o f the Bible as G od’s word, as commonly 
expressed in all Christian traditions, possesses a superior explanatory and re-creative 
power in comparison with all major alternatives — philosophical, ideological, and 
religious. This takes us into the theme o f dialogue and to mission as dialogue, but in 
an area o f engagement little explored hitherto in the feld  o f missiology.
Metho d ologies of research
The fundamental epistemological question has to be, what is required if  we are to 
obtain justified true belief about matters that cannot be settled by appeal to empirical 
data alone? The only hope o f gaining knowledge about realities beyond the 
competence o f the experimental sciences to discover, and that we know we are not 
deceived into thinking exist, is to have access to a different source o f understanding 
We are talking here o f a different category: one which cannot ultimately be measured 
by scientific criteria. There are basically only two alternatives: either this knowledge 
comes from deep within the (collective) psyche o f the human being or it comes from 
a source external to the human race.
In the first case, we would refer to what might be called the collective wisdom o f the 
ages: human beings from different times and places refecting on what they observe 
about human behaviour from within the resources o f their own mental abilities and 
intuitions. They are seeking to obey the injunction to “buy truth...buy wisdom, 
instruction and understanding” (Prov. 23.23). People, naturally, do not acquire 
knowledge by themselves. They are reliant on the accumulated wisdom o f others, 
which is passed on down the generations through teaching and example. Sometimes 
this wisdom will be distilled in proverbs, stories, sayings and parables. It will provide 
a certain amount o f insight into the ambiguous condition o f human existence. Some­
times it will come as a consequence o f deep refective rational thought as in the case 
o f the various schools o f philosophy that have existed in East and West. Sometimes 
this wisdom will be cast in the form o f religious legends, with an appeal to God or 
the gods to sanction what has been discovered by human intelligence.
In the second case, a more substantial claim is being made. Three main religious 
traditions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam)27 affirm that their teaching is derived from 
the revelation that comes from the one and only existing divine being, who inhabits 
eternity, the creator o f all that is. They claim that this revelation has been transmitted 
through human language (Hebrew, Greek or Arabic) by people specially chosen by 
the subject o f the revelation. This claim makes a number o f assumptions: that such a 
divine being exists, entirely independently o f human existence and thought
26 Further on this, see The Future of Reason, chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6.
27 It should be mentioned that the Mormon faith makes a similar claim based on the Book o f  Mormon, 
whilst some religious groups claim a special interpretation o f  existing Scriptures (e.g. The Jehovah’s 
Witnesses).
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(ontological theistic realism28); that such a being is capable o f communicating with 
human beings; that the communication is cast in words and images that are intel­
ligible to humans; that those who receive the communication are able to transmit it 
faithfully to others for whom it is also intelligible. These are strategic claims, but they 
represent the minimum assumptions necessary, if there is going to be a source o f 
justified true belief extrinsic to purely human ruminations.
Whatever the arguments for and against this source o f knowledge, it is clear that the 
claim, if it be true, fu ff s  the criteria for an additional origin o f knowledge not 
accessible by means o f human observation o f and experimentation upon the natural 
world. As a principle, then, it is justified belief, in that there is nothing contradictory 
or absurd about proposing that such knowledge exists, and there is considerable 
circumstantial evidence that it does. However, the question about its truth remains, 
i.e. does it communicate a reliable perception about the way things ultimately are? 
And by what criteria coud  we judge its truth value?
Given that claims to revelation and affirmations about wisdom and understanding o f 
the human condition come in many varieties (often discrepant), it will not be easy to 
settle these questions. However, there is one heuristic device, which might serve as a 
fruitful tool for concluding what is the ultimate truth o f the matter, which is worth 
exploring This is known as ‘Inference to the Best Explanation’ (henceforth IBE). 
This is the tool that I propose to investigate as a means o f engaging in dialogue with 
the epistemological dilemmas o f current Western culture.29 In brief, IBE  makes the 
assumption, based on logical reasoning and evidence, that
“our explanatory considerations guide our inferences. Beginning with the 
evidence available to us, we infer what w oud, if true, provide the best 
explanation o f that evidence.” 30 
In his study o f this axiom, Peter Lipton argues that this is the method we most 
normally use when seeking to infer a conclusion from some piece o f evidence that 
has forced its attention upon us. Thus, “we do often use how well a hypothesis would 
explain as a barometer o f how likely it is that the hypothesis is correct” .31 There are 
two particular mechanisms by which the method proceeds. The first is a contrastive 
procedure: ‘best’ implies the most persuasive among a number o f alternative 
hypotheses; it seeks to answer the question ‘why this account o f reality rather than 
that? The second is to keep a distinction between what Lipton calls ‘the likeliest’ and 
‘the loveliest’ explanation, i.e. a “distinction between the explanation most warranted 
by the evidence... and the explanation which would, if true, provide the most
28 For the meaning o f realism in relation to God, see Peter Byrne, God and Realism (Aldershot: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2003) pp. 1-20.
29 George Schlesinger, Religion and Scientific Method (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1977) has defended religion as a 
rational enterprise by using IBE. Philip Dowe, Galileo, Darwin and Hawking: The I n t e r l  of Science, Reason and 
Religion (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), p. 103, has also suggested that “the method o f IBE ...can  also be 
used to justify the rationality o f belief in God.” He ¿low s that the methodology o f science can be applied to 
religion, as there is a common rationality shared by religion and science. So far, however, I have not yet come 
across anyone who has explored the fruitfulness o f the method in seeking to resolve the epistemological 
dilemma o f our times.
30 Peter Lipton, Inference to the BestExplanation (London: Routledge, 2004/2), p. 1.
31 Inference to the Best Explanation, p. 208.
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understanding” 32 He also argues that we shoud keep in mind a differential between 
potential and actual explanation, such that instances o f inference to the best potential 
explanation are inferences that the latter are o f engaging actual explanations.
I claim that this heuristic device is an excellent, indeed the most adequate, way o f 
engaging in a dialogue between the Christian faith (understood in Trinitarian theistic 
terms) and the epistemological predicament o f secular, Enlightenment and post­
Enlightenment culture. I argue that it proceeds in ways substantially similar to the 
processes o f the law-courts, which aim to discover, ‘beyond all reasonable doubt,’ 
what is the truth o f the matter in the case o f someone accused o f a felony By means 
o f the sifting o f testimonial and forensic evidence and deductive reasoning, the court 
proceeds to the making o f a judgement about the best explanation regarding the 
circumstances surrounding a particular crime. The prosecution marshals evidence that 
points to the accused, whilst the defence produces evidence for an alternative 
explanation. The jury is then given the task o f deciding which evidence is most likely 
to be true to the facts o f the case.
I further argue that this method may become a missiological project in which the 
Christian faith (understood in terms o f Trinitarian theistic realism) is the best o f all 
possible explanations o f our unique experience o f the universe as human beings: one 
which offers the most coherent, consistent, and complete account. The theory’s 
explanatory power is measured by its observational success in accounting for data 
already accepted as veridical, and for new data. It also scores well in its predictive 
ability with regard to human behaviour (i.e. what is likely to happen, if certain courses 
o f action are followed).33 The advantage o f adopting the model for the purposes o f 
dialogue is that it takes account o f universally-available evidence and proven 
categories o f rational argument. The truth-claims that are made are related to self­
awareness, human experience o f the world, the universal concourse o f alternative 
traditions, ideas and explanations and are open to a critical exchange o f views. 
Therefore, when it comes to assessing the causes o f the epistemological predicament 
o f the West and possible responses, it has great missiological potential.
However, there are two major problems with the method that need to be addressed 
before we can conclude that this is a missiological project worth taking up. First, 
there are doubts about the viability o f the method itself. Secondly, there are doubts 
about whether the Christian faith is in the business o f giving explanations at all. We 
continue, then, by considering each o f these potential uncertainties in turn.
32 Inference to the Best Explanation, p. 207.
33 An example o f explanatory prediction might be a prognosis o f the consequences that will inevitably follow 
a deficit o f proper care, security and affection for the emotional stability o f  chHdren. The ability to anticipate 
certain behavioural outcomes in these circumstances is derived from an understanding o f how human beings 
are created to function best within a stable and cherishing family environment.
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Inference to the best explanation — is it a valid procedure?
Several difficulties concerning the theory have been articulated in the philosophy o f 
science.34 These can only be dealt with here in a concise manner, as a full treatment 
would take us beyond the scope o f this introduction.35 First, there is the question o f 
what makes one explanation better than another. This has been called the challenge 
o f identificction. The problem here is to give an adequate account o f the explanatory 
virtues, i.e. the features o f explanation that are most convincing in contributing to the 
degree o f understanding they provide. In general, “better explanations explain more 
types o f phenomena, explain them with greater precision, provide more information 
about underlying mechanisms, unify apparently disparate phenomena, or simplify our 
overall picture o f the world.” 36 As well, better explanations are those which are able 
to clarify complex phenomena, without avoiding or shelving difficult issues. They are 
also those best able to handle satisfactorily objections to the explanations and 
recalcitrant evidence. Clearly, a best explanation is one that surpasses alternative 
explanations in its descriptive power and is also able to account for their existence. 
Secondly, there is a question about the correspondence between the most likely and 
the loveliest explanations. This is referred to as the challenge o f matching. The 
question here concerns the coincidence between the features, noted above, that tend 
to lend support to the best explanation o f a phenomenon or set o f phenomena and 
the features that lend support to a hypothesis “that explain many observed 
phenomena to a high degree o f accuracy”37 Some people have suggested that IBE 
argues in a circle, because the only way the theory can claim to be an independent 
source o f justified true belief is by relying on familiar inductive reasoning, which is 
then made the basis o f concluding that the best explanation is the correct (or true) 
explanation.38 However, a reasonable distinction can be made between the two forms 
o f inference.
Inductive inference deals with relevant evidence that supports a hypothesis and can 
be used ex hypothesi to test the accuracy o f the hypothesis given the evidence germane 
to the case. Inference to the best explanation takes the process one stage further on 
by dealing with alternative explanations o f the same evidence, in order to show which 
is the most plausible given that it explains the widest possible range o f available 
evidence. The process is well Hlustrated in the case o f a criminal investigation. A 
crime has been committed. The investigators assemble all the evidence that appears 
to bear on the case, in the course o f which they probably eliminate some evidence as 
being unconnected or peripheral They form a hypothesis about who may have 
committed the crime (i.e. they construct a profile o f the most likely perpetrator), and 
then look again at the evidence to test whether it does indeed point in the right
34 These are summarised and answered in Peter Lipton, ‘Inference to the Best Explanation’ in W.H. Newton­
Smith (ed .),1  Companion to the Vhilosophh of Science (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), pp. 184-193.
35 In my estimation, the deeper philosophical complexities o f objections to the theory are dealt with 
adequately by Lipton in Inference to the Best Explanation and in the relevant sections o f Martin Curd and J.A. 
Cover (eds.), Vhilosophp of Science: The Central Issues (New York: W.W.Norton, 1998).
361  Companion to the 'Vhilosophp of Science, p. 187.
371  Companion to the Vhilosophp of Science, p. 188.
38 See, Richard Fumerton, ‘Inference to the best explanation’ in Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa (eds.), 1  
Companion to Epistemologp (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 208-9.
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direction. They then make an arrest and charge someone (or group o f people) with 
committing the crime. However, when it comes to the trial, the defence lawyers argue 
that the evidence coud  point to an alternative explanation and that, as a result, the 
prosecution’s case is explanatorily insufficient, and hence unsound. Or, they may 
argue that the evidence is insufficient (in philosophical terms ‘ nderdetermined’).
The whole case, then, rests on which explanation is the best (beyond reasonable 
doubt), or whether there is a third or fourth explanation that would do even better. 
The conclusion that the judge or jury may come to is that one explanation is 
overwhelmingly more warranted than any other and, with great probability, is true. 
Or, they may decide that none o f the alternative explanations are sufficiently strong 
to justify a conviction (beyond reasonable doubt). The case then is either dismissed or 
sent for a re-trial This example, hopefirily, clarifies the distinction between expla­
nations that account for a given effect (the likeliest) and those that help to resolve a 
confict that may arise when more than one likely explanation is submitted for 
consideration. This procedure, as we will hope to demonstrate, is important when it 
comes to using IBE as a heuristic tool in missiological dialogue.
Thirdly, there is a question about the reliability o f inductive practices. This is the 
challenge o f justificction. The challenge was laid down well over two hundred years ago 
by the Scottish philosopher David Hume.39 He argued that the most fundamental 
problem o f inductive justification is that there is no good reason to believe that our 
inductive practices, that take us from true observations to true hypotheses or 
predictions, are reliable. All inductive arguments for induction beg the question they 
are supposed to be answering, whilst deductive arguments, based on the reliability o f 
past observations, do not guarantee that induction will be reliable in the future. This 
is Hume’s sceptical reservation about the value o f the inductive process. As a theory, 
it is difficult to refute on its own terms. However, in practice in order for real life 
scientific or judicial judgements to be accepted as cogent, it has to be ignored, for it 
would make all scientific theories, hypotheses and predictions unbelievable. Although 
always revisable, scientific theories are cumulative in the impact they make on the 
probability that they are true. It w oud, therefore, be entirely unreasonable, and 
counter to scientific experimentation, always to suspend judgement about the 
reliability o f accumulated observation.
As a matter o f fact, in his argument against miracles, Hume breaks his own methodo­
logical scepticism. On the one hand, he appears to argue that
“the only basis for distinguishing real law-like (nomological) generalisations 
from those based on accidental regularities is the evidence the mind adduces 
for the former but not the latter. Law-like generalisations fow  from the 
quantity and variety o f evidence that impinges upon our mental faculties not 
from the unchangeable reality o f the external world.”40 
On the other hand, in his well-known argument against miracles, he gives the 
impression o f appealing precisely to that which exists objectively in the external 
world:
39 See, _1n Enquir Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford: OUP, 1999, first published in 1777).
40 The 'Future of Reason, p. 63.
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“A miracle is a violation o f the laws of nature; and as a form and unalterable 
experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the 
very nature o f the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can 
possibly be imagined.”41 
It will be noted that Hume, in order to argue his case against miracles, has moved 
surreptitiously from law-like generalisations to the laws of nature. However, on his account 
o f induction, there are no such things as laws o f nature, only that every “individual’s 
experience o f past occurrences is uniform and regular.” Now, he seems to be arguing 
that “all past occurrences have been uniform and regular, in accordance with laws.” 42 
Mentioning this apparent contradiction is not intended, in this instance, to be a 
refutation o f Hume’s objection to miracles, but rather a comment on his view o f 
induction as a problem for the axiom about IBE. Though Hume would have strongly 
rejected the ascription, he seems to have adopted here a realist assumption about an 
external world, existing independently o f human experience. Otherwise, his argument 
against miracles based on customary experience simply begs the question.
As a matter o f fact, it is by not attending to the argument from best explanation that 
miracles may be ruled out o f court a priori. Hume based his argument on the direct 
testimony o f individuals, which overwhelmingly witnesses against the occurrence o f 
apparently inexplicable anomalous occurrences. However, he neglected to mention 
the possibility (even probability) that there may also be indirect testimony to an event 
having happened. And, when this testimony is taken into account (for example, in the 
case o f the resurrection o f Christ, the empty tomb and the radical change in the 
disciples), it provides evidence that can only be explained by accepting the hypothesis 
that an irregular or abnormal event did indeed happen. Hume’s argument rules out 
the possibility o f miracles per se; the argument for the possibility o f miracles, however, 
attends to all the evidence (direct and indirect) germane to the case, before coming to 
a conclusion about which theory best explains the data.
From this rather extended discussion, it is legitimate to draw the conclusion that the 
principal objections to the principle o f IBE can be met. Now, speaking about 
miracles, the philosopher Hilary Putnam has put forward an argument (that has come 
to be known as the miracle argument)43 for applying the principle in defense o f 
scientific realism, “according to which there are good reasons to believe that well- 
supported theories are likely to be approximately true” rather than just “empirically 
adequate:”
“Suppose that all the many and varied predictions derived from a particular 
scientific theory are found to be correct: what is the best explanation o f the 
predictive success? .. .the best explanation is that the theory itself is true. I f  the 
theory were true, then the truth o f its deductive consequences w oud follow as 
a matter o f course; but if  the hypothesis were false, it w oud be a “miracle” that 
all its observed consequences were found to be correct. So, by a philosophical
41 ‘On Miracles’ in 1 n  Enquirp, p. 173 (emphasis added).
42J. A. Cover, ‘Miracles and (Christian) Theism’ in Eleonore Stump and Michael _J. Murray (eds.), Vhilosophp of 
Religion: The BigQuestions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), p. 340.
43 The original publication o f the argument occurs in the article, ‘What is Realism?’ in Jarrett Leplin (ed.), 
Scientific Realism (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1984).
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(procedure) o f Inference to the Best Explanation, we are entitled to infer that 
the theory is true, since the “truth explanation” is the best explanation o f the 
theory’s predictive success.” 44 
Although the model proves itself to be “an illuminating description o f some o f the 
general inferential principles that guide scientific practice,” 45 it has not yet been 
established that, by analogy, it coud  be used to overcome the deep epistemological 
predicament that is the focus o f this study Straightaway we come up against the 
objection that this is an illegitimate use o f the model in the context o f supporting the 
truth claims o f Christian faith. To this objection we now turn.
The Christian faith — is its purpose to give explanations?
Stenmark discusses the proposition, neatly outlined by Peacocke, that
“many Christian beliefs are potential explanations: they tell why certain data 
that need to be explained are the way they are; they account for certain facts 
about human existence. When I believe them, I believe they do a better job o f 
explaining the data than the other explanatory hypotheses o f which I am 
aware.”46
This is set in the context o f a claim that Christian faith shares the same understanding 
o f rationality as that used in science, namely that
“the proper way to use or exercise human cognitive resources is to treat our 
beliefs as hypotheses which explain certain data and which should weigh 
against competing explanatory hypotheses and which we shoud seek to inter- 
subjectively assess according to the criteria o f comprehensiveness, fruitfulness, 
general cogency, and so on.” 47 
In other words the assessment is carried out by employing the process o f IBE. 
However, as an account o f how Christian belief is acquired and exercised this model 
has been criticised as demanding acceptance o f belief in God as a hypothesis which 
works in the same way as those employed in the scientific field. This implies that it is 
only rational to believe in God if “this belief fu ffs  the same or at least similar 
standards o f rationality as scientific hypotheses do.” 48
Stenmark argues that there are good reasons to doubt that belief in God is a 
hypothesis. Firstly, for religious practitioners belief in God is primarily grounded in 
direct experience o f something (someone) beyond the mundane, physical world. 
Therefore, secondly, belief in God cannot be made to depend on the acceptability o f 
evidence that passes scientific scrutiny Thus, even if we cannot find support for this 
kind o f evidence, the credibility o f faith in God w oud not be undermined, for belief 
in God is not held on the basis o f other beliefs that function as evidence. Thirdly, if 
belief in God depended on scientifically approved evidential support, faith would 
never be properly open to doubt. But faith is not truly itself, unless there are also 
elements o f doubt that cannot be removed by appeal to a scientifically-based
441  Companion to the 'Philosophy of Science, p. 191.
451  Companion to the 'Philosophy of Science, p. 192.
46 Peacocke, Paths from Science towards God (Oxford: Oneworld, 2001), p. 29.
47 How to Relate Science and Religion (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 2004), p. 118.
48 How to 'Relate Science and 'Religion, p. 74.
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rationality. Faith ceases to be such, if it is compelled through the use o f demonstrable 
evidence. Such evidence does not exist in the case o f belief in God, as the arguments 
against the existence o f God from the problem o f evil and the apparent purpose­
lessness o f the evolutionary process demonstrate.
This line o f argument, in my judgement, misses the point about the use o f IBE as a 
methodological tool for confirming both the likelihood and the explanatory beauty o f 
the existence o f an infinite personal God as the reason and cause for all that exists. It 
confuses the way in which a person may come to believe in this God with rational 
refection on the probability that this belief is true. There may be many ways in which 
a person comes to a personal faith in the transcendent God o f Christian theism, such 
as a direct encounter with the person o f Jesus Christ as portrayed in the New 
Testament or through the testimony o f a Christian whose transformed life is taken to 
show the presence o f a transcendent power at work However there should be no 
objection to, indeed there shoud be a positive endorsement of, the attempt to show 
that such a belief alone does justice to the full range o f human experience, both o f 
the material world and o f self-awareness. So, faith may be elicited by means other 
than a convincing rational argument, although part o f the process o f initial believing 
will engage cognitive faculties; faith will be deepened, nevertheless, by considering 
how it may also account for the methods o f scientific rationality. In this way it is a 
source for showing how it provides the best explanation for the two instances o f 
justified true belief about which this thesis is written.
In conclusion to this part o f the discussion, we can propose that belief in God and 
belief in the existence o f events in the natural world are similar in their rational 
structure. Stenmark argues, mistakenly in my opinion, that typically belief in God is a 
direct knowledge claim, whilst belief in other unobservable entities (electrons, natural 
selection, gravity, thought processes) are indirect knowledge claims, in that they are 
known to be true by inference from other beliefs. It may be true that people can have 
a direct experience o f God, apart from the mediation o f rationally examinable 
evidence, but that experience w oud remain vulnerable to mood swings and 
alternative experiences, unless grounded on more substantial evidence that is not 
affected by an individual’s emotional situation at any given moment.
Thus, the argument from IBE is not intended to act as a first demonstration o f the 
existence o f God, but as a complimentary way o f showing that, given the existence o f 
God, all our experience fits into a comprehensive, coherent pattern o f understanding 
Alternatively, without this hypothesis, life is fragmented, uncoordinated, experienced 
as a series o f unrelated episodes. In other words, the theory is able to fu f f  what it 
promises: to be the best explanation o f existence in the universe.
Summary
The argument o f this thesis has a number o f complementary features. Firstly, it 
alleges that in current Western thought there is a hitherto unresolved epistemological 
predicament that has the effect o f making impossible a unified field o f knowledge 
that encompasses the whole o f human experience. Secondly, it seeks to show that the 
predicament has arisen, due to particular historical circumstances, because a wedge 
has been driven between knowledge based on the empirical procedures o f the natural
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sciences and knowledge based on disclosures that come from an extra-material 
source. Thirdly, it claims that, as long as these two sources o f knowledge are not 
brought together into a coherent ontology o f existence in the universe, the 
predicament will remain unresolvable. Fourthly, it argues that, for reasons o f its 
humanisation project, the Christian faith has a missiological responsibility to see if 
there may be a way o f resolving the dilemma. Fifthly, it suggests that engaging with 
the epistemological predicament o f the West is a legitimate sphere for an inter­
cultural dialogue. Finally, it explores the possibility that the heuristic mechanism 
known as IBE  could be a creative means o f ensuring that the dialogue is fruitful. In 
order to show the discursive potential o f IBE, the thesis concludes with two major 
examples o f how it can serve as a dialogical tool within a missiological context.
The purpose, then, o f the discussion o f IBE  in this Introduction is to suggest a 
method o f dialogue that is specifically attuned to the main subject o f the thesis, 
namely the analysis o f an epistemological predicament in Western thought from a 
Christian theistic perspective. The discussion at the end o f the thesis is designed to 
show how the method works as a method o f dialogue, giving examples in the fields 
o f scientific assumptions and processes and ethical decision-making 
I am making out a case for saying that IBE is both a method o f dialogue and a 
research method. The first option is not under dispute, for it has already (perhaps not 
by this name) been proven fruitful in those areas o f dialogue normally associated with 
missiology, namely inter-cultural and inter-faith encounter. How then could it be 
justified as a research method? I w oud argue that it is already set up and used as both 
a method o f discovery and a method o f confirmation in the experimental sciences 
and, therefore, by inference can be applied (with caution) to issues in areas o f 
philosophy (such as epistemology in general and moral reasoning) with a view to 
testing hypotheses and tentative claims about the nature o f reality.
IBE  is not intended to be the main topic o f the thesis, although I w oud claim that 
the way I have presented it and the reasons for citing it as a dialogical method in the 
context o f Western epistemological thought may be considered original I also believe 
that the link between mission, dialogue and the exercise o f IBE  may also be 
innovative.
What I intend to present in this thesis is a coherent account o f a way o f engaging with 
a particular problem in the current intellectual tradition o f the West (namely, its 
epistemological predicament), which has Christian missiological implications. The 
purpose o f the articles, then, is to explore the nature o f the predicament and to show 
why it is a problem in epistemology and how this affects human life existentially (in 
terms o f identity — giving an account o f self-perception) and ethically (in terms o f 
having an adequate basis for moral judgements). At the same time, I believe that IBE 
is implicit within this discussion in the sense that I am referring constantly to 
alternatives to the uniform modernistic and post-modernistic attempts to make sense 
o f knowledge about the whole o f reality.
The reason for including two articles on issues to do with multi-religious discourse is 
by way o f showing how, in my opinion, the area most associated with dialogue in 
missiological study relates to dialogue in the sense in which I am exploring it as a 
missiological question. In the first article, I am arguing that the basic secular
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substratum o f Western European society constrains the type o f inter-religious 
dialogue that is meaningful in this context. I am also arguing that, implicitly, Christian 
faith will react differently from most other religions to the challenge o f the secular, 
just because, in part, secular consciousness derives from the Christian world-view. 
Finally, I suggest that religion (or spirituality) will not necessarily lessen in a secular 
environment, but will certainly take a different path. These factors impinge heavily on 
the nature o f dialogue. They demonstrate too, in my opinion, the failure o f secular 
humanist thought, due to the dichotomy that it has tacitly accepted between the 
sacred and the secular, to be able to explain the enduring reality o f religious 
aspirations. In terms, therefore, o f IBE it does not have a convincing explanation o f 
the phenomenon.
In the second article, I am arguing that the pluralist thesis concerning the inter­
relationship o f differing religious systems o f belief is culturally determined. I put 
forward the thesis that, although it may not be the originator o f pluralism, post­
modern perspectivism is highly congenial, as an epistemological position, to a 
pluralist outlook. Thus the same epistemological assumptions underlie both post­
modernity and the defense o f religious pluralism. By the same token, they both fall to 
the same critique.
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A N  E N IG M A  A N D  A N  ID E A 49
The importance of the case
The discussion, which follows, will begin to explore a theory, which might help 
explain a vexing social and cultural enigma which has dogged the history o f the West 
for over 300 years. Like other investigations it will seek to understand and interpret 
complex evidence, with a view to suggesting a possible solution. Modernity, as an 
amalgam o f intellectual convictions and social change (namely, the confidence in 
reason alone to discover the truth about the whole o f life and the power o f 
technology to alter social patterns and disturb cultural assumptions),50 has been the 
main engine that has driven forward historical mutations on a breath-taking scale 
since the end o f the 17th century.51 Post-modernity has arisen as a theory translated 
into practice that the modern period has run its course. However, due to the nature 
o f its analysis o f the modern project’s apparent failure to live up to its own dreams — 
in particular the criticism o f any interpretative theory that claims a privileged 
explanation o f all the data — it avoids language about the beginning o f a new era.
Both modernity and post-modernity, as sets o f social phenomena understood within 
particular theoretical frameworks, shape the contemporary world in both hidden and 
overt ways. By understanding their respective impacts on society as a whole, it is 
possible to appreciate why certain beliefs and values became accepted, tentatively at 
first, as a plausible explanation o f changing experiences but later were embedded in 
the collective consciousness o f society as self-evidently true. To use the analogy o f 
crime detection, by comprehending the motives o f the principal actors in a felony, the 
detective is able to unravel the pot. Investigations are intended not only to solve the 
main elements o f a mystery but (as for example in the case o f a serial rapist) help 
make the environment a safer place to live in. In a way, this research is about 
attempting to firifil both these aims.
The case to be investigate d
Within the sweep o f several centuries o f history, modernity as a distinct, self­
conscious, rational process has seemingly turned out to be a digression from a 
promising, but rather quicky obstructed, intellectual tradition - namely the 
exploration o f the implications o f the symmetry o f two complementary sources o f 
truth, the word and world o f  God. Post-modernity, on the other hand, is proving 
apparently to be not so much an advance on the modern project as a regression to ideas 
which ostensibly exalt irrational thinking52 In the midst o f a volatile and erratic 
cultural situation, due to the harmful consequences o f both the digression and
49 The Future of Reason, Science and Faith: Following Modernity and Post-modernity (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing,
2007), pp. 9-26.
50 The strength o f particular beliefs (Weber) and the potency o f  productive forces (Marx) as instigators o f 
change are both accepted in this account as necessary explanations o f the phenomena.
51 The period when modern science became established in the work o f Isaac Newton and modern political 
discourse was initiated in the writings o f Thomas Hobbes andjohn Locke.
52 See, Susan Haack, Manifesto of a Passionate Moderrte: Unfashionable Essays (Chicago: University o f Chicago 
Press, 1998), passim; Donald Wood, PostTntellectualism and the Decline of Democray: The Faildre of Reason and 
Responsibility in the Twentieth Centur Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1996), pp. 1-44.
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regression, an unprecedented challenge faces current thinking to retake the threads o f 
a promising beginning and develop them into a contemporary agenda for the renewal 
o f thought and life. This study will seek to test the thesis that mainstream Christian 
belief, shorn o f the temptation to convert itself into an institutional power-base, is the 
best contender to take on this task It will endeavour to accomplish this formidable 
quest by assessing the relevant evidence for its claim to possess superior explanatory 
and re-creative powers in comparison with major alternatives.
The tools of investigation
In attempting to solve any crime, detectives will come across a number o f clues which 
may begin to identify the perpetrator. N ot all the clues give clear evidence. I f  the 
criminal is clever enough, he or she may well lay false trails. Often, the crime remains 
unresolved until a pivotal clue is uncovered. Similarly with an investigation o f the 
causes o f a serious assault on the promised dawning o f a new era some three 
centuries ago there are many clues to hand. They are provided by the analytical 
powers o f different disciplines, all o f which are important. But the essential clue is 
still missing The inability o f opinion-formers today to stem the incoming tide o f 
pessimism and apprehension is not easily explained by using the instruments o f 
interpretation fashioned from within the modern project itself. Often, the assump­
tions on which they are based refect the problem. They are prone to reject, as in­
admissible, the very evidence needed to clear up the enigma o f contemporary 
Western society. The process is equivalent to overlooking, through myopia or 
prejudice, the key piece o f evidence that would resolve the case.
An enquiry, from a Christian perspective, into the significance o f the data is not a 
guarantee o f easy solutions; it does not propose a short-cut through difficult terrain 
nor offer a quick fix at the rub o f a lamp. It does, however, provide a standpoint 
which does not exclude ab initio any explanation which looks like proving fruitful. 
More particularly, it offers a framework in which to test the conjecture that the 
harmonious correlation between the word and world o f God is a necessary assump­
tion for making sense o f the deep intellectual, ethical and spiritual unease apparent 
today in cultures which refect modernity. To demonstrate that this is the decisive key 
will require serious, critical investigation.
The abandone d tradition
In brief, the tradition which momentarily promised to come to fruition some 350 
years ago suggested that the best hope for authentic human fourishing would come 
through harnessing the resources o f two sources o f truth: the word and the world o f 
God. Human beings would understand their true destiny and w oud be able to enjoy 
it to the full only as they "read" and lived on the basis o f the two "books": the Bible 
as the record o f God's action within and interpretation o f the whole o f reality and the 
natural world as a source o f human nourishment and pleasure. Neither "book" was 
self-contained as the source o f all knowledge and wisdom. Both books had to be 
opened and read with the other present for cross-referencing Each needed a
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commitment o f faith, or belief in a particular prior understanding o f reality, for the 
process o f reading to make sense53.
The subversions o f the tradition
Unfortunately, the tradition was swiftly sabotaged from within and distorted from 
without. Indeed, the existence o f the tradition may be more theoretical than real, 
more o f an ideal than anything that can be identified historically as having possessed a 
self-conscious existence.54
From within, the tradition was vandalised by a particularly devastating will-topower. At 
around the time o f the birth o f modern science, the gigantic confict between the 
forces o f the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation was still being played out. 
The "territorial tragedy"55 o f Christianity encountered its nadir in the Thirty Years' 
War, one o f the last major attempts to maintain the coercive force and authori­
tarianism o f the religious state over the non-violent compulsion o f truth and the 
authority o f conscience. In some instances, this absolutism was also mobilised against 
the incipient findings o f scientific discovery. The enemies o f the tradition failed to 
perceive the nature o f genuine Christian freedom,56 which, whilst stating that there is 
an inviolable form given to reality, nevertheless affirms the legitimacy o f free investi­
gation and freedom o f belief
From without, the tradition was deformed by the will-to-independence. The humanist 
impulse, begun in the Renaissance,57 was about to embark on its 'rationalist' turn 
provoked by the intellectual project o f Descartes.58 Autonomous self-reference (the 
human mind alone as the measure and guarantee o f assured knowledge) began its 
fateful march.
53 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 
1958) and others have argued that faith in the intelligibility o f  the world is a necessary basis for scientific 
investigation. In an anaogical way, belief in a reliable source o f knowing external to empirical data is a 
necessary basis to search for a fully human knowledge. In the case o f  science, the confirmation o f sense 
perception and the discovered regularity o f  mechanisms in the world help to authenticate the ‘faith’ in the 
reliability o f empirical investigation; in the case o f biblical revelation, the ability to give, over the long-term, 
comprehensive answers to life’s major dilemmas helps to authenticate faith in the word. However, as there 
are proper external criteria for testing truth-claims, the initial commitment o f faith should not imply the 
circular reasoning which leads to ‘ deism’: c .f , the discussion between Harold Netland and Lesslie Newbigin 
in P.Sampson, V.Samuel and C.Sugden (eds.), Faith and Modernity (Oxford: Regnum Books, 1994), pp. 85­
87,106-111.
54 However, c .f, W. Mark Richardson and Wesley J. Wildman, Religion and Sciencc (London: Routledge, 1996), 
pp. 8-12; Stanley Jacki, The Origin of Sciencc and the Sciencc of its Origin (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 
1978), pp. 1-21, and the discussion o f the origins o f  modern science in chapter 2.
55 Namely the identification o f one political region with one form o f  Christianity to the exclusion o f others. 
C .f, Thomas Munck, Seventeenth Century Europe: State, Conflicc and Social Order in Europe 1598-1700 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 277ff.
56 See, J. Andrew Kirk, The Meaning of Freedom: 1  Study of Secclar, Muslim and Chri,stian Views, (Carlisle: 
Peternoster Press, 1998), chapter 3.
57 See, David Cooper, World Philosophies: A n Historicd Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell 1996), pp. 228-231.
58 See, chapter 3 o f  The 'Future of Reason.
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The consequences of subversion - mo dernity
It was by no means inevitable that the "reading o f the world" (the scientific 
enterprise) should have been conducted independently o f  even less in opposition to, 
the "reading o f the w ord" There are some signs that the destruction caused by the 
divorce o f the two is now being recognised as the result o f an unnecessary polemic. 
For example, the assumptions, methods and conclusions o f science raise theological 
and ethical questions that only sources o f knowledge beyond those that science itself 
supplies can answer satisfactorily, and theology and science share some o f the same 
basic principles o f rational enquiry.59 It seems almost trite to claim today that "if God 
is the source o f all truth, there sho^d be a consonance between the right conclusions 
o f human scholarship and theological conclusions based on revelation."60 And yet the 
‘conditional’ o f this sentence is precisely what has been, and continues to be, the 
most basic matter o f dispute in Western thought since the 17th century.
However, we can only deal with history as it unfolded. The modern project, it is 
generally recognised, can be traced to the attempt to ground the attainment o f 
indubitable knowledge on irrefutable grounds.61 To avoid the acids o f scepticism and 
the destabilising effect brought about by radical uncertainty, infuential thinkers 
believed that the process o f reasoning needs to be self-validating without having to 
appeal to authority or depend on faith. It has to be able to generate from itself a set 
o f necessary, self-evident principles which no-one could doubt without being self- 
refuting:
"In Descartes’ system, reason first clears away all preconceptions and then elaborates 
its own first principles, accepting only clear and distinct conceptions which can 
survive the most rigorous examination ... For the system to work, the universe must 
be modelled on a deductive system, so that what happens in it must be deducible 
from the laws o f its operation and its initial state"62
This desire to buüd, from utterly secure foundations, an incontrovertible body o f 
knowledge about the world which humans inhabit had an emancipatory intent. It was 
believed that humans had it within their grasp to liberate themselves from all 
disputable, uncertain and arbitrary beliefs that intrinsically could not validate them­
selves, in order to build knowledge afresh from non-controversial, universally 
acceptable, initial postulates. Humanity w oud come to self-realisation in the struggle 
“to separate truth from falsehood, reason from unreason, fact from fiction” .63 
As well as deductive reasoning from incontrovertible axioms, the inductive 
proceedings o f the scientific method, based on meticulous observation and well- 
tested hypotheses, seemed to guarantee the fulfilment o f the aspiration for incontest­
able knowledge, o f a different order from mere opinion or belief It had the twin 
merits o f being rationally accessible to anyone who grasped its methods o f operating
59 These claims will be explored as part o f  the concluding discussion in Part IV.
60 Philip Clayton, God and Contemporary Science (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), p. 77.
61 See, David West, An Intraduction to Continental Philosophy, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996) pp. 10-13.
62 Keith Ward, ‘The Decline and Fdl o f  Reason’ in Ursula King (ed.), Faith and Procticc in a Postmodern Age 
(London: Cassell, 1998), pp. 22-23, 20.
63 Christopher Norris, Reclaiming Truth: Contribution to a Critique of Cultural Relativism (London: Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1996), p. 141.
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and universal in character, i.e., not contingent on factors (such as culture, situation, 
personality, and upbringing) which coud  relativise perspectives. Science, it is claimed, 
more than any other force within history, has the ability to make all equal, since it 
obeys a logic and set o f rules that no-one can control but only submit to.
This approach to knowledge - from a firm foundation building upwards - and the 
cumulative discoveries provoked by the scientific method suggested an evolutionary, 
progressive or dialectical dimension to human history.64 Progress seemed to be the 
inevitable accompaniment o f a rational analysis o f human problems in which the 
causes o f the defects o f human life coud  be objectively examined and put right in an 
ascending progression towards human perfection.65 It is not surprising that dreams o f 
the future dominated the imagination, the dream o f a society o f social equality and 
harmony, free from oppression, ignorance and bigotry. Such was the stuff o f the 
utopias proclaimed by the Marquise de Condorcet66, Saint-Simon,67 Fourier, Owen 
and others.68
By contrast, the past was a dark age to be overcome, a vale o f intellectual obscurity, 
primitive emotional drives and unproductive labour. Religion and faith belonged to 
this stage o f human society, superstitious and pre-critical Indeed, "religion, faith and 
rationality present themselves as three successive layers in a historical process, as 
human instruments that gradually unfold and become distinct"69 The egg turns into a 
caterpillar and the latter into a chrysalis from which the butterfy gradually emerges 
and fies away free, discarding the earlier stages o f its life. The development was 
irreversible; there was no turning back As a matter o f temporal sequence, rationality 
simply superseded faith.
The whole process has been well-documented. There have been many twists in the 
tail (tale) o f the story, which have been described and analysed at length. Now, 
however, modernity is sorely wounded, though, in the immortal words o f Mark 
Twain (applied to himself), notice o f its death is greatly exaggerated. In many ways it 
is bankrupt, but it is not obvious that it has yet been superseded. At the risk o f over­
simplification, the fundamental problem appears to be, not the use o f reason itself as 
an instrument o f awakening and edification, but the entrusting to reason a weight o f 
expectation it cannot bear. Reason became isolated from all the other aspects o f
64 The orderly progression o f science from conjecture to hypothesis to the testing o f evidence to confir­
mation or revision has been disputed by Thomas Kuhn in his elaboration o f ‘paradigm shifts’, c .f , The 
Structure of Scientific Revoldtions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 92-110. However, 
some commentators believe that Kuhn’s theory has confused too readily the distinction between the context 
o f discovery and the context o f  justification, c .f, Martin Curd and J.A.Cover, Philosophy of Science: The Centml 
Issues (New York: W.W.Norton, 1998), pp. 230-245; Christopher Norris, Against Relativism: Philosophh of Science, 
Deccnstruction and Critical Theor (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 82-96. Kuhn’s historical approach to scientific 
discovery will be explored later in this study (c.f, chapters 4 and 5).
65 See, J. D. Hunter, 'What is Modernity? Historical Roots and Contemporary Features' in 'Faith and Modernity, 
p. 21.
66 'Sketch for an Historical Picture o f  the Progress o f  the Human Mind', c f , Lawrence Cahoone (ed.), From 
Modernism to 'Postmodernism: A n Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 72-82.
67 K. Taylor (ed.), Saint-Simon: Selected Writings on Science, Industr and Social Omani3ation (London: Croom Hill, 
1975).
68 See, K. Taylor, The Politicd Ideas of the Utopian Socialists (London: Cass, 1982).
69 Bert Hoedemaker, Secalarisation and Mission (Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 1997), p. 18.
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human life. Paradoxically, the theory about its ability to perform universal functions 
coud  not be tested by the light o f reason done. Once the ‘book o f the word’ was 
shut tight and allowed to gather dust in the basement o f history, the ‘book o f the 
world’ became ever more mystifying Principles like justice, mercy and forgiveness do 
not present themselves as self-evident truths to the rational mind.70 The very 
existence o f the world and its order, and the ability o f rational minds to understand 
reality, are not self-explanatory, they need explicating by recourse to a theory which is 
held prior to empirical investigation.71
From being an instrument which coud  help define means within a context in which 
the ends were discerned by other principles, reason became the sole actor in the field. 
It became an autonomous power which carried other potentially oppressive powers 
within its bosom - capitalism, colonialism, technology and state bureaucracy - , but 
without sufficient power o f discernment to see the inherent dangers:
"The idea that the free market is self-stabilising is an archaic, curious relic o f 
Enlightenment rationalism."72 
By pretending to be the measure o f the knowable, reason became reductionist. 
Having presumed that the chief end o f human existence was accessible to reason and 
having discovered its limitations in practice, there developed an increasing divorce 
between the objective world created by technological rationality and the subjective 
world o f meaning and purpose.73 The person is simply reduced to choosing between 
objects in the outside world put there by the harnessing o f instrumental reason to the 
domination o f the book o f nature. But pure choice, when there is no ultimate reason 
for choosing, because the meaning o f existence is unknowable through reason alone, 
is degrading; it shrinks the complexity o f the fidl potential o f humanness.74
Mo d ernity — not so much progress as d iversion
Paradoxically, the modern project, in trying to secure an unshakeable h o d  on reality 
by eliminating what has been considered mere belief, has lost the most powerful 
reason for believing there is such a thing as reality, namely the divine warrant. 
Reliance upon the imminent powers o f reason alone has inevitably given rise to an 
intellectually irrefutable scepticism.75 The main problem resides with the strong 
foundationalist claim that there are self-validating criteria for distinguishing between 
genuine knowledge and mere opinion in all cases. The sceptic disputes the claim that 
we have a reliable basis for confidence in our ability to conceptualise the world as it 
is.76 Richard Rorty traces scepticism to the 'representational' conception o f belief and
70 See, Lamin Sanneh, Religion and the Variety of Culture (V^ley Forge: Trinity Press International, 1996), p. 60.
71 Diogenes Allen, Chri.stian Belief in a Postmodern WorU: The Full Weight of Belief (Louisville: Westminster/John 
Knox Press, 1989), pp. 3-4.
72John Gray, False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism (London: Granta, 1998), p. 198.
73 Alain Touraine, Critique of Modernity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 5.
74 See, G. M. Tamas, 'A Clarity Interfered With' in T. Burns (ed.), After H istor? Frmcis Fukuyama and His 
Critics (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 1994), pp. 86-87.
75 Scepticism is the conviction that "a l so-caied knowledge is groundless belief', c .f, Michael Williams, 
'Scepticism' in John Greco and Ernest Sosa, The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), p. 
41. The proper place o f belief in reasoning about reality will be explored more fully in Part IV o f  the book.
76 See, Crispin Wright, Realism, Meaning and Tmth (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p. 2.
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its close ally the correspondence theory o f truth; in other words, the very assumptions 
on which a firmly realist view o f the objective world is based.77
Even if a radical, philosophical scepticism is not justified, it has to be admitted 
(according to the nature o f reasoning) that belief is an indispensable component o f 
rational endeavour. The theory links belief and rational critical method together in an 
unbreakable chain: knowledge is impossible without prior belief; belief can only 
assume the status o f knowledge if there is sufficient propositional evidence for it. In 
other words, knowledge is not possible without the acceptance o f some fundamental 
assumption(s); belief is not warranted unless supported by good evidence.78 Conse­
quently, it is a major conceptual mistake to suggest a necessary dichotomy between 
belief and reason. Donald Wood commits this fallacy in a stark, yet all too common, 
form:
“By definition, faith is belief which cannot be verified by reason. Faith is the 
blind acceptance o f an idea or doctrine without any rational evidence or 
tangible proof Faith is non-intellectual.” 79 
Modernity appears to be a classical case o f disposing the baby with the bath water! 
Reliance on reason alone (rationalism) has led inexorably and paradoxically to an 
unnecessary lack o f confidence in the place o f reason in understanding the world 
(rationality), and consequently to various experiments with irrational postulates as 
ways o f negotiating the world. According to the theory we wish to test, the rejection 
o f confidence in the truth o f the word leads, pari passu, to a loss o f confidence in the 
truth o f the world. Driving a wedge between the two has created a number o f false 
dichotomies, which have led to an immensely significant, 300 year, digression o f 
Western consciousness. Holding together the two sources o f knowledge allows for an 
effective way o f being able to distinguish between proper belief and irrational super­
stition, between justified true belief and a knowledge that is supposedly immune from 
error (infallible), refutation (incorrigible) and doubt (indubitable). Being constrained 
by the truth o f the word and the world eliminates an unstable human autonomy that 
tends towards incoherence, but without, however, having to compromise a genuine 
freedom.
The tendency to split apart what should remain together has led to an unfortunate 
and unnecessary demand that a belief in foundational assumptions must be able to 
answer the 'infinite regress' dilemma.80 In other words, it is claimed that those who 
wish to argue for a foundationalist approach to knowledge are obliged to defend the
77 See, J. Dancy and E. Sosa, A  Companion to Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. 89. It will be necessary 
to meet the sceptical ch^lenge later. Suffice it to say here that the position appears to be self-referentiaiy 
inconsistent, in that it cannot justify its own demands, and ultimately irrelevant, in that in making ordinary 
judgements we have to suspend scepticism; see, Stephen Nathason, The Ideal of Rationality: A  Defense within 
Reason (Chicago: Open court Press, 1994), pp. 209-211. The common-sense view is put colloquiaiy by 
Dostoyevsky: "A hundred rabbits don't make a horse and a hundred suspicions don't make one single proof 
.. that's just common sense" Crime and Punishment (London: Penguin Books, 1951), p. 463.
78 See, A  Companion to Epistemology, op. cit., p. 437.
79 Post-Intellectualism, op. cit., p. 250.
80 The dilemma that there seems to be no end to the chain o f  necessary justifications: "each step in the chain 
(of the search for ultimacy) demands a further explanation, and if it is not forthcoming, everything that 
depends on that step is 'ungrounded'," Roger Scruton, Modern Philosophy. A n Intrrduction and Survey (London: 
Mandarin, 1994), p. 4.
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strong version. The critics seem to assume that, if the acquisition o f significant 
knowledge cannot pass the three-fold test o f freedom from error, refutation and 
doubt, then foundationalism must be abandoned altogether. This demand for the 
strong version or no version at all is fortunately not self-explicating; fortunate, 
because all alternatives to some kind o f foundationalism as a theory in epistemology 
(holism, coherentism, pragmatism or behaviourism) end up with more problems than 
they solve.81
Without denying the importance o f the role that coherence plays in the justification 
o f true beliefs, the possibility o f gaining access to knowledge demands a moderate 
foundationalism if it is to escape from an unresolvable relativism. To have knowledge 
one must assume a source o f direct knowledge or directly justified belief and that any 
other knowledge or justified belief is traceable to this source. The difference between 
the strong and moderate forms o f foundationalism lies in the requirements: the 
former has to be incorrigible, the latter is defeasible (i.e. open to correction).82 
There seems no reason to dispute a pri,ori the possibility that the Christian view o f 
divine revelation - God's personal and rational communication o f truth to human 
beings (the word o f God) - can act as a foundation in this moderate sense. Likewise, 
the empirical discovery o f the natural world forms a foundation on which trust in the 
reliability o f certain mechanisms can be built.83
The question for Christian faith that arises from this discussion, and to which we will 
return in the last section o f this chapter, and more fully in Part IV, concerns the 
relationship between the task o f making sense o f and living in the world as we 
experience it and the foundational assumption that only in the revelation o f the 
personal God is knowledge, and its conditions, properly established, vindicated and 
completed. This is a matter which encompasses the 'plausibility o f beliefs' in a given 
culture, questions about right and wrong living (e.g peace, justice and the integrity o f 
the environment84) and the truth, or otherwise, o f 'other gospels' (both religious and 
secular). Before we turn to this debate, we need to explore the other current 
alternative to modernity, namely post-modernity.
81 Thus, for example, the coherentist version o f  epistemic justification, namely that "knowledge o  is true 
belief that coheres with the background belief system and corrected versions o f that system" (A Companion to 
Epistemology, op cit., p. 69) is implausible as a wholly adequate account. Laurence Bonjour finds three reasons 
why it is inadequate: it entails that epistemic justification requires an input from or contact with the world 
outside the system o f beliefs; many alternative systems o f belief can be invented, each o f  them entirely 
coherent, there is no clear connection between the coherence o f  a system o f  beliefs and the cognitive goal o f  
truth, 'Foundationalism and Coherentism' in The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, op. cit., p. 122.
82 This position is argued for persuasively by Robert Audi, Epistemology: A  Contemporciry Intrrduction to the Theor 
of Knowledge (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 204-207. Precisely because knowledge is justified true belief 
about a proposition or state o f  affairs, it is open to being chaienged as unwarranted and mistaken.
83 Bonjour argues that "the basis for the needed inference between sensory appearance and objective fact is 
to be found in ... first their involuntary, spontaneous character and second, the fact that they fit together and 
reinforce each other", op.cit., p. 138. (This epistemological observation combines foundationalism and 
coherentism).
84 See, J. Andrew Kirk, What is Mission? TheologicdExplorrtions (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1999), 
chapters 6, 8 and 9.
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Post-mo d ernity — not so much advance as regression
The cultural phenomenon generically referred to as postmodernity manifests itself in 
a variety o f ways, through architecture, art, philosophy, cultural theory, lifestyles, the 
media and politics.85 The name suggests that it is a way o f viewing the world which 
comes after modernity, with the inference that it is, at least, reinterpreting, if not 
seeking to replace the traditions which have flowed from the Enlightenment. Its 
significance is hotly disputed. Some see it as having signalled quite clearly and force­
fully the demise o f the modern project, others see it as in essential continuity with 
modernity (a kind o f late, or self-reflexive modernity86), yet others view it sceptically 
as a clichéd reaction to a decaying movement that still clings on to the last vestiges o f 
a faded intellectual legitimacy Whatever the interpretation, and we wül discuss the 
post-modern condition at much greater length later, it manifests many beliefs that 
appear to be largely untouched by the cultural and intellectual impact o f the Christian 
message on Western history.87
Post-modernity can best be described as a complex cultural and social movement 
which is premised on a thoroughgoing critique o f the normal assumptions associated 
with the Enlightenment:
"Typical o f postmodernism is its scepticism concerning the central role 
assigned to reason and rational thought. Over against indubitable truth-claims, 
an overconfident faith in science, and a metaphysical way o f reasoning, the 
interrelatedness o f truth-perspectives, ethical pluralism, and cultural relativism 
is typical o f the postmodern perspective."88 
It is commonly associated with the phrase, 'the end o f metanarratives'.89 By this is 
meant the impossibility o f finding one over-arching interpretation which does justice 
to the whole o f reality. Rather, the history o f humankind is judged to be a dis­
continuous succession o f fairly random events without any transcendent meaning or 
purpose. For post-modernity there is no alpha and omega to the human story; indeed, 
there is no one story, only fragments o f many stories (or, perhaps, fables).
In one sense, this affirmation is less a description o f what is perceived by the post­
modern apologists to be the case as a judgement o f what ought to be the case. It is 
not so much an empirical observation as an ethical demand. Modernity is interpreted 
as an ideology in the sense that the assumptions on which it is based simply mask the 
play o f power. Its view o f rationality, progress and the 'end' o f history is little more 
than a legitimisation o f a set o f relationships in which certain sectors o f society and 
certain nations o f the world maintain their dominance and privileges:
85 See, Stuart Sim, (ed.), The Icon Dictionary of Postmodern Thought (Cambridge: Icon Books, 1998); Hans Bertens, 
The Idea of the Postmodern: A  History (London: Routledge, 1995).
86 See, Anthony Giddens, Modemity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the 7ate Modem Age (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1991).
87 Unlike modernity, postmodernity in general explicitly ignores the cultural and intellectual impact o f 
Christianity on the West. I f  it is touched by this tradition at a i, it is only indirectly by being part o f a 
historical process affected subconsciously by the Christian worldview and moral teaching
88 J.Wentzel van Huyssteen, Essays in Postfoundational Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), p. 187.
89 Richard Kearney, Modern Movements in Eurnpean Philosoph (Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 1994), pp. 
123-127; also caied "master" narratives because o f their supposed tendency to dominate and oppress, and to 
represent an exclusively masculine view o f reality.
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"Knowledge is always the relative and questionable expression o f a particular 
constellation o f relations o f power and force. The symbiotic relationship
between knowledge and power is __at the heart o f Foucault's account o f the
parallel emergence in modern societies o f the human sciences as 'disciplines’ 
with scientific pretensions and what he calls 'disciplinary power'".90 
The great attraction o f post-modernity probably lies in its uncompromising exposure 
o f the pretensions o f the modern discourse, and in particular the claims sometimes 
made on behalf o f science that it has the power to deliver an increasingly problem­
free world. The post-modern sensibility appears to be a new force which defends the 
legitimate aspirations o f 'the other', namely those who are 'different' from me, giving 
them back the right to shape their beliefs and lives in accordance with their own 
subjectivity and not another's interpretation o f what is right or wrong for them. It 
allows for a heterodoxy which challenges the orthodoxy o f a late capitalist, globalised 
system, which manifestly coerces and oppresses vast segments o f humanity. It cais in 
question what is taken for granted. It is iconoclastic, irreverent, counter-cultural It 
appears to be radically tolerant o f difference, incoherence and permissiveness, critical 
o f seriousness and passionately committed to play It is highly compatible with a 
post-revolutionary, post-ideological, pluralist age. It catches and challenges admirably 
the Zeitgeist o f  modernity with its passionless rationalism and unremitting tedium.
Yet, for all its potentially beneficial analysis o f contemporary social and cultural 
forms, overall it represents a regression to an unattractive past. To begin with, in so 
far as it is largely a reaction against something else, it is not likely to be particularly 
visionary It knows what it does not like, but is confused about alternatives. In this 
sense it follows other reactions to the Enlightenment project - Romanticism and 
Existentialism being, perhaps, the most significant. The Romantics "placed the 
determinate effects o f unconscious passion at the centre o f human subjectivity."91 
They vigorously disputed the Enlightenment notion o f progress and returned to a 
reevaluation o f the primitive (Herder) or original innocence (Rousseau): the so-called 
'savage' who loves his family and his tribe is a "truer being than that shadow o f a 
man, the refined citizen o f the world."92 They criticised the exalted view o f rationality 
as the supreme quality o f human life, emphasised feelings as at least an equal source 
o f knowledge to reason and, in anticipation o f the contemporary 'linguistic turn', 
emphasised the subjective powers o f language.93
Existentialism can be identified as a kind o f Constructivism, the view that "humanity 
has now reached a point o f self-conscious development at which it must construct its 
own values, and not expect them to be delivered by some higher authority".94 The 
higher authority now being rejected was no longer that o f religion but o f reason. 
Neither God nor universal reason predetermine what we shall be - existence precedes
90 A n Introduction to Continental PhUosoph, op. cit., p. 171.
91 Anthony Elliott, 'Psychoanalysis and Social Theory' in Bryan S. Turner, The Blackwell Companion to Social 
Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. 172.
92 Quoted in WorU Philosophies, p. 281.
93 "Here, perhaps, are the earliest intimations, in the West at least, o f  that 'linguistic relativism' which was to 
become an important tendency in twentieth-century phHosophy", World Philosophies, p. 283; see, Maurice 
Cranston, The Romantic Movement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 21ff.
94 Bernard WHliams, 'Ethics' in A. C. Grayling, Philosophh, p. 555.
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essence -; therefore, human beings are free from any possible 'given' to create their 
own reality and values. This, says Sartre, places on the individual an enormous 
responsibility, for he or she has to choose which chief ends to pursue; not anyone nor 
anything — God, tradition, reason, nature - gives answers. The individual is 
'condemned' to make his or her own world and face fully the consequences o f his or 
her own creation. Every attempt to hide behind the decisions or responsibilities o f 
others, pretending that we are forced to play certain roles, is 'self-deception' and 'bad 
faith'.95
Post-modernity shares these historically preceding movements' emphasis on the 
priority o f the primordial,96 inter-subjective, attitudinal or prescriptivist account o f 
ethical knowledge, which claims that vaues are not given as universal, categorical 
imperatives but represent the desire or decision o f the individual will. They arise, as it 
were, from below, not from above (given by Reason, Revelation or Nature). Practical 
reason cannot bring us to a consensus which all intelligent, well-educated persons 
would be bound to accept if they were able to rise above partisanship and prejudice. 
Post-modernity denies all pretensions to the intrinsicaiy given because o f its 
"sceptical mistrust o f all truth-claims, normative standards or efforts to distinguish 
vertical knowledge from current and contingent 'good in the way o f beliea". It marks 
an epochal shift "from the regime o f truth to the absence o f all validity-conditions".97 
The result is a radically relativistic approach to knowledge and decision-making, 
clearly exemplified in the pragmatics o f Richard Rorty. In one particularly robust 
article, he outlines with brutal clarity the stark achievements o f post-modern 
(post)philosophy:
"Recent philosophy helps us to see practices and ideas ... as neither natural 
nor inevitable - but that is all it does. When philosophy has finished showing 
that everything is a social construct, it does not help us to decide which social 
constructs to retain or replace"98 
He continues by recognising the almost impossible dilemma that post-modernity has 
posed for the feminist movement. Feminism is based on the distinction made in all 
ideological critique since Marx between reality and false consciousness and on the 
notions o f distortion and dissimulation practiced by the ruling classes seeking to 
legitimise their interests. However, ideas like 'false' and 'distortion' presuppose a 
representational view o f an objective reality that is in clear conflict with the 
pragmatist and deconstructionist argument that everything is a matter o f social 
construct. I f  it is impossible to talk o f 'distorted communication' or 'distorting ideas' 
without believing in objects external to discourses, capable o f being accurately or 
inaccurately represented by these discourses, then "there is no point trying to
95 See, Calvin Pinchin, Issues in Philosophh (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1990), pp. 289-301; Modern Movements, pp. 
67-68.
96 Post-modern poetry is "marked by an acceptance o f the primordial, or spiritual and sexual necessity, o f 
myth, the latest understandings o f science, chance and change, wit and dream", D on ad  Allen and George 
Butterick, The Postmodems: The New Americcn Poetry Revisited (New York: Grove Press, 1982), p. 11, quoted in 
The Idea of the Postmodern, op. cit., p. 51.
97 'Reclaiming Tmth, pp. 182,183.
98 'Femininism, Ideology and Deconstruction: A Pragmatist View' in Slavej Zizek (ed.), Mapping Ideology 
(London: Verso, 1994), p. 227.
40
distinguish between 'natural' and merely 'cultural'; no point in appealing to 'way things 
really are'".99 The outcome o f Rorty's position is Nietzschean in tone and 
consequences:
"Neither pragmatists nor deconstructionists can do more for feminism than 
help rebut attempts to ground these practices (namely patriarchal) on some­
thing deeper than contingent historical fact - the physical strength o f men over 
against women. A ll that is left for women is to grab power when they acn".100 
Here we can see the inevitable outcome o f the dogma o f 'the end o f meta­
narratives’.101 It seems as if the solution to the seriously ill patient is to prescribe a 
deadly poison. Rather than diagnosing the true symptoms and applying an appro­
priate medicine, post-modernity's answer is euthanasia! I f  recent history can be 
likened to a sea voyage, post-modernity represents mutiny - the determination to 
wrest the steering mechanism from the self-appointed (‘enlightened’) owners o f the 
ship. Once having 'deconstructed' (the authority of) the captain and won over the 
crew, the mutineers go on a pleasure trip which may take them anywhere or nowhere
- there is no map, no compass and the natural fixed-points o f sun, stars, wind and 
currents are unreliable. No matter! The idea o f destination, or o f home-coming, is an 
absurd Elusion. Like the porpoises and whales (probably more intelligent than 
humans) the boat's passengers can give themselves up to endless play When the 
engine runs out o f fuel, we can sink the ship and take to the life-boats. Each group o f 
passengers can then decide for itself which destination it wishes to take, none are 
right and none are w rong102
Getting back on track
Speaking inevitably in general terms, modernity has been characterised by the attempt 
to build a universally valid explanation o f existence, an intellectually satisfying theory 
that encompasses everything, from the basis o f human reason alone. It proposes a 
verifiable view o f reality which is not historically contingent, culturally loaded or 
socially prejudiced, but acceptable to every right-minded thinker. It is a grand scheme 
to bring unity to human discourse and community out o f the conflict o f sectarian 
interpretations. It aspires to adhere to W.K. Clifford's famous aphorism: "it is wrong
99 Mapping Ideology, pp. 229-230.
100 MaiingIdeology, pp. 233-234 (italics mine).
101 Every bit as much a dogma as Fukuyama's 'end o f history' thesis, The End of Histom and the East Man 
(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992). Thus, for example, "Lyotards's conception o f justice conforms to the 
general experimental anti-representationalism o f  the postmodern condition, except, o f  course, in the 
absolutist ban on the elimination o f  rival players from a game. Although this meta-rule involves him in 
contradiction - it is clearly not subject to experimentation - it is also clearly necessary for the inability o f  his 
experimental/political model”, The Idea of the Postmodern, p. 129.
102 "In post-modern writing there is very little that aiows any direct application to existential situations except 
as ironic stances for negotiating a world so full o f signifiers it must be empty o f beliefs", Charles Altieri, 
'Postmodernism: a question o f definition', Par Rafflor, 2,2, 1979, p. 98. "Post-modernism means cutting 
ourselves adrift from solid and stable, boundary markers o f what is right and wrong, good and bad, correct 
and incorrect, true and false, real and illusory and sailing o ff into the unknown without benefit o f map or 
compass, H. Gene Blocker, 'An Explanation o f Post-Modernism' in Alburey Castell, D on ad  Borchert and 
Arthur Zucker (eds.), An Introduction to Modem Philosophy: Examining the Human Condition (New York: 
Macmillan College Publishing House, 1994), p. 678.
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always, everywhere and for everyone, to believe anything upon insufficient 
evidence",103 where evidence means experimental data that is intrinsicaiy open to 
being falsified.
Post-modernity, on the other hand, is characterised by its 'absolute' conviction that 
any attempt to build a uniform body o f knowledge is not only doomed to failure for 
good epistemic reasons but actually hides a sinister design to impose upon a i peoples 
only one right way o f looking upon the world. The outcome o f the modern project is 
exclusion o f difference, uniformity, monotony and vapidity. It reduces a richly 
textured, multi-form world into a grey, drab, monotonous tedium. Modernity means 
control; post-modernity advocates the breaking o f all bounds, experimentation, 
rebellion against the 'experts', diversity, acceptance o f divergence and incongruity, the 
celebration o f eccentricity.
However, as attempts to encompass a meaningful approach to life (and post­
modernity is no less a 'meta-narrative' than its rival) both are fataiy flawed: reliance 
upon a unifying, ultimately unambiguous rationality leads eventually to a scepticism it 
cannot answer on its own terms, whilst the dismissal o f rational criteria for judging 
the veracity o f beliefs is self-defeating and leads to indifference and relativism. There 
does not seem to be any way out o f this impasse, unless an epistemology can be 
discovered (or rediscovered) that can allow for and give an account o f both unity and 
diversity in the knowledge and explanation o f the whole o f life. It shoud be an 
epistemology that is able to critique ideologies, sustain an unpretentious science, 
recognise truth and admit error, reunite a fragmented world whilst allowing for 
creative diversity. It should be realist, firily rational, consistent, non-relativist and non- 
sceptical whilst being fallibilist I f  such an epistemology (perhaps wisdom w oud be a 
more adequate concept) is unavailable, contemporary Western society w oud appear 
to be condemned to perpetual confusion about the most basic propositions 
concerning human life.
Assuming that the conflict between modern and post-modern ways o f assessing life 
best describes the cultural condition o f the West in the 21st century, and that both 
have exhausted their resources in trying to explain and re-create contemporary society 
in a way conducive to real human thriving, the hypothesis o f this study is that the 
only fuiy sustainable epistemology is one that allows mutual respect for and the 
interplay o f knowledge through the world’ and through the word’. It means a 
thorough re-examination o f these two sources o f knowledge in such a way as to 
eliminate an unnecessary and false rivalry and to avoid the Scylla o f scepticism and 
the Charybdis o f relativism. The hypothesis has to be able to do justice to both the 
ordinary and specialist use o f language104 and has to be consistently workable in 
practice. Quite probably the most potentially fruitful place to explore the hypothesis 
is in the field o f ethics, moral philosophy or practical reason. The French 
philosopher, Levinas, has in recent times strongly advocated ethical discourse as the 
real loccs for epistemology.105 Seeking for knowledge either through a disembodied
103 Lectures and Essays (London: MacmHlan, 1879), p. 185.
104 Discussion o f a number o f crucial issues in pMosophical thought about language will be dealt with in 
chapter 6, ‘The Turn to Language.’
105 See, Zygmund Bauman, Postmodemily and its Disccntents (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), pp. 46-52.
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ontology or an objectifying epistemology, whilst ignoring the absolute claim o f the 
'other', will always lead to a stultifying reductionism o f epistemological possibilities.106 
Others have also either hinted at or developed the rewarding epistemological 
possibilities inherent in ethics. Thus John Bowker argues that to know is not 
dependent so much on the certainty that one thinks as on the observation that, 
without exception, human beings make ethical judgements, i.e. valuations o f what is 
right and wrong behaviour, or what one is responsible to do and avoid doing107 
Stephen Nathason explores the deep relationship between criteria o f rationality, the 
examined life and what are intrinsicaiy good ends.108 Linda Zagzebski believes that the 
normative side o f epistemology is crucial to a satisfactory answer to its fundamental 
questions:
"My purpose in writing this book is to draw more attention to the side o f 
epistemology that overlaps with ethics and, in particular, to show how one 
form o f ethical theory - a pure virtue theory - can be developed in ways that 
are rich enough to permit the kinds o f evaluations o f epistemic states that are 
crucial for epistemology."109 
It is well known that Alasdair MacIntyre develops epistemological themes out o f 
attention to 'the good' and, in a sense, tests his theory about traditions in the ethical, 
political debate about the common good.110
An ethical approach to epistemology seeks to discern what is justified true belief in 
relation to action. It brings theoretical discussions about both the possibility o f 
knowing and the adequacy o f beliefs into the arena o f every day living The issues 
raised cannot, then, be ignored as belonging only to the concerns o f professional 
academics. They touch the lived experience o f the ‘average person-in-the-street.’ 
Important for this account o f knowledge is the consistency between intellectuaiy 
defined belief and the moral decisions o f daily life. The fundamental question is not 
how do I justify my beliefs or know that I can rely on my perceptions or memory or 
the witness o f others, but how do I justify my actions. To know what is right to do is 
more important than either knowing how the world works or which beliefs seem the 
most valid to hod.
Empirical knowledge and faith assumptions are crucial to ethical judgement, but can 
be most clearly seen as a way o f substantiating the way we conduct ourselves. Thus, 
for example, if I wish to examine the reasons for and against a married couple being 
divorced, I need to know what the best empirical research says about the effects on 
children o f divorce, or o f an unresolved conflictual relationship, and I need to have a 
well-grounded view o f marriage and the family. I may look at alternative beliefs to the 
traditional ones about male-female bonding I may assess how much changing
106 See, An Introduction to ContinentalPhilosopy, p. 163.
107 Is God a Vims? Genes, Culture and Religion (London: SPCK, 1995), pp. 110-113.
108 See, The Idea of Rationality, op. cit., pp. 224-229.
109 Virtues of the Mind: A n Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethiccl "Foundations of Knowledge, (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1996), p. 336.
110 See, 'Moral Relativism, Truth and Justification' and 'Politics, Philosophy and the Common Good' in 
Kelvin Knight (ed.), The MacIntyre Reader (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), pp. 202ff, 235ff
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cultural styles affect decision-making But in the long run the important issue is: what 
shoud be done?
Philosophical systems, religious beliefs and ethical stances are o f no ultimate vaue 
unless they can be lived consistently. Living consistently raises then the question o f 
what is right and what is true, and these questions in turn raise the ultimate issues o f 
primary assumptions. It is through daily ethical dilemmas, I believe, that we come to 
realise that neither modernity nor post-modernity has the resources to provide 
satisfying answers. They are both ship-wrecked on the rocks o f the 'deontological 
fallacy' — namely, that one can know what ought to be the case from knowing what is 
the case —, for neither reason, empirical research, social consensus nor personal 
judgement by themselves can ground moral judgements. They may help in deciding 
what means should be used to achieve certain ends, but the choice o f moral ends 
depends on what moral values or virtues one believes in and these depend in turn on 
having reliable access to the answers to fundamental questions about the purpose, 
meaning and worth o f life.111
Given the fact that we are all live a moral life and all make moral judgements, another 
way o f getting a handle on the epistemological question is by analysing the cogency o f 
different ethical theories in establishing ethical decision-making The main alter­
natives in contention within the modern period have been ethical intuitionism, (Kantian) 
mtionalism, utilitarian empiricism and non-csgnitivism (expressivism)}12 Each o f these is an 
attempt to give both an account o f moral notions and reasons for acting in particular 
ways. However, given an explicit rejection o f the idea that goodness and truth are 
given realities within the human horizon, each o f these positions builds its theory 
from an assumption o f human autonomy and from within human experience 
rationaiy or empirically mediated. Methodologically, they succeed in giving reasons 
why it might be right or wrong to engage in some actions but they still beg the 
question about the content o f the good or the virtuous.
Thus, we have, in the need to find an adequate epistemological rationale for ethical 
decision-making, a (the?) major intellectual and practical challenge for Western 
society in general and the Christian community in particular. Although the latter 
shoud be conscious in theory and practice o f its minority position within a 
belligerent but brittle culture in the West, it has a responsibility to propose (but not 
impose) an epistemology in which truth claims are substantiated by their ability to 
ground a coherent ethics.
One o f the tasks o f such an epistemology w oud be to evaluate the traditions o f 
modernity and post-modernity in order to incorporate into contemporary ethical 
discourse that which is o f proven value whilst rejecting the unfounded claims. In this 
sense, the Christian community has, as one o f its undertakings, a continuing diaogical 
and prophetic assignment with respect to the formative theories that drive current
111 These are controversial statements, set out here by way o f a preview. They will be argued for later in this 
study.
112 See, Robert Audi, Epistemology, pp. 264-267; Robert Audi, 'Moral Knowledge and Ethical Pluralism' in the 
Blackwell Guide, pp. 271-278.
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perceptions o f the good in the West.113 Christians cannot afford to be plausibly 
accused o f trying to revert to a pre-modern world, by ignoring or undervaluing the 
massive changes o f thought, belief and lifestyle o f the last 300 years.
I f  the main reflective enterprise for the Church in the West is to retake the promise 
o f the fruitful alliance o f word and world, it has to be done within the changed 
circumstances that acknowledge that we live (chronologically at least) after modernity 
and post-modernity. Thus, for example, if the "reading" o f the word implies a 
coherent theory o f revelation,114 this will be re-examined in the light o f the hypothesis 
that it is not a concept unique to monotheistic faiths, but is present, in different 
forms, in both modernity (nature "speaks") and post-modernity (art and language 
"give meaning"). In other words, 'revelation' is an indispensable necessity for the 
avoidance o f ontological and ethical nihilism, it is a foundationalist assumption that 
permits the construction o f a coherent life, not least by substantiating arguments in 
favour o f freedom and tolerance115. Its inescapability is demonstrated in practice by 
the observation that, even when classical forms o f revelation are abandoned as un­
sustainable, new varieties are invented.
It is crucial for the Christian community to realise that it lives after modernity and 
post-modernity in another sense, namely that its 'cultural dialogue and evangelism' are 
undertaken in a world in which it no longer can expect privileges. The alliance o f 
throne and altar is irrevocably (and rightly) broken in the Western world, even though 
there are attempts by some people in all religions to sustain it, or even revive it. The 
Christian community finds itself in a world much closer to that o f the first century, 
with one imperium (global capitalism) 116 and a plethora o f beliefs. Like the early 
Christian community in the Mediterranean basin, in political and cultural terms it is 
inconsequential.
Nevertheless, also like the first generation, Christians today are called to surpass their 
generation in intellectual endeavour and integrity. They are to emulate the practise o f 
their forebears, described by one historian in the following terms:
“The Christian read the best books, assimilated them, and lived the freest 
intellectual life the world had. Jesus had set them to be true to fact.. .Who did 
the thinking in that ancient world? Again and again it was the Christian. He 
out-thought the world.” 117
113 A recent historical analysis and current discussion o f  these from a ‘classical’ humanist perspective is 
contained in A. C. Grayling, What is Good? The author lays down a considerable chaienge to what he cais 
transcendental (religious) views. It is precisely this chaienge that has to be taken up and answered, if the 
thesis o f  this study is to be vindicated.
114 As, for example, Nicholas Wolterstorffs comprehensive advocacy o f  the God who speaks, c f , Divine 
Disccurse: Philosophicd Reflections on the claim that God speaks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); 
also Roger Trigg, Rationality and Religion (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), pp. 209-214.
115 See, The Meaning of Freedom, pp. 190-221.
116 Chapter 18 o f the The Book of Revelation gives an account o f the trading arrangements going on between the 
‘centre’ (Rome) and the ‘periphery’ (its conquered colonies), which echo global economic relations in the 21st. 
century It is not surprising that the writer intones a lament over the city-state, because it is under judgement 
and will collapse.
117 T.R. Glover, The Jesus of History (Montana: Kessinger Publishing, 2005, first published in 1914), p. 217; 
also, The Conflicc of Religions in the Early Roman 'Empire (London: Methuen, 1910), chapter V.
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However, the task is not for self-aggrandisement, but for the sake o f helping to repair 
the damage being done to human life by the tacit acceptance o f cultural assumptions 
which have torn apart the unity and wholeness o f knowledge. This study is offered as 
a way o f showing why, culturally and ethically, the task is so vital, and how, epistemo- 
logically, it might be accomplished.
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C H R IS T IA N  M IS S IO N  A N D  T H E  E P IS T E M O L O G IC A L  C R ISIS  
O F  T H E  W E S T 118
Introduction
There is a sense in which the epistemologica crisis o f any culture is the ‘mother o f all 
its crises’. Epistemology explores the very foundation o f its modes o f perceiving, 
thinking, communicating and knowing When there is a break down o f the culture’s 
consensus regarding the nature o f reality, the possibility and criteria o f truth and the 
scope and function o f reason, almost every other aspect o f its existence - art forms, 
educational policies, attitudes to health and healing, the working o f its institutions, the 
position o f its traditional religious undergirding, its patterns o f family life and many 
more - will be profoundly affected. Christian mission in the West, if it is to be self- 
reflective, has to explore with deep and sensitive understanding the issues that are 
involved in this crisis and ponder long and hard on its own specific response.
Christian Mission
Missiology as an intellectual discipline is concerned to reflect critically on the content 
and practice o f the Church’s life and work as this is perceived theoretically and 
carried out in action. How does the Church envisage its calling? Why does it 
implement it in particular ways? What are the reasons for its apparent successes and 
failures? Can one aim to discover ‘best practice’ in a wide variety o f circumstances? It 
assumes that there is a given imperative which urges it on to undertake specific tasks 
and refrain from others and a particular social, political and cultural context in which 
to work out its mission.
In recent years there has been a vigorous debate across the whole spectrum o f 
Christian churches world-wide concerning the extent to which mission is an un­
changing task entrusted to Christian communities and the extent to which its 
implementation is freshly discovered (or rediscovered) in each new generation, 
acknowledging an always tentative, contingent and fallible grasp o f its nature. What­
ever the balance o f conviction and certainty any person or group may possess or lack, 
there can be no talk o f mission without the assumption that there is a definite calling 
to which the response shoud be obedience and f jf fm e n t
Some people are convinced that the Church needs to invent its mission imaginatively 
in response to the rapidly changing kaleidoscope o f events that characterizes contem­
porary Western culture. It is said that it must learn to shed the accumulated baggage 
inherited from the past, as simply the fallible attempts o f former generations o f 
Christians to make sense o f their calling in vastly different circumstances. In the 
hands o f such people, this stance may involve the virtual abandonment o f any 
distinctive Christian content in their attempt to witness to their faith. Among 
contemporary theologians such a position is perhaps most clearly discerned in the 
case o f Don Cuppitt, though in varying degrees among several others as well
118 J. Andrew Kirk and Kevin Vanhoozer (eds.), To Stake a Claim: Mission and the Western Crisis of Knowledge 
(Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1999), pp. 157-171.
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Although the classical formulations o f faith and traditional methods o f mission may 
cause acute embarrassment to such people, they do not (cannot) start to think 
Christian mission as it were ex nihilo. Both their ‘mission’ involvement and their 
reflection upon it will inevitably entail the acceptance o f certain presuppositions 
which they take as substantive starting-points. These, o f course, may be just as much 
baggage from the past as the traditions which they believe to be no longer tenable119. 
Discarding any element from the past or present, if  the process is to be self-reflective 
and not a matter merely o f intuition or whim, necessitates a mechanism o f justifi­
cation based on more adequate grounding
The question then becomes one o f criteria. Here, I believe, there is no possibility o f 
sheer invention, for, if it is true that all human beings are, to a degree, children o f 
their age, they will use ideas, language, thought-forms and practices already available 
to them within their horizon o f experience. There may be a certain amount o f 
creativity discernable in new combinations o f thought taken from different sources. 
However, it is extremely rare that anyone in the field o f Christian mission hits upon 
genuinely unthought-of and untried concepts and practices. Those whose musings are 
declared by the media to be radiccl, in the sense o f being shocking to conventional 
wisdom, are usually combining ideas taken from other traditions and applying them 
to their understanding o f Christian faith, not abandoning tradition altogether.
This argument is designed to show that in practice, when considering Christian 
mission everyone is obliged to work with traditions that they have chosen to believe 
are more or less compelling. The vitality o f their vision lies in the strength o f the 
grounds they h o d  for justifying it. For this reason it is much truer to actual procedure 
to talk about reinventing or rethinking Christian mission within changing contexts 
than to give the impression that one is capable o f reinventing the wheel de novv. It is 
true to experience that our reflection always happens on the basis o f given traditions 
which we find sufficiently convincing, either because o f their intellectual consistency, 
their ability to offer an explanation for the fundamental questions o f existence, 
including those o f other explanations, or their ability to achieve a fully satisfied life. 
This essay is built on the conviction that there is no other way inpracticc in which we 
can proceed rationally. To the objection that explanations o f life or the achievement 
o f personal meaning offer futile and unprofitable expectations, I would reply that 
such a counter-conviction can only mean anything on the basis o f counter­
presuppositions which in turn need justifying
To envisage missiology as a discipline that seeks adequate criteria to discern between 
good and bad mission theory and practice means taking one’s stance within a 
particular tradition that provides such criteria. Critical reflection means in the first 
place using the standards or norms o f the tradition itself to judge the adequacy o f the 
mission undertaken. O f course, it will also involve opening itself to criticism that 
comes from outside its own tradition, in order to re-evaluate not only its current 
practice, but the adequacy o f its justifying foundation.
119 In the case o f  Don Cuppitt, for example, see the discerning analysis o f  his own particular indebtedness to 
the past in S.N.Williams, Revelation and Recsnciliation: 1  window on modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), pp. 113-142.
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In the light o f the discussion so far, I would like to attempt a brief summary o f what I 
take to be the foundation o f Christian mission within the tradition inherited and 
accepted by the vast majority o f Churches and what I take to be certain aberrations 
which have been criticized from outside the tradition and found subsequently to be 
inconsistent with the norms o f the tradition itself. Christian self-identity is built on 
the foundation o f Jesus Christ, both as an historical person who lived in a particular 
way and communicated a particular message, and on the interpretation o f his 
significance given by the original disciples (called apostles)120. In other words, certain 
hypotheses concerning the nature and mission o f Jesus Christ form the basis for 
Christian mission prior to Christians engaging with society and culture. These 
hypotheses spring out o f a particular interpretation o f God’s intentions in dealing 
with the Hebrew people.
The Church has gone wrong, according to its own criteria o f judgement, whenever it 
has sought ‘secular’ power for itself as a means to achieve its missionary ends, 
whenever it has used coercion or unworthy incentives to force people into accepting 
its teaching, or whenever it has depended on a sociaiy-privileged position to spread 
the gospel In the first instance, it has sought to represent the goal and interests o f the 
whole o f society, rather than being salt or leaven within society; in the second 
instance, it has used weapons, forbidden to it in its founding message, to bring about 
conversion or conformity; in the third instance, it has used ends to justify unaccept­
able means.
When speaking about Christian mission in the light o f the epistemological crisis o f 
the West, it is vitally important to know how to distinguish between the ends o f 
mission and the means used to achieve them. In Christian thinking ends determine 
means and means either proclaim or distort the ends. What is justifiable to do is 
strictly controlled by the message itself. The import o f these affirmations will become 
clearer as we seek to engage missiologically with the West’s epistemological crisis. To 
this we now turn.
The Epistem ological Crisis o f the West
Many o f the arguments advanced so far are based on lines o f reasoning profoundly 
disputed by certain current epistemological conclusions. Thus, for example, the 
notion that one may still argue from the basis o f foundational beliefs which do not need 
any further justification seems to have been refuted two and a h a f  centuries ago by 
Hume’s arguments in 1  Treatise of 'Human Nature. The desire to achieve some kind o f
120 The issues surrounding the interaction o f faith and history in the shaping o f the New Testament are 
immense; they have been explored from dm ost every conceivable angle by critical scholarship over a period 
o f two hundred years. My own general view about this vast amount o f  work is that reliable historical method 
requires a rigorous distinction being made between a critical sifting o f evidence and speculation. Scepticism 
with regard to the historical reliability o f  the New Testament has dm ost always arisen as a result o f  the over- 
indugence o f speculative theories. The most recent survey o f  the evidence has been accumulated by Tom 
Wright in the first two volumes o f  his projected five volume study with the overdl title, Christian Origins and 
the Question of God. these are, The New Testament and the People of God and Jesus and the "Victory of God (London: 
SPCK, 1994 and 1996). He shows that historical investigation, shorn both o f methodological naïveté and 
inappropriate rationalist assumptions, comes face to face with an uncompromisingly real person impossible 
to portray as a mere figment o f  faith.
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indubitable foundation for a l  true knowledge is question-begging and therefore 
inevitably leads to a radical scepticism that anything can be known, outside the 
inclinations o f the mind to believe something Building on this criticism, Wittgenstein 
says that the justification for our beliefs cannot go beyond the acknowledgement that 
“this is what we do” . In other words, there is no way o f adequately distinguishing 
between opinion (“this is what I happen to believe”) and justified true belief (“this is 
what all self-critically thinking persons ought to believe”).
The position advocated here, that Christian missiology begins with propositions that 
are, in principle, distinguishable from contingent cultural formulations o f them, is 
radically disputed on a number o f grounds that have almost become accepted as in 
themselves not depending on any further justified belief There is the argument from 
rehtivism. All claims to knowledge and truth are relative to the times and circum­
stances in which they are formulated. There are no neutral criteria which can be 
universally applied to judge between standards o f evaluation o f these claims. The 
Christian claim that the New Testament message about Jesus Christ is universally 
valid and applicable is to be explained by the contingent necessities o f historical 
context, cultural dominance or psychological need, for it fies in the face o f the 
multiple interpretations o f reality in existence for which, it is alleged, there is no 
adjudicating yard-stick.
Closely connected to the relativism inherent in the acceptance o f multi-cultural 
pluralism is the notion that tmth-claims invariably refect the will-to-power’. Most 
powerfidly stated in Foucault’s work on the genealogies o f certain institutions, this 
interpretation o f human history makes much o f the infuence o f official ideologies 
which are manufactured to justify a particular status quo and then backed by the most 
powerful institutional authorities o f the day121 Truth-claims then operate in society by 
excluding difference and, through enforcing consensus and uniformity, abolish the 
precious commodity o f individual freedom. They are little more than adjuncts to the 
messy business o f securing and maintaining the power o f some over others.
Another way o f approaching the question o f truth is to deny the possibility o f any 
access to objective reality. It is common today to find fault with the notion o f reality 
as a picture or mirror o f something that exists independently o f the observing person 
and thinking mind. It may be argued that reality only exists as it appears and therefore 
that the real-in-itself cannot be distinguished from a reproduction or simulation o f 
the real Our apprehension o f what we take to be real is always situated in language 
systems, which are simply instruments that have evolved for thought and communi­
cation to be possible. Language is a sign-system that, because it does not correspond 
to any univocal facts beyond the power o f language to evoke them as such, is open to 
the endless play o f invention. In other words, we create our own realities as we so 
desire.
There is a further logical step from this way o f seeing reality to a pragmatic notion o f 
truth. Truth is created in order to enable us to cope with our experience o f life. What is 
true is what is good for us to believe if we are to function optimally in a given
121 See, D.Hawkes, Ideology (New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 1-12.
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context. Clearly this may vary from situation to situation, and cannot therefore be 
prejudged.
From Mo d ernity to Postmo d ernity
The epistemological crisis o f the West is often summed up in the much-quoted, but 
not very precise, assertion that Western culture is in the process o f transition from 
the age o f modernity to the age o fpostmoderaity. Epistemologically, modernity is charac­
terized as that period o f history in which the human person is conceived as a self­
sufficient autonomous subject requiring no external support for his or her knowledge, 
either in God or in nature122. Critical, enlightened human reason was adequate to 
comprehend all that was necessary for the ordering o f human life on the foundation 
o f scientifically demonstrable universal laws. From now on it would be possible for 
human society to base its knowledge on evidence accessible to all and intrinsically 
open to verification or falsification. Such a situation w oud lead, sooner rather than 
later, to humanity abandoning its commitment to unfounded beliefs, whose 
conflicting nature coud  never be resolved as they were based on unprovable pre­
suppositions. History then became intrinsically open to the possibility o f a unified 
human race in which everyone w oud accept the self-evident truths o f reason and 
gladly agree to harness them to overcome ignorance, superstition and intolerance 
which so degraded the inherent dignity o f human nature.
Postmodernity is the name given to the period o f history in which the supreme value 
o f critical reason as a foundation for the emancipation and progressive development 
o f human life is no longer believed. It marks a dramatic act o f ‘unbelief’ or, as 
Lyotard stated it, “ incredulity towards meta-narratives” ; in this case the self­
legitimation o f science as the bearer o f internal and external emancipation.123 
The critical element o f doubt surrounds the ability to create an unshakable relation­
ship between the observing, classifying and understanding subject and the world o f 
objects immediately accessible to intelligent assessment. In other words, the funda­
mental distinction between the real world o f nature and the fictitious worlds o f 
imagination has been broken. The situation then becomes one o f ‘hyper-reality’ 
(Baudrillard), in which the distinction between objects and their representations 
becomes dissolved; one is left only with ‘simulacra.’ 1,4
What has led to the rejection o f the exaggerated claims o f modern rational thought is 
the suspicion, based on social and cultural analysis, that scientific method in all reams 
o f investigation was being used to enhance the control o f an elite minority o f 
professionals over ordinary citizens (George Bernard Shaw defined a profession as a 
conspiracy against ordinary people). Excess dependence on rationality has led to an 
am ost uncontrolled desire to use knowledge to dominate and manipulate. Because o f 
its universalizing claim to be the measure o f a i  things, there is no transcendent bar o f
122 See, Richard Kearney, Modern Movements in European Philosophy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1994) p.288.
123 See, David West, 1 n  Introduction to Continental Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), pp. 189ff; Hans 
Bertens, The Idea of the Postmodern: 1  histom (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 111-137.
124 Cf. D. Lyon, Postmodemity (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1994), p. 16.
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accountability: reason is judge, jury, prosecutor and counsel for the defense in its own 
cause.
Postmodernity is iconoclastic. Fredericjameson has identified four critical models o f 
understanding which have been pervasive in modern times, but that are now 
chaienged to their core: the distinction between essence and appearance (for 
example, in concepts o f ideology and false consciousness); the gap between the latent 
and the manifest (for example, in the Freudian understanding o f repression); the 
choice between authenticity and inauthenticity (in the existentialist account o f 
alienation), and the differentiation between signifier and signified (in theories o f 
language).125 The net result is an all-pervading sense o f uncertainty and instability, a 
constant challenging o f the once accepted, unshakable foundations o f apparently 
well-tested knowledge o f the real world.
The Challenges to Christian Mission
Just when the Churches o f the West were coming to terms with the culture o f 
modernity (in particular with the strengths and weaknesses o f a scientific world-view), 
a very different approach to the experience o f life is presenting itself.126 On the 
evidence o f history so far, it may take a long time for the Churches fully to appreciate 
the nature o f the current challenges and, in particular, to be able to handle criteria 
sufficiently rigorous to give some confidence that it knows how to distinguish 
between genuine insights and false trails.
The sustained attack on foundationalism, particularly in its form o f a meta-narrative 
that claims to be able to give a comprehensive, intelligent and consistent account o f 
the great questions o f human life, is serious for a faith that takes for its starting-point 
a story Because o f the evocative power o f story-telling and the intrinsic attraction o f 
stories which encompass the full range o f human life (epic, heroicism, tragedy, 
comedy, confrontation, reconciliation) to d  sometimes in straight narrative, some­
times in poetic form or through proverbs, metaphors and symbols, Christians in the 
late twentieth century have increasingly emphasized the communicative power o f the 
Bible as story and invited listeners to find meaning for their story in the light o f the 
story.
Implicit in the method, however, is the claim that in the story o f Jesus as to d  by his 
earliest followers is set forth the answer to the most perplexing conundrums o f 
human life, wherever lived and by whomever. This story is the measure o f all others. 
This life is the measure o f the meaning o f liberation and freedom.127 All other stories, 
however profound and noble they may be, are ultimately defective in their ability to 
explain the greatness o f human achievement and remedy the coossal effects o f 
human failure.
As we have already seen, such claims appear no longer to be sustainable, even if they 
are shorn o f all vestiges o f triumphalism. For one thing, to use the terminoogy o f
125 See, Modem Movements, p. 166.
126 See, for example, among many other works, M.Rae, H. Regan, J.Stenhouse, Sciencc and 'Theology:Questions at 
the Intemace (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1994).
127 See, J. Andrew Kirk, Loosing the Chains: Religion as opium and liberation. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 
1992), pp 194-201.
52
one story is to be guilty, in the words o f Roland Barthes, o f an “authoritarian 
discourse” 128 i.e. a language o f power whose intention is to create submission. For 
another thing, one must not imagine that the story encodes a fixed, clearly defined 
discourse with a fundamentally univocal meaning If one follows a post-structuralist 
stance then the text allows “a libertine excess o f multiple signification” , “an infinitely 
playful performance o f signification” . The importance o f this point o f view is that the 
claim to an authoritative interpretation o f the text is subverted, undermining “all 
hierarchical systems o f language which institutionalize one form o f discourse by 
repressing all non-conformist alternatives.” 129
The consequence o f this proposition is that no controlling meaning can be given to 
the text which would exclude any others.130 People o f other faiths and none may quite 
legitimately read into and out o f the text whatever they please. The Christian claims 
are quite simply one possible perspective among equals. I f  this is an acceptable 
approach to the basic Christian text, then clearly claims to truth based on the 
singularity o f its message and the origin o f its thought have nowhere to go, they 
vanish ephemeral-like into the shadow world o f every person’s opinion.
Earlier we stated that Christian mission is based on a conscious response to an 
imperative understood to emanate unambiguously from God. However the 
imperative is thought to be mediated, mission by its nature is consequent upon there 
existing an obligation acknowledged and acted on131. The language o f imperative and 
obligation assumes some kind o f unconditional responsibility laid upon one to act in 
a certain way. Such notions do not fit a culture where the relativity o f truth and values 
is taken as being beyond the need for demonstration. It is not surprising that the 
concept o f Christian mission causes acute embarrassment to those who have imbibed 
the intoxicating pluralism o f human self-expression.132
Pragmatic notions o f truth are unlikely to sustain a sense o f mission either. I f  the 
criterion o f truth is its ability to Hluminate an individual’s experience and orient him 
or her towards a goal in life which he or she finds personally meaningful, then 
persuasion to believe and act on a particular message as the only one having the 
inherent power to make sense o f life for everyone, however gently accomplished, will 
be sternly resisted on the grounds that what is Drue’ for one person may well not be 
Drue’ for another. What is important is that my sense o f the divine and o f right and 
wrong are made more coherent and serviceable. It is this attitude to truth which 
underlies the notion that a Christian’s greatest responsibility to people o f another 
faith is to help them, when invited, to deepen their commitment to their own
128 Modem Movements, p. 329.
129 Modem Movements, pp. 329-30.
130 See, Nicholas Wolterstorff s presentation and critique o f Derrida’s theory o f signification, Divine Disccurse, 
pp. 157-169.
131 Paradoxicaiy this is true also for those who see their ‘mission’ to be the debunking o f  a i  claims to possess 
a mission.
132 Thus G.M. Thomas observes: “Freedom must consist (according to the moderns) in would-be monks 
being able to become monks and would-be tarts becoming tarts if they so wish...Choices will have to be 
made in an unencumbered fashion from a virtuaiy infinite menu o f  potentialities.” G.M.Tamas, ‘A Clarity 
interfered with’ in T.Burns (ed.), After History: Francis Fukuyama and his Critics (Lanham: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1994), pp. 89-90.
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traditions o f symbolization as a means o f integrating more consistently their own 
experience o f life. Any other approach is rejected as overweening presumption.
Ways o f responding to the Challenges
Christians can and have reacted in a number o f different ways to the mission 
challenges posed by the diversity o f changes taking place throughout Western society. 
By adapting somewhat the typology suggested by Richard Niebuhr in his classic 
document, Christ and Culture,133 we can identify the following four categories: 
escapism/privatization; absorption/cultural consensus; opposition/minority status; 
transformation/minority status.
Christians may decide that the issues (some o f which we have identified here) are too 
complex and, in their opinion, too esoteric to bother about. In some ways it w oud 
appear to be easier not to have either to adapt to the changing scene, by devising new 
ways o f formulating the message or o f communicating it, or to challenge the assump­
tions lying behind the changes. The task o f the Church remains, as it always has, the 
faithful exposition o f an unchanging message to individuals. Irrespective o f the 
cultural changes, the fundamental needs o f human beings remain unchanged. The 
Church’s main responsibility is to offer God’s forgiveness and strength in the call for 
a new style o f living following the way o f Christ. Human beings, universally, need: a 
sense o f worth, a community to live in they can trust, a hope for the future, care 
when living through times o f distress. A l  these are offered in the unchanging gospel 
At the opposite end o f the spectrum, some Christians are convinced that the familiar 
categories o f thought by which the Church has expressed itself are no longer 
serviceable. The changes taking place in culture are irreversible. The message which 
the Church has traditionally proclaimed is not so much unbelievable as incompre­
hensible. The imperative is to attempt to proclaim and live Jesus Christ from within 
the thought-forms o f a postmodern age. The cultural consensus is accepted: ‘God’s 
death’ is affirmed as a positive value, because most images o f God (mainly male, 
white, heterosexual, middle-aged and hierarchical) are repressive and, therefore, too 
dangerous to resurrect. The major contribution a Christian may be able to make 
within the cultural confusion left by the “ shaking o f the foundations” is to rediscover 
the identity o f the self stripped o f the false assurances o f the past.134 
There is a growing body o f opinion that conceives the Church’s mission in terms o f 
faithful opposition: not in the wholly negative sense o f finding fault with every aspect 
o f contemporary culture, but in the discerning attitude o f providing a set o f values, an 
intellectual perspective and a community which offers a permanent alternative to 
current fashions.13 The major hermeneutical key o f such a position is the suspicion 
o f idolatry on the part o f institutions and intellectual trends. The abandonment o f the
133 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951).
134 Alain Touraine sees the greatest danger o f the moment to be “ a complete dissociation between system 
and actors, between the technical or economic world and the world o f subjectivity” . He believes this is a 
problem equdly, though for different reasons, for those who defend the gains o f  modernity and those who 
believe the postmodern ch^lenge is more hopeful. See his Critique of Modernity (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), pp. 5-6.
135 The position has been associated in recent years particularly with the name o f  Stanley Hauerwas; see, for 
exampll , After Christendom (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1991).
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God o f the prophetic initiative (explicit in all death-of-God pronouncements) is not a 
liberating act, but the submission to the greater slavery o f intellectual and moral 
anarchy and arbitrariness. Above ai, the Church must rigorously guard against all 
temptation to align itself with secular power, however sympathetic some programs 
and strategies may seem to be towards those values Christians w oud wish to defend. 
The final category we have identified is that which, whilst also wishing to eschew the 
exercise o f power qua Church, believes that the main assumptions o f contemporary 
Western culture, whether in its modern or postmodern appearance need not only 
chaienging but replacing Whereas this position requires the Church as an institution 
to keep itself clear o f involvement in the running o f the institutions o f society, it 
encourages Christians individually or collectively to work within institutions for new 
attitudes to human life which reflect the way o f Christ. In other words, the goal o f 
Christian mission is to seek a culture and society which, in every way, mirrors more 
closely the new resurrected order inaugurated by Jesus Christ.136
As with a i  categorization, there is a danger o f caricaturing the different mission 
stances taken or o f not aiowing sufficiently subtle shades o f differentiation. The four 
positions must be understood as general tendencies, and ones which are not 
necessarily mutuaiy exclusive. I will continue by giving an account o f what I consider 
is the best way o f grasping the opportunities for missiology presented by the present 
epistemological crisis. I will use the heuristic device utilized so successfully (in my 
judgement) by liberation theology, following the methodological lead given by Paolo 
Freire in his pioneering work in popular education: see, judge, act.
See, Judge, Act
The first step for missiological reflection is carefuiy to examine through a systematic 
analysis the real nature o f the crisis. This is not a task that Christians need necessarily 
initiate or carry through on their own. In many ways the work has already been done, 
either implicitly or explicitly, by many people engaged in the epistemological debate 
who may own a variety o f different faith perspectives. In my estimation, the crisis can 
best be summed up in the one word incsnsistency. Within the different thought- 
processes examined in the first part o f this volume which have provided such a 
multiplicity o f epistemological options, one may notice in varying degrees a lack o f 
consistency This is true within the intellectual tradition itself it often becomes even 
more evident when thought is applied to moral reasoning and ethical action. 
Inconsistency manifests itself as a fundamental contradiction between two or more 
axioms or statements or between an intellectual stance and practical living It means 
that if one is to be accepted as valid, the other has to be denied. It is based on the 
premise that two, or more, propositions cannot disagree and both be right. It may be 
discerned in a line o f reasoning, when conclusions are reached that are incompatible 
with the premises o f the argument. It is also obvious when moral positions are taken 
that seem to bear no resemblance to the logic o f the person’s theoretical stance. Its 
most celebrated formulation is in the so-caied Daw o f non-contradiction’ that asserts
136 This position has been clearly set out in a number o f significant books by Lesslie Newbigin: c f , for 
example, Truth to Tell: The Gospel as Public Truth (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991).
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that when two (or more) statements contradict each other they cannot both be 
correct, (though they could, o f course, both be false).137
One might well ask why consistency in thinking and living is deemed to be such an 
important principle that it is erected into the key for understanding the contemporary 
crisis. After ai, there are not lacking those who deny the universal applicability o f the 
law o f non-contradiction. This has been particularly true in philosophical thought 
associated with eastern religions. The response has to be twofold. First, in practice, 
there is literally no other way that thinking can proceed. In order to deny the law o f 
non-contradiction, one has to invoke it. Secondly, to think coherently and to be able 
to make one’s actions harmonize with one’s thinking is to enhance the dignity o f 
human life. Inconsistency degrades and debilitates the meaning o f human existence.138 
It is vitally important in a missiological perspective that one does not exempt the 
mission agent from the critique o f inconsistency An accusation directed elsewhere 
and refused for oneself is generally given the name o f hypocrisy Unfortunately, there 
is too much evidence o f that within the thinking and practice o f the Church. 
Therefore, the analysis o f the crisis must encompass the intellectual tradition and life 
o f the Christian community
Let us now turn to the issues we noted when looking at the epistemological pre­
dicament o f the West. The rejection o f foundationalism may seem to be self-evident, 
because access to universally recognized and indubitable knowledge is simply not 
possible. However, the apparent alternatives do not seem to leave one with any 
resting-place at all. Thought is caught between the rock o f scepticism and the hard 
place o f relativism; neither o f which can be consistently maintained.139
137 There have been attempts to refute the law o f non-contradiction in its form as ‘the law o f the excluded 
middle’ by asserting the ambiguity o f  referents in some sentences that appear to be contradictory However, 
once the m eaningfJness in context o f  the proposition is established and the scope o f  the language is 
identified, the logic o f  the law hods. C f  Mark Sainsbury, ‘Philosophical Logic’ in A.C. Grayling (ed.), 
Philosophy, pp. 81-84.
138 There are some legitimate objections to what appears to be the rigid application o f an invariable law. 
These encompass those situations where the only way o f doing justice to a full range o f complex evidence 
seems to be the formulation o f  explanations which appear to invoke contradictory statements. The two most 
celebrated, from very different disciplines, might be the formulation o f  the movement o f light and the 
Christian understanding o f God as Trinity. Whether, or not, these are exceptions to the general rule is 
debatable, and the discussion beyond the scope o f  this essay; the important principle is that the law is valid 
because it demonstrably covers the vast majority o f cases.
139 For the impossibility o f  maintaining a relativistic approach to ethical vaues, see my argument in Loosing the 
Chains, pp. 53-66, 165-176. With regard to scepticism, the common-sense argument o f  Thomas Reid (a 
contemporary o f Hume’s) that life can only be lived on the basis that complete scepticism is unwarranted 
seems to be a sufficient rebuttal. We can only act on the assumption that effects have causes and that a real 
internal and external world exists. So, Stephen Nathanson, The Ideal of Rationality: A  defense within Reason 
(Chicago: Open Court Press, 1994), pp. 208-212, and Robert Audi, Epistemology, pp. 308-313.
My “ foundationalism” is methodological: actions spring from faith, in the sense explored by Juan Luis 
Segundo, Faith and Ideologies (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1984), passim; when actions clash, the faith needs 
justifying; justification assumes a foundational authorization; when justifications clash, the authorizations are 
used as the ultimate judging criteria. My contention is that this is the way in which argumentation actuaiy 
takes place, when there is a serious clash o f interpretations about practice. I am not happy with the term 
“chastened foundationalism” . Although I recognize in it a cai to epistemic modesty, there is nothing to be 
ashamed o f in adopting a carefJly defined form o f foundationalism. I w oud prefer to cai it “modified” or 
“moderate presuppositional” foundationalism.
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In practice all people, whatever their theory may say to the contrary, act on the basis 
o f fundamental beliefs.140 These are ones universally held by humankind, reflected in 
the common structure o f a i  languages, whose negation is not merely false but absurd 
and which are necessary for engaging in the practical affairs o f life.141 It can be shown 
from careful observation o f normal life that everyone acts on the basis o f knowledge 
acquired, however fragmentary, which they do not justify by recourse to a deeper 
knowledge. O f course, such knowledge may be accepted as a working hypothesis and, 
therefore, be corrigible; but, at the point o f action, it is decisive.
The questions o f pluralism and truth may be dealt with in the context o f moral 
reasoning Again, in practice, no-one seriously believes that moral action can be 
encompassed either as a matter o f personal taste or o f the enforced decision o f state 
or family. Universally, human beings consistently make moral judgements that assume 
an absolute code o f practice; at least in some instances. This is the only way one can 
make sense o f the paradoxical intolerance that the most liberaiy-inclined people 
show towards certain attitudes and actions. Though, according to a person’s moral 
tradition, they may vary from case to case, there are moral limitations which everyone 
accepts. Perhaps, the most universally accepted w oud be the wanton exploitation o f 
and cruelty towards vulnerable people (like children, the mentally and physicaiy 
disabled and the old) and deliberate deceit. Even where a moral tradition allows an 
excess o f moral liberty (as in libertarianism), it upholds the absolute (?) duty o f a i  to 
respect the freedom o f others.
The notion that truth can be identified with personal or group dispositions (what is 
true “ for me” or “ for us”) is absurd. It empties truth o f any meaning whatsoever, by 
allowing to it a purely private definition. Moreover, it makes a complete nonsense o f 
the reality o f error. I f  truth is identified with what seems right in my internal world, 
then what seems right is right. As long as I believe it, I cannot be in error. If, on the 
contrary, one acknowledges the possibility o f error, then it follows that some criterion 
(external to myself) must be employed to distinguish what is false from what is true. 
Here, we do not have to argue from any particular definition o f truth, only to demon­
strate that in practice, invariably, people argue and act on the basis o f believing that it 
exists as a reality external to individual desires and interests.
The belief that truth can be understood in pragmatic terms is question-begging If the 
meaning o f truth is to be defined by its utility in producing a good or useful outcome, 
the argument has not been advanced at all, unless we know what is the good and why 
The good cannot be specified by appeal to the consequences it produces without 
further begging the question. Manifestly, the appeal to functionality is not an 
adequate explanation o f ethical right, for wrong action can also work, according to 
the criteria adopted. There is no possibility here o f short-circuiting the appeal to 
intrinsic vaues. Pragmatism is altogether too subjective to provide adequate guidance 
to right and wrong action, for as a guiding principle it is too easily confused with
140 This is the case though many deny it to be. Their reasoning is careful and sophisticated and yet, in my 
opinion, ultimately inconsistent. When I appeal to foundations, I am not seeking to defend ‘classic 
foundationalism’, if by that is understood the possibility o f acquiring for any belief or interpretation o f life 
the three main ‘epistemic immunities’ - immunity from emor, from refutation and from doubt.
141 See, J.Dancy and E. Sosa, A  Companion to Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p.72.
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opportunism. Nevertheless, the consequences o f actions do provide an important 
consideration in judging between alternative choices; but only when tested against 
norms right or wrong in themselves.
I f  it is widely conceded that the reductionist rationalism o f modernity is inherently 
incapable o f satisfying the deepest intellectual and moral questions posed by human 
existence, the postmodern denouement probably fairs even worse. The problem o f 
modernity does not lie with the limitations o f reason, nor the use to which it has been 
put (instrumental reason), but the assumptions on which it has been used. It is a self- 
defeating exercise to attempt to begin with the empirical particulars o f the natural 
world with the hope o f being able to buüd theories that can make sense o f the whole 
o f experience. Explanations that begin and end with observable and verifiable causal 
sequences are doomed to conclude that human life is machine-like. The sensations o f 
personal worth, moral values and ultimate purpose in existing have to be incom­
prehensible. Rationalism is bereft o f the instruments necessary to fathom out this part 
o f human experience. In a very real sense, the modern predicament, by posing a 
dilemma which it does not have the instruments to solve, makes human beings 
inferior to animals, for the latter do not possess these sensations and therefore do not 
experience a need to explain them.
The dilemma began when the culture in general accepted (following the arguments o f 
Hume and Kant) that intellectual probity necessitated the assumption that the 
uniformity o f natural causes required a closed-order universe. As a result, just as 
nature gradually swallowed up grace in the theology o f the medieval period, so nature 
took the place o f the revelatory and reordering activity o f God within the world. The 
dilemma is acute. No longer is there a sufficient reason for believing with certainty 
that anything exists, or that there is an adequate correlation between the observer 
(subject) and the thing observed (the object) or that a meaningful distinction can be 
made between reality and fantasy As Kant observed, reason supplies the human 
mind with regulative ideals, not constitutive ideas. In ethics reason guides our choice 
o f principles on which to act, but does not supply those principles. In decision­
making reason may help determine the means we appropriate to achieve desired ends, 
but the ends themselves are not discovered as necessary truths by rational intuition, as 
Descartes and Spinoza believed. Once revelation is considered impossible or 
irrelevant, the universe becomes silent except for the prolonged echo o f merely 
human chatter reproducing itself.
In theological terms, the epistemological crisis is due to an idolatrous faith in the 
power o f reason to bring the whole world o f nature and o f experience under its 
regulative principle. Reason itself is not at fault. The postmodern tendency, therefore, 
to delight in the irrational and the absurd küls the patient rather than curing the 
disease. The turn to carefree playfulness as a riposte to the drudgery o f bureaucracy 
and the boredom and superficiality o f endless consumerism marks a regress to 
childhood not a development to a fully responsible adulthood. As a matter o f fact, its 
attention to variety, choice and the importance o f minority interests is a perfect foil 
for the consumer culture. What may be said about the drive to consume may be said 
with identical language (substituting experience for goods and services) o f the post­
modern condition:
58
“ In general terms, modern Euro-American societies are characterized by the 
strongly rooted belief that to have is to be ...; this is related to the privileging o f a 
relationship between individuals and things in terms o f possession ...Indeed, 
most people describe possessions as aspects o f the self, and their loss is 
experienced as personal violation and a lessening o f the self. It is in this 
context that possessions have come to serve as key symbols for personal 
qualities, attachments and interests.” 142 
The unpalatable truth is that postmodernity, if consistent to its own ideals, is pure 
escapism. Its deconstruction is reaction (and reactionary), for it has no grounds for 
reconstruction. Here again, it mirrors the results o f the technological reason it so 
passionately despises:
“ It has been argued that consumption...is also driven by hedonism, escapism, 
fantasy and the desire for novelty or ‘ dentity-vaue’” 143.
The fight into pure aesthetics144 is a new form o f the old romanticism: conservative, 
reactionary, sentimental, priestly rather than prophetic. Postmodern consciousness is 
forced, as was existentialism before it, to disregard its own ideals in order to reengage 
with political, moral debate.145
“It seems that nothing is capable o f reuniting things that have now been 
divorced for a hundred years. That is why political and social ideologies have 
disappeared and been replaced only by moralizing declarations which are 
momentarily moving, but which soon come to look laughable, hypocritical or 
even manipulative.” 146 
The second step for missiological reflection is to invite147 contemporary Western 
culture to consider the thesis that the destructive consequences o f the inherent 
contradictions in its mode o f thinking and between its thinking and action can be 
turned into new life by accepting the Gospel as the one perspective that gives 
sufficient grounds for the integration o f thought and o f theory and practice. This will 
be an arduous task, which, even if it is achieved in part148 may not result in the
142 Celia Lury, Consumer Culture (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p. 7.
143 Consumer Culture, p. 46.
144 See, H.Bertens, The Idea of the Postmodern: “John Paoletti, in a discussion o f postmodernism in the visual 
arts, speaks o f ‘those artists who assume the mysterious role o f shaman in order to bring us closer to the 
verities o f the complex and difficult-to-decipher environments that we inhabit’...The shaman’s most utopian 
moment was voiced by Richard Pam er, who expressed the hope that a postmodern hermeneutics o f 
performance’ might restore to the interpreter his ancient shamanic-hermeneutical powers to reveal the 
hidden, to transform the understanding, even to heal the soul’ “  p.75 (see also pp. 87, 224).
145 Others too have noted Foucault’s smuggling o f critical standpoints into his work, without ever 
acknowledging or explaining them” , D.Lyon, op. cit., p. 79; “ One can only agree that the right to differ must 
be both universal and binding if difference wants to avoid being forced into unity,” H. Bertens, op. cit., p. 
195.
146 A.Tourain, op. cit., p. 191.
147 Following the critique o f inconsistency, it is vitaiy important to couch the mission imperative in terms o f 
invitation rather than proclamation. Whereas the latter has overtones o f  the crusade and inviJnerability, the 
former bespeaks hospitality and exposure. However, it shoud be understood that the invitation is to a real, 
rich and satisfying Meal, not to a thread-bare board.
148 My own book, The Meaning of Freedom: a study of Secular, Muslim and Chri,stian views (Carlisle: Paternoster 
Press, 1998), is an attempt to engage in this task by looking at contemporary notions o f  freedom in the light 
o f Christian faith.
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invitation being accepted. Perhaps the hardest task for missiology is to procure a 
hearing; in the words o f the title o f this book ‘ o stake a claim’ that is taken seriously. 
As far as epistemology is concerned, this task o f integration awaits another 
opportunity. It will be one o f the assignments still outstanding at the end o f this 
present project. I f  the argument o f this chapter has any weight, it cannot be done in 
isolation from the work o f the other subgroups, particularly those working on the 
self-identity o f the Church in history and on the meaning o f the Church today 
Integration involves thinking, being and doing The subject o f the missiological task 
must himself or herself seek as consistent a unity between the three, on the basis o f 
the Gospel, as is possible to achieve in an imperfect world. Otherwise, he or she will 
contribute no more to the promised banquet than the meagre scraps with which the 
non-Christian world seeks to assuage its hunger.
60
T H E  C O N F U S IO N  O F  E P IS T E M O L O G Y  IN  T H E  W E ST  A N D  
C H R IS T IA N  M IS S IO N 149
Summary
Western culture is facing a major intellectual crisis, because it is confused about the 
meaning o f truth, the relationship between belief and knowledge, and the nature and 
use o f language. This article points out some o f the consequences and suggests a new 
way o f meeting contemporary cognitive challenges to communicating Christian faith.
Introduction
The title may not seem very promising In a quick association o f ideas, epistemology 
and mission do not seem closely related.150 Surely, there are more important mission 
concerns. For example, what about the stubborn problems that arise from the 
process o f secularisation, at the heart o f which is a massive indifference to any supra­
natural reality? Then again, although some writers believe we live in a post-ideological 
age, the all-embracing phenomenon o f ‘globalisation’ presupposes a powerful 
ideology, all the more perilous for being implicit rather than overt. Ethical and 
cultural relativism is now assumed to such a degree, that a putative burden o f proof 
seems to rest on those who would dispute it. Last, but not least, the equal validity o f 
a i  religious beliefs is taken for granted by most self-respecting liberal thinkers as self- 
evident; conversely, those who still wish to h o d  to the exclusive truth o f their faith 
are dismissed as anachronistic fundamentalists. However, interestingly, each one o f 
these issues embodies deep epistemoogical premises and theories. Relativism, for 
example, the view that all beliefs are proportionate to particular circumstances and no 
belief can claim to be universaiy valid, because there are no generaiy agreed 
standards for ascertaining truth, only transitory and localised consensus, is a claim to 
knowledge about a reality open to examination. Epistem oogy is simply that discipline 
which studies the articulated or unexpressed convictions that all people have about 
what and how it is possible to know. As such, it deals with the assumptions that 
underlie any assertion that people make about any aspect o f life. Though probably 
unrecognised by most people most o f the time, its’ subject matter is any piece o f 
thinking Action, in so far as it follows a process o f self-conscious reflection, depends 
on epistemic principles.
The case for taking epistemoogy seriously as a crucial subject for mission does not 
have to be made a priori; it should become obvious in the course o f our study 
Nevertheless, we do have to establish concretely that, at present in the West,
149 Tyndale Bulletin, 55.1, 2004, pp. 131-156.
150 To my knowledge the only published work, which explicitly relates mission to epistemoogy, is J. Andrew 
Kirk and Kevin Vanhoozer, To Stake a C lim : Mission and the Western Crisis of Knowledge (Maryknoll: Orbis 
Books, 2000). However, Lesslie Newbigin in a number o f  books, written towards the end o f his life, on 
mission in the West implicitly refers to some epistemoogical issues in his analysis and critique o f the 
Enlightenment, see, for example, his Truth to T el His debt to the philosophy o f Michael Polanyi is well 
known. See also, Paul Weston, ‘Gospel, Mission and Culture: The Contribution o f  Lesslie Newbigin’ in 
David Peterson (ed.), Witness to the World (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1999), pp. 32-62, and Colin Gunton, 
‘Knowledge and culture: towards an epistemoogy o f  the concrete,’ in Hugh Montefiore (ed.), The Gospel and 
Contemporar Culture (London: Mowbray, 1992), pp. 84-102.
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confidence in the ability to know anything is in deep trouble. We will seek to do this 
by showing how canons o f rationality, objectivity and truth are being vigorously 
contested from a number o f different angles. Then, we have to demonstrate that the 
ensuing confusion is deeply significant for Christian mission. Finally, it will be 
necessary to outline briefly and tentatively ways in which the Christian community 
might respond as a part o f its given vocation to mission.
By the West I mean the shared cultural values, achievements and expectations that 
have developed from the history o f the Western peninsular o f the Asian landmass, 
since the flourishing o f Hellenic society from the 6th century BC onwards. By mission 
I mean the process by which the Christian faith is communicated and becomes 
established across boundaries, whether these be geographical, cultural, ideological, 
linguistic, ethnic, or o f any other kind. The challenges, opportunities and barriers to 
believing and living the good news o f Jesus Christ form a substantial part o f the study 
o f mission. One o f its major concerns, therefore, has to be the relation between 
Christian speech and action and the different elements o f culture.151 This is why 
students o f mission have to interest themselves in other disciplines, like epistemology, 
even though they may not be their central concern.
Epistem ology as a discipline
In its most general sense, epistemology refers to Dhe theory o f knowledge and justi­
fication.’152 Knowledge has been understood classically as ‘justified true belief’
Hence, the justification o f beliefs is central to its concerns. Justification deals with 
reasons for belief, namely the evidence which is brought to bear to substantiate 
statements which purport to be about some reality. How does one know that 
something affirmed is the case? What warrants one to make truth claims?
The claim to know something is more than having justified beliefs about it, for it is 
possible to be justified in believing a proposition on the basis o f a virtuous cognitive 
process and stül be in error. It is normal, for example, to believe a fact on the basis o f 
the testimony o f a hitherto reliable witness, and one w oud be warranted in so doing 
However, the witness may decide to play a practical joke (it being the 1st o f April) by 
distorting some incident or may simply, in all innocence, misinterpret some 
occurrence. Therefore, in order to know that fact, by removing all reasonable doubt, 
additional information wül be necessary In other words, knowing something is 
equivalent to ascertaining its status as truth.
In many ways, epistemology concerns itself with the question o f the meaning o f truth 
and the criteria that must be adopted in order to be able to distinguish true from false 
statements. The latter lead us on to the question o f the foundations o f knowledge: on 
what possible basis can I claim to know the truth? This issue has proved to be one o f 
the most controversial in the history o f epistemological discussion. A number o f
151 For further understanding o f mission, see, Roger Bowen, So I  Send You: A. Study Guide to Mission (London: 
SPCK, 1996) and What is Missioni
152 Robert Audi, Epistemology, p. 1.
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different answers have been given.153 Classically, it has been asserted that reliable 
knowledge has to be founded on beliefs that do not themselves need justifying for 
they are either self-evidently true, incorrigible or immediately evident to the senses. 
Because o f alleged difficulties in this position, known as foundationalism, other alter­
native theories have been put forward.154 Thus, conventionalism argues that the basis for 
true statements is their concordance with the conventional uses o f language, i.e. the 
ways in which words and signs relate to one another according to generally accepted 
rules.155 Coherentism, the main chaienger in contemporary epistemology to the classical 
view,156 stipulates that what makes one belief justified and another not is the way it 
coheres with a particular set o f background beliefs.157 Pragmatism suggests that beliefs 
are best justified by their practice; their truth-value is dependent on the success o f 
their practical outcome.158 Finally, reliabilism states that a belief is justified just in case 
it is based on reasons that are reliable indicators o f the truth, produced by cognitive 
processes that are generally reliable.159
The nature of the present epistemological confusion
Historical antecedents
In synthesis, the increasing uncertainty about the possibility o f finding any proper 
basis for knowledge is due to a widespread belief that all forms o f foundationalism, 
because o f the problem o f infinite regression in the chain o f epistemic justifications, 
are inherently defective, and that all the alternatives proposed are equally, if not more, 
venerable. In many circles, the attempt to construct a system o f knowledge on an 
immovable basis that is clear, universally valid and indubitable has been abandoned. It 
is as if one age had passed irrevocably and given rise to another whose mood is 
characterised by ambivalence, indecision and mistrust.160
Like a i  transitional situations there is a history. The birth o f the modern world can be 
dated with some precision to the first successes in discovering how the universe 
functions, as these confirmed the validity o f the broadly empirical procedures o f the 
emerging sciences. For want o f a better point in time we might nominate 1660, the 
year in which the Royal Society was founded in London.161 Epistemologicaiy one
153 It is beyond the scope o f this study to discuss a i  the possibilities in detail It is, however, worth 
mentioning that not a i  views are mutuaiy exclusive, and some people prefer to see a combination o f at least 
some as the best possible guarantee that one can be truly justified in having certain beliefs.
154 See, Hugo Meynell, ‘Faith, Foundationalism and Wolterstorff,’ in Linda Zagzebski (ed.), Rational Faith: 
Catholic Responses to Reformed Epistemology (Notre Dame, University o f Notre Dame Press, 1993), pp. 92-99.
155 This view has been argued most cogently by Alfred Tarski, Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1956).
156 See, Robert Audi, The Stricture ofjustificotion (Cambridge: CUP, 1993), pp. 117-164.
157 This view is most closely associated with the philosophers, Rescher and Bonjour c .f, Nicholas Rescher, 
The Coherence Theor ofTrath (Oxford: OUP, 1973); Bonjour, The Stmcture of Empiricol Knowledge (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1985). However, in the case o f Bonjour, see n. 253.
158 See, Richard Rorty, The Consequences of Pragmatism (Hassocks: Harvester, 1982).
159 W.J. Talbot, The Reliability of the Cognitive Mechanism (New York: Garland Publishing, 1990).
160 It has to be said that this mood permeates the intellectual world o f philosophy, it is not necessarily true o f 
the scientific community nor o f  the business world which relies on the technological achievements o f 
science.
161 The French Academy o f Sciences followed in 1666.
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might say that this birth was a neutral coming into being Fundamental changes in 
people’s ways o f thinking began only when particular assumptions were linked to the 
scientific enterprise. Out went Aquinas, Luther and Calvin, in came Bacon, Locke 
and Descartes.
Bacon championed a straightforward account o f the discovery o f the natural world 
through empirical induction, in which laws and theories o f science are built up out o f 
systematic processes o f observation and testing Inductive inference is a matter o f 
weighing the evidence, judging probabilities and drawing likely conclusions with 
regard to some aspect o f the natural world.162 Bacon was supremely confident that 
the method w oud produce a true understanding o f the Book o f Nature for the 
immense benefit o f humankind. The empirical method was further elaborated by 
John Locke. He espoused the view that all ideas come ultimately from experience 
through a process o f integrating sensations, derived from the observation o f external 
objects, and reflection, as the introspective awareness o f the activities o f the mind.163 
Descartes, on the other hand, was aware o f the sceptics chaienge to a too naive 
reliance on the immediate availability o f data to the human senses. Unlike the 
empiricist, he did not believe it possible to rely on the data o f the senses to give un­
conditional knowledge. In order to stem any conceivable sceptical regress against the 
claims for certain knowledge, he turned inward to contemplate the operation o f the 
mind. He sought to adduce axioms that could be seen to be self-evidently true to the 
faculty o f intellectual intuition, as long as humans’ rational mechanisms remained 
unimpaired, because they were clear, distinct and free from internal contradiction. It 
is possible, he reasoned, that most o f what we conceive to be knowledge about the 
world coud  be undermined either by the unreliability o f the senses, or by being 
unable to distinguish between the state o f being awake or that o f dreaming, or by a 
malicious demon who was able to deceive us into believing we had direct contact 
with the external world or even that the apparently cast-iron certainty o f mathe­
matical and geometrical conclusions might be false. Nevertheless, it is quite 
impossible to doubt that we are thinking
His method is an attempt to overcome the lingering doubt that must always be there 
in the empirical method, namely that the human mind truly is in contact with real 
external objects. The certainty o f knowledge can only be justified ultimately in the 
mechanisms o f the reasoning subject which is able to demonstrate that doubt is self­
contradictory: the very process o f doubt uncovers the existence o f a thinking subject; 
I can only doubt by thinking, therefore I am. The intuited and incontestable axiom o f 
the ccgito is a sufficient and efficient causality for other types o f knowledge. Descartes’ 
thesis has subsequently been regarded by many commentators as the first attempt to 
construct a foundation for knowledge that w oud have immunity from error (be 
infallible), from refutation (be incorrigible) and from doubt (be indubitable).
Descartes’ process o f reflection has been called the ‘rationalist turn’ in Western 
philosophy, and it is a defining moment. In treating the notion o f reality as dependent
162 See, Richard Tarnas, The Passion of the Western Mind, p. 275.
163 His theory o f perception has been caied an indirect representative realist theory because he believed that 
objects have the power to cause ideas in our minds, see, Philosophy: 1  Guide through the Subject, pp. 488-508.
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on what is clear and self-evident to the mind, Descartes has ended up in an un­
bridgeable dualism between mind and matter. In order to try to reconnect to the 
sensible world, Descartes invoked the concept o f God. God is the being who brings 
together rational faculties and a rationaiy ordered world. However, for Descartes, 
God is a necessary postulate to overcome the ultimate limitations o f reason. As such 
a being cannot be demonstrated by reason alone, God has to be assumed. In order 
not to end up in a vicious circle, it is necessary to start from a position o f faith, not o f 
certainty. Faith, however, cannot logically refute an unyielding scepticism. Ultimately, 
one has to conclude that Descartes’ ingenious scheme fails on its own terms.
In the attempt to found knowledge, whether empirical or axiomatic, on the autono­
mous human thinking subject in direct contact with the world or the mind, the 
modern epistemological dilemma was born. The human subject became divorced 
from the external object, with the result that scepticism about the real reality o f the 
external world has pervasively influenced all discussion about noetic procedures, and 
human beings have condemned themselves to various forms o f solipsism. Parallel to 
this, in the religious sphere, there was a notable move from theism, which heralded 
God as the initiator o f knowledge, to deism, in which God was seen as an indis­
pensable postulate to conserve the possibility o f knowledge (not least by Isaac 
Newton164) to atheism, in which the hypothesis o f God was abandoned altogether.165 
The consequence o f this move was not only to posit naturalism as a self-sufficient 
account o f the material world but also to erect Nature into a kind o f human- 
transcending Subject that w oud perform at least some o f the functions hitherto 
ascribed to the deity: most notably those o f providing a sense o f meaning to life and a 
foundation for morals.
An obscure philosopher from East Germany, ‘aroused from his dogmatic slumbers’ 
by the scepticism o f David Hume sought to find a secure framework in which the 
validity o f empirical knowledge coud  be substantiated against the sceptics. Kant 
conceded to Hume the objection against empiricism that human beings cannot know 
the world as it is in itself166 and the critique o f rationalism that objective knowledge 
cannot be attained by the use o f reason alone. So, Kant argued, human beings cannot 
know things as they are in themselves, only as they are mediated to us in experience. 
The raw material is given through our intuitions, which are then organised, using 
concepts, so that we might understand the data we experience. Knowledge is only 
attainable by a synthesis o f sensations o f objects and prior organising principles, 
which are the categories o f the mind. The latter are innate or a priori ideas, which 
have to be presupposed for knowledge to be possible at ai. In order to answer the
164 See, Michael Buckley, A t the Origins of Modern Atheism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), pp. 143­
144.
165 The first modern thinker openly and system atical to espouse atheism was Diderot, followed by 
D ’Holbach and many members o f his Paris circle; see, A t the Origins, pp. 194-321, Michael Hunter and David 
Wootton, Atheismfrmm the Reformation to the Enlightenment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 273-300.
166 Hume’s scepticism arose from his assertion that the experience o f any object was no more than an 
experience o f its impression, which, in conjunction with reflection, became a perception. Perceptions are 
elements or objects o f the mind, not representations o f external existences; see, David F. Norton (ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Hume (Cambridge: CUP, 1993), pp. 7-8, 107.
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dilemma o f both rationalists and sceptics, such concepts can be both analytic and 
synthetic, i.e. both presupposed and confirmed by actual experience.
Kant’s response to Hume’s chaienge, clever as it is, fails to overcome the dichotomy 
between the autonomous mind and a real world. Objects can only be known through 
the mechanism o f an interpreting mind, as phenomena that appear to us in a certain 
way. The implication is that the world is actually constituted by the mind’s own 
categories. The only world available to human consciousness is that already organised 
within the mind’s own processes. This means that the world cannot be known in a 
direct sense, only thought about. Kant has come no nearer to solving the problem o f 
bringing together an objective reality and a subjective reflection on experience. As 
Richard Tarnas perceptively observes, Kant had only succeeded in rejoining ‘knower 
to known, not knower to any objective reality.. .Knower and known were united, as it 
were, in a solipsistic prison. Man cannot know whether the internal ordering 
principles possess any ultimate relevance to a real world, or absolute truth outside the 
mind.’167
Although, perhaps, intellectually the most impressive attempt to overcome the 
dichotomy between an assumed empirical knowledge o f the natural world and a sure 
confidence that it is indeed knowledge, Kant not only fails to solve it he actuaiy 
makes it worse. He cannot escape from the prison o f a self-referring subject to make 
contact with an objectively real world. He appears to have substituted the Cartesian 
absolute thinking subject with his own absolute experiencing subject, from which he 
works outward to his theory o f a priori categories. However, the categories are them­
selves postulates o f the mind necessary to make sense o f experience; they are not 
derived from experience. They belong more to the designation noumena, the real an 
sich (in itself), than that o f phenomena, the real as it appears to us.
The conclusion seems inevitable. As long as there is no dependable way o f asserting 
the intrinsically absolute correspondence between a real universe and the human 
perception o f it, human beings will be trapped in what Francis Bacon called ‘ he idols 
o f the cave’ (individuaiy accepted mental creations) or ‘ he idols o f the tribe’ (collec­
tively accepted mental creations).168 The way was set for a continuing rift between the 
scientific enterprise, which has to assume epistemological realism in order to give an 
adequate explanation o f its method, and yet which, in so far as it is positivistic and 
naturalist, has no adequate grounds for doing so, and other avenues to knowledge 
which appear to be trapped in an inescapable subjectivism. In the next section, we 
will explore how contemporary issues in epistemology follow as consequences o f the 
split.
Contemporary issues
It is impossible to provide more than a brief summary o f some o f the most pressing 
dilemmas in the contemporary scene.169 For the purpose o f this paper, I will speak
167 The Cambridge Companion to Hume, p. 348.
168 See, Mary Tiles andjim  Tiles, ‘Idols o f  the Cave’ in Linda Martin Alcoff, Epistemology: The Big Questions, pp. 
423-424.
166 A much fUler overview is given in To Stake a Claim, pp. 3-52.
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briefly about three major questions, which I take to exhibit the main elements o f the 
present confusion.
The justification of beliefs
We have already begun to discuss the various theories that have been advanced to 
legitimate the belief that one can know certain statements to be true. Foundationalism 
is the view that some beliefs are directly justified, either by being self-evidently true or 
immediately evident to the senses. All other beliefs are then dependent upon the 
foundational beliefs, as in the construction o f an edifice. It has to be assumed that the 
regress o f justified beliefs has an ultimate stopping place, a foundational belief that it 
would be rationally absurd to doubt.170
However, this notion has been disputed for a number o f reasons. First, the idea that 
facts are somehow ‘given’ prior to being interpreted, and that beliefs can be justified 
on that basis, is dismissed as impossible, since all facts are always already theory­
laden. Thus, one cannot rely upon unmediated information presenting itself to the 
senses in such a way that the sceptics challenge to demonstrate incorrigibility can be 
met. Second, the infinite regress problem cannot properly be avoided, since the 
beliefs used to justify other claims turn out in practice not to be indubitable, but 
dependent on the structure they are intended to justify.171 Third, there appear to be a 
number o f contradictory theories, viewpoints and statements equally well-founded, 
not a i  o f which can be equaiy true. Moreover, it is alleged there is no non-arbitrary 
way o f establishing one set o f propositions as superior to another without arguing in 
a circle.172
The other main contender as a theory o f justification is coherentism or holism. The 
central idea is that the justification o f a belief depends on its coherence with other 
beliefs within a particular set. Beliefs, which are sufficient for knowledge, do not lie at 
the foundation o f a building but make up an integrated web and their justification 
proceeds from being an appropriate fit within that pattern.173 For those who h o d  to 
some form o f holism the theory is superior to that o f foundationalism in that it 
allows a multi-directional flow o f reasoning and different kinds o f connection 
between beliefs. It also takes into account the observation that data are always already 
dependent on theoretically accepted premises.174
However, the theory is not without its severe weaknesses. Systems o f belief can be 
fully coherent within themselves and yet be (a) incompatible with other fuiy coherent 
systems o f belief, such that only one could be completely true (or, all o f them false), 
and (b) incompatible with what is otherwise generaiy and universally acknowledged
1701  Companion to Epistemology, pp. 144-147.
171 Godel’s theorem states “that for every sufficiently complex system o f axioms and proof procedures there 
will always exist at least one indispensable axiom whose validity cannot be proved in terms o f that same 
system,” Christopher Norris, Against Relativism: Philosophy of Scienca, Deconstmction and Critical Theor (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1997), p. 22.
172 See, Stephen T. Davis, God, Reason and Theistic Proofs (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), pp. 
91-92.
173 Robert Audi, Epistemology, pp. 189-190.
174 See, Nancey Murphy, Beyond Eiberalism and Fundamentalism: How Modem and Postmodern Philosophy set the 
Theologiccl Agenda (Vaiey Forge: Trinity Press International, 1996), p. 94.
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to be true. Without some independent indication that some o f the beliefs within a 
coherent system are true, coherence in itself is no indication o f tru th .O u r  criteria 
for justification must indicate to us the probable truth o f our beliefs. Hence within 
any system o f beliefs there must be some privileged class with which others must 
cohere to be justified.’175
I f  scepticism seems to undermine foundationalism, relativism seems to be the logical 
outcome o f holism. ‘I f  we abandon foundationalism, we are able to defend all sorts o f 
preposterous claims and theories by showing either that they are consistent with 
everything else in a person’s noetic structure or that beliefs tend to produce helpful 
practical consequences.’176 It is the notion that any part o f the system can be suitably 
adjusted in order to turn aside the challenge o f defeaters that suggests an underlying 
disregard for any notion o f truth. It w oud seem as if epistemic standards o f confir­
mation are internal to the system. There may be internal coherence, but then each 
web o f beliefs is incommensurable with every other, and there appears to be no way 
o f judging between them.
So unconvincing do the two foremost theories o f justification seem to be that a 
number o f thinkers wish to abandon epistemology altogether. For Richard Rorty, for 
example, all attempts at justification are allergic and anxiety-ridden reactions to the 
human condition, which cannot be transcended, o f necessity possessing a historically 
and culturally contingent view o f things. The only way we can approach knowledge is 
on the pragmatic basis that we refine our serendipitous language and methods to 
cope better with life as we know it.177
The use of language
Following the ‘rationalist turn’, inaugurated by Descartes, a second major shift in 
epistemological theory is connected with Wittgenstein. In between the publication o f 
the Tractatus (1922) and the Phillsophical Investigations (published in 1953, two years 
after his death) Wittgenstein had ‘taken’ a ‘linguistic turn.’ In the first instance, he 
sought to lay down a uniform, logical theory o f language, which fixes the bounds o f 
meaning He adhered to a strong picture theory o f language in which the words in a 
sentence stand for objects in the world in the same way that pictures represent 
entities in space. Thus, ‘a picture is a model o f reality. In a picture objects have the 
elements o f the picture corresponding to them. In a picture the elements o f the 
picture are the representatives o f o b je c ts . A picture depicts reality by representing a 
possibility o f existence and a state o f a f fa ir s .  A picture agrees with reality or fails to 
agree; it is correct or incorrect, true or fa lse .T h e  agreement or disagreement o f its 
sense with reality constitutes its truth or falsity.’178
The ‘first’ Wittgenstein puts forward a robust representational view o f language and a 
correspondence theory o f truth. It is not surprising that his work was interpreted as
175 Alan Goldman, ‘The Given’ in A  Companion to Philosophy, p .160.
176 God, 'Reason and TheisticProofs, p. 93.
177 See, ‘Pragmatism, Relativism and Irrationalism’ in Epistemology: The BigQuestions, pp. 336-348.
178 Ludwig Wittgenstein, ‘Picturing Reality’ from Tractatus Eogico-Philosophiccs (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1961), quoted in Andrea Nye (ed.), Philosophy of Language: The "BigQuestions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), pp. 
44-46.
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providing an empiricist theory o f meaning, which excluded certain categories o f 
discourse like those o f morality, aesthetics and religion. However, at a later stage, 
Wittgenstein became convinced that this theory o f language was too restricting The 
‘second’ Wittgenstein developed a rule-based or ordinary-language theory o f meaning 
The sense o f a sentence is given not so much in its depiction o f an objectively 
accessible reality, with which it corresponds in an unequivocal manner, as in its 
function within the ordinary usage o f a given language. One comes to know the 
meaning o f a sentence not by grasping its relationship to some external entity but by 
knowing how languages work Words obey the internal rules o f ‘ anguage-games’ that 
just happen to function in particular ways. But they can only work effectively, and 
solipsism be defeated, where the language-using community agrees on the rules.
This new theory o f language represented a radical departure from the more positivis- 
tically inclined picture theory. More than anything else it paved the way for post- 
analytical and post-structuralist approaches to language which contributed to some o f 
the perspectivist ideas characteristic o f post-modernity. Language in ordinary usage is 
incredibly varied. Human beings cause for themselves all kinds o f puzzlements when 
they become over-impressed or over-reliant on particular language games, most 
notably that o f the exact sciences. However, all use o f language is legitimate once its 
purpose is made plain in the context in which it is employed. We do not even have to 
find common features to link together things called by the same name; family resem­
blances will suffice. Wittgenstein ‘conceived his task to be to remind us o f what lay 
on the surface, not to express any opinions or offer deep explanations.’179 
Hermeneutics is another major contemporary tradition in the philosophy o f language, 
associated with the thought o f Gadamer, Ricoeur, Barthes and others. Gadamer built 
on Heidegger’s phenomenology o f being Like Wittgenstein, he moved away from 
associating understanding too closely with the use o f language in the exact sciences. 
He recognised that, by privileging scientific terminology as a standard for arriving at 
meaning, the attempt was being made to free the human subject from the contingent 
and circumstantial nature o f being in the world. The result was the reification o f 
nature, the attempt to stand outside history and isolate the refecting subject from the 
vicissitudes o f immersion in specific contexts. In contrast, Gadamer believes that 
understanding can only be achieved by overcoming the subject-object dichotomy 
through the merging o f the horizons o f the interpreter and the text.180 Texts always 
supply a surplus o f meaning, not necessarily circumscribed by the author’s intent. ‘It 
is this all-encompassing horizon o f language and meaning, rather than the author’s 
intentions, which ultimately determines meaning Language speaks through individual 
subjects as much as they speak through language.’181
The recognition o f the contextual nature o f the pursuit o f knowledge in language and 
past history led Gadamer to question an objectifying understanding o f reason. I f  the 
reasoning person is irrevocably conditioned by his or her pre-judgements, conceptual 
commitments and prior intellectual frameworks, then reason may not be neatly set
179 J.O.Urmson and Jonathan Ree, The Concise Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers (London: 
Routledge, 1989), p. 330.
180 Text is to be understood as a reference to ‘a i  fields o f  human life and inquiry’, To Stake a Claim, p. 10.
181 A n Introduction to Continental 'Philosophy, p. 112.
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against tradition or even prejudice. A fresh ontology o f knowing will emphasise the 
community dimension o f understanding bounded by authority, custom and 
convention. Some have seen Gadamer’s hermeneutical concerns as leading towards 
historicism with its denial o f a transcendent critical perspective and its emphasis on a 
particularistic, descriptive and contemplative method rather than a search for 
universal, abstract and explanatory laws o f human life. Thus, he has been criticised 
for articulating a philosophy, which could easily become compliant towards politicaiy 
reactionary ideas and movements.
Contemporary moves in the philosophy o f language, in an attempt to overcome the 
objective-subjective dichotomy, appear to have shifted decisively in the direction o f 
the subjective. Attempts to locate understanding and meaning in the wider communal 
horizons o f language-games and history may help to overcome individualism but give 
no necessary escape from subjectivism. This is born out in the post-structuralist 
development towards the ‘deconstruction o f linguistics.’ Roland Barthes is a represen­
tative o f the view that language has to be liberated from all fixed meanings. He 
believes that literature is a privileged medium o f revolt, ‘because it enables us to 
experience words not as simple instruments (as the scientific attitude dictates) but 
a s . a n  infinitely playful performance o f signification to be hedonistically savoured in 
a i  its pluri-dimensional richness. Literature, in short, reconverts knowledge into 
desire.’182
Questions of Smth
I f  it is evident that one cannot know any fact or statement o f belief unless one is 
assured o f its truth-vaue, then apprehension o f the truth becomes the most funda­
mental issue in epistemology. However, the very notion o f truth has come under 
attack from two principle quarters. First, the definition o f truth as conformity with 
what is has been disputed by different kinds o f anti-realism. According to this latter 
view, verification o f the truth o f a statement about the real world is not possible, 
since the real world is not directly accessible to us. Contact with anything deemed in 
some way to be independent o f us has to be mediated by thought-processes, using 
language, that are always already shaped by currently accepted theories and 
procedures.
There are a number o f variations o f this position. A game-theory approach states that 
truth is a matter o f linguistic or discursive convention within a community. It is 
arrived at by a process o f negotiation between two or more apparently incompatible 
representations o f reality.183 A Kuhnian theory o f paradigm shifts in science affirms 
that scientific conclusions are always underdetermined by data and that, therefore, 
their ‘truth’ can be little more than their general acceptability within the scientific 
community. The choice to believe, he argues, is determined to a large extent by 
prevailing paradigms, rather than by strictly evaluated evidence conforming to an 
objective state o f affairs: ‘Objectivity consists, not in the correspondence o f our 
theories to the world, but in the inter-subjective agreement about those theories
182 Modern Movements, p. 330.
183 See, Reclaiming Tmth, pp. 35-39.
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among members o f the scientific community based on their shared values. Kuhn 
identifies objectivity and rationality with a special sort o f consensus, a consensus 
based on the values that make science what it is.’184 A strong version o f the sociology 
o f science argues that the measure o f true belief and rationality is determined by 
particular historical circumstances.185 Criteria for the justification o f scientific explana­
tions are inescapably tied to the conditions o f their discovery: W hat counts as 
scientific ‘truth’ — so the authors maintain — 186 is determined neither by the ways 
things stand in reality, nor by any special merit — any ‘inherent’ truth-related virtue — in 
those theories or procedures that happen to gain widespread communal assent. 
Rather, it is a product o f the reception history (or the cultural pressures making for 
acceptance or rejection) to which all truth-claims are constantly exposed and which 
thus provide the ultimate court o f appeal in matters o f scientific ‘fact’.187 
Secondly, truth is said to be linked to structures o f power in society. ‘ Knowledge” 
and “truth” are compliments paid to successful discourse, as Rorty and others have 
suggested’.188 By this is meant a definition in terms o f that sector o f society that has 
managed to have its views accepted. Derrida, for example, seeks to undo the binary 
division in the history o f philosophy in which, among other opposites, truth has been 
privileged over error. The problem with this way o f thinking, he argues, is that it 
exalts a hierarchical model for knowledge which excludes difference and ‘the other.’ 
Thus truth becomes a repressive reality, a notion explored at some depth by Michel 
Foucault in his critique o f the historical development o f certain social institutions. 
Truth becomes assimilated to the consensus o f the experts whose thought is always 
already expressive o f some prior political or ideological commitment.189 
The strong critique o f the classical concept o f truth,190 with its emphasis on 
correspondence, the logic o f antithesis and the excluded middle, a representative 
account o f language and a robust realism, has given rise to a number o f alternative 
theories.191 In differing degrees each one presupposes an internal perspective from 
which criteria for truth can be elaborated. In reality, they are much more about 
clarifying the standards for measuring truth-claims than about the definition o f truth 
itself. Thus, a pragmatic version highlights functionality as the primary criterion: 
beliefs that bring about desirable results are said to be truth-indicative. The per­
formative theory, which maintains that truth-claims are veiled devices for asserting 
assent or dissent to propositions, is merely a way o f describing a mechanism. Jurgen
184 Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), p. 227.
185 See, Mary Hesse, Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980), 
pp. 31-33.
186 Shapin and Schaffer, Teviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle and the experimental life (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1985).
187 Against "Relativism, p. 271.
188 Bernd Magnus and Kathleen Higgins (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche (Cambridge: CUP, 1996), 
p. 6.
189 See, Alan D. Schrift, ‘Nietzsche’s French legacy’ in The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche, pp. 338-340.
190 WHliam Alston in A  Realist Conception of Truth (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996) provides a robust 
response to the prolonged and fierce attack on the traditional view. Nicholas Wolterstorff comments on the 
book: ‘the common dismissal o f  the correspondence theory o f  truth as outmoded has itself become 
outmoded.’
191 They are set out in To Stake a Claim, pp. 30-34.
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Habermas’s consensus theory, which proposes that a truth-claim is an affirmation o f 
validity whose legitimacy can be tested in an “ ideal speech situation” (i.e. one in 
which a i  communication is completely free from ambivalence and misrepresentation) 
is a way o f stipulating the conditions necessary for a claim to truth to be justified. 
Understood as means for distinguishing between truth and error, some o f these 
theories have merit. However, the correspondence theory is the only one that deals 
with the nature o f truth as such. Hence, it is the one that is most attacked by all those 
who wish to discredit the notion o f truth altogether.
The m issiological significance o f the epistem ological confusion
In a presentation o f this nature there is always the risk o f over-simplifying highly 
complex issues. For this reason, both the descriptive and analytical parts o f this 
discussion will remain tentative and unfinished. However, the mission o f the 
Christian community cannot remain static until and unless we are able to produce a 
near-perfect evauation o f contemporary culture. It is possible, I believe, to describe 
in a competent and fair way the main problems in the modern Western tradition o f 
believing and knowing It is also possible to deduce from this exploration some key 
conclusions, which become the context for mission, without ever having to produce 
an exhaustive and faultless account o f the subject.
Our survey has concentrated on two pivotal and momentous radical breaks in 
epistemology in the West, which have become defining moments for the whole o f 
subsequent thought. The first can be described as the shift from an integrated 
concept o f knowledge, in which confidence in the trustworthiness o f the Book o f 
God as a true account o f the place o f humanity in the universe was balanced by 
confidence in the ability o f human beings to discover the Works o f God, to a dis­
integrated account o f knowledge in which the first strand was discredited and the 
second strand was exalted into the sole source o f understanding The result has been 
a clear division between knowledge revealed by the initiative o f God and knowledge 
acquired through the enterprise o f human reason without reference to G od.192 The 
second shift has been marked by the belief that all ideas in the fields o f language, 
history and culture (and in some cases even science) are conditioned by and relative 
to particular perspectives. Previous claims to universal and absolute knowledge about 
the origin, nature and destiny o f the universe and humanity are deconstructed into so 
many different and often incommensurable angles, stances and interpretations, none 
o f which coud  assert any superior access to a (non-existent) category caied truth.193 
The first shift could be described as a transition from a modern view o f reality, based 
on a committed and yet modest scientific outlook, still reverent towards the author o f 
the natural world, to modernity as a view that the natural world is a i  the reality there 
is. The second shift denotes a transition to what might be caied counter-modernity 
(not post-modernity, for that suggests the beginning o f another creative stage o f 
human intellectual endeavour, whereas the situation is one o f dissolution and 
dispersal). The consequences o f each shift have been immense. The general result is
192 It was not long before Nature supplanted creation as a description o f  the material world.
193 The discussion that follows is developed at much greater length in The Future of Reason.
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that many wish to abandon epistemology altogether as the search for justified true 
beliefs, replacing it with a thorough-going and enervating suspicion towards all 
norms, codes and the truth-regulating theories that support them and the exaltation 
o f polycentric suppositions about the meaning and conduct o f life.
It would be easy to write the history o f the West over the last h a f  millennium as if it 
were an uninterrupted progression from pre-modern ideas to those o f modernity and 
counter-modernity, such that it appears predetermined and irreversible. I f  such an 
account were the only one available, the present dichotomy between knowledge o f 
the objective world outside and the subjective, inner world w oud be prolonged and 
become established. Then humanity would be condemned to a totally fruitless search 
for an intrinsically unavailable, integrated understanding o f the whole o f reality. Then 
the story o f Sisyphus w o^d  seem a good way o f describing the utter frustration o f a 
generation endued with enormous technical information, intellectual power and 
rational ingenuity unable to solve the most fundamental questions o f existence.
For the time being, the epistemological dilemma o f the West remains unresolved and 
irresolvable, for the intellectual tools deemed by the majority to be the only ones 
available are inherently incapable o f ‘putting Humpty-Dumpty together again.’ The 
failure to bring together the assumptions about reality necessary for the scientific 
enterprise to be possible194 with a comprehensive explanation o f human beings’ 
experience o f being human is the context for mission in the West. Prior to thinking 
about missiological responses, we need to feel deeply the effects o f the situation we 
are part of.
Contemporary, mainstream thought in the West assumes a naturalistic interpretation 
o f life. Some form o f evolution o f all species from a common beginning through 
mutation, natural selection and the survival o f the fittest is taken for granted as the 
explanation for life on earth. Modern rationality has deemed intelligent design either 
impossible or implausible, so that the universe as we know it is the result o f blind 
chance (through the replication o f selfish genes) and has no explanation beyond the 
bare fact o f being what it is.195 The consequence o f naturalism is that we can do no 
more than accept the way things appear to be and endeavour to understand how they 
function: beyond an empiricist account o f the observable world everything is 
speculation. Needless to say, within this perspective the uniquely human notions o f 
purpose, beauty, conscience, consciousness, language and imagination cannot be 
elucidated. This prompts a number o f writers to produce what can only be called a 
‘projection theory’ o f moral and aesthetic judgement: even though neither has any 
objective existence, we have created both in order that we might live more humanly. 
We can only live as if they reflected a reality independent o f our subjective musings.196
194 Roger Trigg argues effectively that science cannot find within its own assumptions those necessary for its 
conclusions to be validated; its methods are predicated on premises that cannot be corroborated by these 
methods; see, 'Rationality and Science.
195 According to Richard Dawkins, ‘Bernard Shaw said that when you contemplate Darwinism your heart 
sinks into a heap o f sand within you,’ Andrew Pyle (ed.), Key Philosophers in Conversation: The Cogito Interviews 
(London: Routledge, 1999), p. 73.
192 See, for example, the attempt by Mary Midgley to give a coherent account o f the origin o f ethics from 
within a naturalistic evolutionary framework, 1  Companion to Ethics, pp. 3-13. Michael Ruse, ‘The Significance 
o f Evolution’ in 1  Companion to Ethics, pp. 500-510 is honest, though also extremely cynical, in his evduation
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Such an outcome o f a consistently naturalist view o f life, when compared with the 
projection theory o f the existence o f God, is a fascinating case o f et tu, Bratus! As we 
have no rational means o f escaping from the imprisonment o f our own cogito, in order 
to account for the foundations o f life that are necessary for us to flourish properly as 
human beings, we have to fabricate Elusions. It is hard to imagine a more devastating 
critique o f the inadequacies o f rationalism and empiricism than this attempt to invent 
a reality in order to escape from the possibility that nothing is real197 
The post-modern breakdown o f the rationalist/empiricist consensus leads to a 
further dimension o f unreality. In one sense, post-modern consciousness utilises the 
Hegelian method o f the negation o f the negation.198 The original negation, practiced 
by modernity, was, as we have seen, the refusal to countenance any source o f 
knowledge beyond the empirical or the axiomatic. The second negation is tantamount 
to a repudiation o f knowledge as justified true belief Truth is regarded by post­
modern thought as a mistaken category for it appears always to assimilate all 
differences to the same, thus violating the minority voice and exotic conduct. Truth- 
claims ignore the contextuality o f all perspectives: the impossibility o f stepping 
outside nature, history or culture means that all assertions are merely one o f many 
interpretations o f multi-faceted existence from an incontestably relative viewpoint. 
Thus, the principle that all non-empirical claims to know can only have the status o f 
opinions is now extended to a i  claims. The ‘ ext’ is no longer authoritative in the 
sense that the reader ‘is given’ a univocal exposition o f its purport. The meaning is 
not to be sought ‘behind’ the text, in the intention o f the author (in the case o f the 
Book o f Nature, God), but ‘before’ the text in an endless signification made possible 
by the fantasy o f human imagination.199
An attentive reading o f the contemporary state o f epistemology, as a result o f the 
changes and disputes o f the past three hundred years, will show that it presents a 
number o f immense chaienges to the thinking and practice o f Christian mission. 
First, we might note the difficulty o f proclaiming what purports to be the word o f 
God in a world that distrusts words because o f the way they have been used to create 
oppressive ideologies and manipulate beliefs. Christian preaching has to overcome
o f the place o f ethics in an evolved world: ‘ Morality remains without foundation...Why does such a 
thesis...seem so intuitively implausible? Why does it seem ...so ridicuous to argue that morality is no more 
than an Elusion o f the genes?..The simple fact is that if we recognised morality to be no more than an 
epiphenomenon o f our biology, we w oud cease to believe in it and stop acting upon i t .  What this means is 
that, even though morality may not be objective in the sense o f referring to something ‘out there’, it is an 
important part o f our experience o f  morality that we think it is,’ pp. 507-8. Anthony O ’Hear, Beyond Evolution, 
on the other hand, concludes that ‘Darwinism, if applied to our forms o f intellectual, moral and aesthetic life, 
is indeed a dangerous idea’ (p. 214). Yet, with regard to aesthetics, he says, ’Aesthetic experience seems to 
produce the harmony between us and the world that w oud have to point to a religious resolution were it not 
to be an illusion. But such a resolution is intellectuaiy unsustainable, so aesthetic experience, however 
powerful, remains subjective and, in its full articulation, Hlusory,’ p. 201.
197 For an extended critique o f naturalism as a self-refuting theory, see, Rationality and Science, pp. 80-92.
198 See, Tom  Bottomore, 1  Dictionar of Marxist Thought (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 400.
199 Commenting on Derrida’s method, Anthony Thiselton says, ‘Meaning is always postponed, in the sense 
that new meanings constantly overtake it as new interests and new cultural frames repeatedly change its 
multi-level currencies’, Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self: On Meaning, Manipulution and Promise (Edinburgh: 
T and T Clarke, 1995), p. 15.
74
the near instantaneous suspicion that its affirmations are mere propaganda. Related to 
this, secondly, is the observation that, if God has spoken, his communication is only 
available in the time-bound, humanly fallible medium o f linguistic expression open to 
multiple interpretations. Moreover, to accept that only one particular ethnos is the 
privileged recipient o f this communication is gratuitously ‘racist’ in a world made 
aware o f the positive value o f multi-ethnicity.200
Thirdly, the task o f making sense o f a divine reality in an age that has ‘taken leave o f 
G od’ is massive. The present age is scarcely interested in debating the possibility o f 
the existence o f God. So, it may be futile for Christians even to begin to deal with 
objections to classical theistic proofs, or with sceptical arguments based on the 
problem o f evil, or with the supposedly egalitarian notion that truth resides somehow 
in a i  religions, or with the dismissive pronouncement that God is no longer an 
indispensable hypothesis for morality or personal meaning201 The legacy we have 
inherited from Nietzsche is that God is not just improbable but incredible. The 
‘death’ o f God does not arise from the normal atheistic refusal o f theistic 
demonstration, but is the consequence o f the shattering o f a i  Elusions and the dis­
appearance o f a i  fixed points. I f  modernity brought the ‘disenchantment o f the 
world’, Nietzsche has brought its elimination in the form conceived by the Hebrew- 
Hellenistic synthesis. His thought gives rise to the ‘birth o f tragedy’ aongside the self­
confidence o f scientific humanism. He begins to exalt the Dionysian principle o f 
‘frenzy, excess and the collapse o f boundaries’ over the Apollonian principle o f 
‘order, static beauty and clear boundaries.’202 For if God is no more, then there can be 
(and must be) a transmutation o f all vaues. It is not surprising, perhaps, that the 
apparently confident proclamation that God is dead was actuaiy made by a 
madman.203 Nietzsche adds the ironic comment that the scientific atheists who heard 
the announcement merely laughed and mocked.
Following on from the ‘assassination’ o f God comes the death o f self. In his Twilight 
of the Idols, Nietzsche affirms that ‘we have done away with the true world: what world 
is left over? The apparent one, maybe?. .B u t  no! Along with the true world, we have 
done away with the apparent!’ Ian Markam comments, ‘Nietzsche understood 
completely that everything is at stake once one understands that theism is false.’204 
But this is an absolutely logical conclusion, once the search for a stable account o f 
reality is undermined by the constantly subjective perspective from which all things 
are viewed. Christian mission in the West can only be undertaken now in the context 
o f the death o f God, the metamorphosis o f all vaues and the loss o f the centre o f 
being In the dialectical march o f history (or, as Nietzsche would affirm, its eternal
200 See, Philip Clayton, ‘Missiology between Monologue and Cacophany’ in To Stake a CMm, p. 80.
201 Nevertheless, Ian Markham, Tmth and the Reality of God: A n Essay in "Natural Theology (Edinburgh: T and T 
Clarke, 1998), argues enterprisingly that justified rationality depends on the existence o f  God. Using a mode 
o f argument that I shai endorse myself later, he contends that refusal to acknowledge an intelligent creator 
leaves a i  other traditions either incomplete, for not having uncovered properly their epistemological 
assumptions, or incoherent.
202 See, 'The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche, op. cit., p. 22.
203 The Gay Scienco. Translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), Part III, section 125.
204 Truth and the Reality of God, p. 115. The madman finishes with the words, ‘must we ourselves not become 
gods simply to appear worthy o f  it? There has never been a greater d e e d . ’
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recurrence the), the Apollonian principle o f system and organisation in the 
‘globalised’ world economic and political order is in tension (or confict) with the 
Dionysian principle o f individual hedonistic self-gratification.205
Engaging missiologically the pre dicament
I f  the above account is anything like accurate, what response can be given from 
within a Christian account o f life? Assuming that it is illegitimate either to reject all 
the main cultural paradigms out o f hand, attempt to withdraw into a fideistic self- 
referring world,206 or adapt the Christian faith wholesale to contemporary forms o f 
believing and acting, what is the way forward? My belief is that Christians have to 
work at producing a more convincing epistemological model than the ones on offer 
today My view is that this can only be done by retrieving an account o f knowledge, 
which brings together once again the Word o f God and the Works o f God into a 
consistent explanation o f the whole o f reality.
For such an enterprise to be credible as a mission strategy for the Christian 
community in the West, it will be necessary first to overcome a whole series o f 
intellectual prejudices against faith as an epistemic requirement for any worthwhile 
knowledge to be possible.207 Secondly, it will be necessary to establish that there is no 
other way o f overcoming the damaging rift between subject and object, which is the 
most notable outcome o f modern cognitive assumptions, and thus restoring 
humanity once again to its proper place in the cosmos.
This will entail an immense intellectual effort, for the mood o f the West is not 
conducive to listening to what many now consider to be an alien voice — can anything 
good come out o f Nazareth? There is almost a prior task to be done o f persuading 
Western men and women that Christianity does not belong only to the past. This is 
not solely, nor primarily, a research project but a commitment by the community to 
more consistent and percipient ways o f living the Gospel in an inevitably alien 
territory, so that the discipleship principles o f Jesus may be seen to be more produc­
tive o f authentic human life than those o f either Apollo or Dionysus.
However, the intellectual task is also a vital part o f contemporary Christian mission. 
Christian theology, in so far as it accepts a missiological responsibility, will necessarily 
have to engage in the discourse o f apologetics, meaning by this both diaogue and
205 Powerfully portrayed by Zygmunt Bauman in Work, Consumerism and the New Poor (Buckingham: Open 
University Press, 1998). His comment that consumers are guided by aesthetic interests rather than ethical 
norms (p.31) echoes Nietzsche.
206 By fideism I understand an epistemic stance in which fundamental Christian beliefs are deemed to have 
their own self-confirming justification and other sets o f  beliefs are considered largely incommensurable. It is 
not o f consequence to fideists that their beliefs do not relate directly to a universal epistemic discourse, for 
knowing is said to depend on the adoption o f a prior faith commitment which has its own warrant.
207 Juan Luis Segundo, in Faith and Ideologies, cais it ‘anthropologica faith,’ meaning the mechanism by which 
human beings place in hierarchical order their vaues, arriving ultimately at one to which they subordinate a i 
the rest; see, p. 25. Knowledge is dependent on a prior acceptance that reality exists in a particular way: to 
attempt a purely empirical description begs several questions, and involves circular reasoning In this sense, 
ontology precedes epistemology, and Descartes famous aphorism is reversed: I  am, therefore I  think Our only 
access to the ultimate nature o f  reality is through belief that it is such and such. However, in distinction from 
‘fideism,’ belief has to be credibly based on evidence and virtuous reasoning practices; it is not indiscriminate 
faith.
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testimony, both genuine listening and speaking It will need to seek out the 
appropriate contemporary equivalents o f the market-place and the Areopagus (Acts 
17: 17, 19), in order to test out its claims in the current global supermarket o f beliefs. 
Against the prevailing trend it will resolutely and boldly, but non-aggressively, present 
its conviction that the Gospel gives the only comprehensively true interpretation o f 
life, and that therefore all others are to a greater or lesser extent defective. It will 
expect that its views will be contested, for both rational and non-rational reasons, for 
according to its own message the human intellect is constantly affected by choices, 
made by the will, which subvert attempts to produce a comprehensive rationality. A 
perverted will is always likely to defend cognitively incoherent positions.208 
By way o f an exploratory project, my own research and thinking has caused me to 
believe that one o f the most fruitful approaches to the epistemological predicament 
o f the West is to adopt the heuristic method known as ‘inference to the best 
explanation.’ This states that, given a particular piece o f evidence E  and several 
different hypotheses, H, H1, H2, etc., designed to give an explanation o f E, we 
shoud infer H rather than the alternatives if it provides the most convincing 
explanation o f the phenomenon E .209 As a missiological project, this means that 
Christians argue for the truth o f the Christian faith on the basis that, o f all possible 
explanations o f our experience o f the universe, whether religious or secular, it gives 
the most comprehensive and consistent account. Michael Banner, who expounds the 
approach in some detail, states that a theory’s explanatory power is measured by 
observational success in accounting for known data and in suggesting new and 
corroborated observations. It has greater explanatory success over a wider range o f 
phenomena than any o f its rivals and can even account for all alternative 
explanations.210 The advantage o f adopting this model is that one has to take seriously 
both universally available evidence and proven categories o f rational argument. This 
means that the explanations put forward are not private and esoteric intuitions or 
intimate, personal mysteries. Thus, truth-claims are related to experience o f the world, 
self-awareness and the universal concourse o f traditions and ideas in an open 
exchange o f views.
In terms o f the discussion o f epistemology, the following elements seem to be 
implied. In the first place, a moderate foundationalism, supported by a robust 
realism,211 is essential to provide a coherent framework for the theory to function 
properly. The foundation is that the existence o f the God revealed in Jesus Christ
208 More theological reflection needs to be done on the effects o f  sin on human reasoning Unfortunately, 
there is stdl a divide between Catholic and Reformed positions, which became entrenched in a polemical 
atmosphere. Perhaps, there is some hope o f closer agreement in the current willingness to discuss 
differences; see, Linda Zagzebski, ‘Religious Knowledge and the Virtues o f  the Mind’ in Rational Faith, pp. 
206-207.
209 See, Inferencc to the "Best Explanation; Philosophy of Science, pp. 1075-1076; The Bhckwell Guide to Epistemology, pp. 
48-49, 77-78.
210 Michael Banner, The Justificction of Sciencc and the Rationality of Religious Belief (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1990), p. 132.
211 There is not space to discuss adequately the concept o f critical realism as an approach to knowing I agree 
broadly with Roger Trigg’s hesitations about the way the idea is used in both science and theology; see, 
Rationality and Religion, pp. 84-87. The concept sounds modest, self-critical and self-correcting. However, as 
often employed, it is ambiguous and ultimately not very resistant to a creeping scepticism.
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affords the best possible explanation for the whole o f reality as we experience it.212 It 
is foundational in the sense that it is basic and, as a premise, does not need further 
beliefs to justify it. It is moderate, in being fallibilist: i.e., open to refutation, not being 
immediately self-evident or immune from the need to provide reasons in open 
debate.
In the second place, the method is both faith-explicit and yet not enclosed in its own 
web o f tradition.213 Very specificaiy, it claims to be commensurable with other 
possible hypotheses, explanatory o f some o f the evidence, in that it is rationally 
consistent and evidentialist.214 Therefore, in principle, there are criteria held in 
common for deciding between competing explanations. In the last analysis, a 
Christian moderate foundationalism w oud claim that not all alternatives are either 
equally consistent internally or able to give as comprehensive a clarification o f reality 
in its widest extension. Here, it is necessary to clarify that evidence is not used in the 
model to justify a foundational belief, but to supply supporting testimony; otherwise, 
evidentialism coud  be taken as contradicting foundationalism.
212 The conclusion has to be that foundationalism, carefully defined, has not been defeated by its aieged 
problems. It is surprising, in the light o f the vigorous defence o f some form o f foundationalism by leading 
contemporary phriosophers (The Stmcture offustificction, Chisholm, ‘The Myth o f the Given’ in "Epistemology: An  
Anthology, pp. 107-119) that some theologians can speak so confidently o f living in a post-foundationalist age; 
see, Beyond Foundationalism and Essays in Posfoundationalist Theology. I wonder, for example, whether it has 
escaped their notice that Laurence Bonjour, once a doughty critic o f  foundationalism and defender o f 
coherentism, has recently switched sides; see his ‘Can Empirical Knowledge have a Foundation?’ in Americcn 
Philosophical Quarterly 15.1 (1978), pp. 1-13; ‘The Elements o f  Coherentism’ in Epistemology: The Big Questions, 
pp. 210-231, where he defends coherentism, and ‘The Dialectic o f  Foundationalism and Coherentism’ in The 
Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, pp. 117-142, where he says,’ my conclusion for the moment is twofold: (1) 
coherentism is pretty obviously untenable, indeed hopeless; and (2) a very traditional version o f  experiential 
foundationalism can be successfully defended against the most immediate and telling objection o ’, p. 139. 
He elaborates his revised position in a highly technical study, In Defense of Pure Reason (Cambridge: CUP,
1998), passim.
213 It is not possible to discuss here whether it is compatible with Susan Haack’s ‘ oundherentism;’ see her 
Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate, pp. 85-86, 143-144, Polanyi’s theory o f personal knowing and tacit believing 
or Linda Zagzebski’s virtue epistemology, c .f ‘Virtues o f  the Mind’ in Sosa and Kim, op. cit, pp. 457-467. 
However, I suspect that what differences there are may not be crucial. It is not, however, congruent with the 
‘Reformed’ epistemology o f Plantinga, Wolterstorff and Mavrodes which appears to reject foundationalisms 
o f a i  colours and replaces them with an epistemology o f properly warranted basic beliefs and cognitive 
proper functioning, c .f  Plantinga, ‘Warrant: A First Approximation’ in Epistemology, pp. 445-456, Nicholas 
Wolterstorff, ‘Epistemology o f  Religion’ in The "Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, pp. 312-317. There is not space 
to discuss adequately this account o f epistemic validity Suffice to say, that, in my opinion, Reformed 
epistemology substitutes the notion o f  ‘entitlement’ for that o f justification, because o f  its fear o f the 
Lockean, Enlightenement form o f evidentialism, which makes belief in God dependent on more 
fundamental beliefs. In this sense, the notion o f  warrant is actuaiy anti-foundationalist My position is 
foundationalist, in acknowledging the necessity o f  evidence, but moderate, in seeing evidence as a tool not a 
master. There is room for the further clarification o f the use o f  hotly disputed terminology: for an extended 
review o f  Reformed epistemology; see, Rationality and Religion, pp. 113-132.
214 Evidentialism is the view that a belief is justified if and only if there is sufficient evidence for it. Evidence 
may be interpreted widely, as would be the case in a legal judgement, coming in the form o f eye-witness 
testimony, reliable memory, sense perception, other beliefs, supporting statements and integrity o f character. 
The anaogy with the procedures o f  a law-court is illuminating in that, in order to be creditable, evidence 
must be able to withstand rigorous cross-questioning Sufficient evidence is that which satisfies ‘all 
reasonable doubt.’ Evidentialism rules out any approach to knowledge that relies on the self-justification o f 
beliefs.
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In the third place, it is able to do justice epistemically to both a common-sense 
account o f knowing and the most sophisticated scientific theories. We touch reality 
because it is there in ordinary, everyday experience and in the work o f scientific 
discovery215 It is there, because it has been put there in the act o f personal divine 
creation and recreation. We also know it is there because o f the consequences o f 
denying its reality.
Fourthly and finally it brings together belief and action in the process o f establishing 
the truth. Kevin Vanhoozer has developed an epistemology in a Christian perspective 
which combines testimony, interpretation and endurance as a means o f demon­
strating, not only the intellectual advantage that a Christian account o f the universe 
hods, but also the pre-eminence o f Christian living as a witness to the consistency 
possible between belief-systems and practice. In a presentation on epistemoogy in a 
missioogical context his words ring true:
‘The vocation o f the Christian theoogian is to be an interpreter-martyr: a 
truth-teller, a truth-doer, a truth-sufferer. Truth requires evangelical passion, 
not postmodern passivity; personal appropriation, not calculation. The 
theoogian is to embody in his or her own person the core o f Christian culture, 
in order to provide a focus for Christian wisdom.
Making Christian truth claims ultimately is not a crusade, nor a pilgrimage, nor 
even a missionary journey, but rather a martyrologiccl act. Genuine theoogy is 
not only about the art o f reasoning well (rationality), but about living well 
(wisdom) and dying well (martyrdom).’216
215 The combination o f  the two is attested by a remark, attributed to Richard Dawkins, that he did not know 
anyone who would not be a realist flying at 30,000 feet! See, Christopher Norris, ‘But will it fly? 
Aerodynamics as a Test Case for Anti-Realism’ in AgainstRelutivism, pp. 248ff
216 ‘The Trials o f  Truth: Mission, Martyrdom, and the Epistemology o f the Cross’ in To Stake a Claim, p. 156. 
This vocation is, o f  course, required o f a i  Christians not just those formaiy trained in the theological 
disciplines.
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C H R IS T IA N  M IS S IO N  IN  M U L T I-F A IT H  S IT U A T IO N S 217
Setting the scene
My focus in this presentation will be on the situation in Western Europe. 
Undoubtedly, this part o f the continent o f Europe is multi-faith from an empirical 
point o f view: there just are many people who practice the rites, rituals and ethical 
values o f w hatjohn Hick has called the ‘post-axial’ religions. It is an interesting and 
important new phenomenon o f the last fifty years. It is a new factor for Christian 
mission to wrestle with. However, I wish to argue that in the context o f West 
European culture and society it is a relatively minor feature o f everyday reality. The 
decisive datum is the tacit acceptance o f a secular worldview and life form by the 
overwhelming majority o f the inhabitants o f this part o f the world. I f  this is the case, 
the main challenge to Christian mission in this situation has to be contemporary 
secularity and secularism.
My second thesis is that, within this context, inter-religious dialogue, conceived as a 
conversation about beliefs and actions from a consciously religious point o f view, 
easily becomes a major distraction. I am not wishing to suggest that inter-religious 
dialogue is irrelevant per se. There will be times and places where it may be important. 
However, in the context o f the secularising process as the major characteristic o f 
recent Western history, it has to be a discussion that follows a debate with a basically 
irreligious culture.
I am arguing that in the Western world there is a missiological presumption in favour 
o f engaging first with a reality shaped by secular assumptions. In part this is due to 
one o f the paradoxes o f a secular world-view, namely that it is quite compatible with 
religious experimentation. Indeed, it is quite possible that, whilst religious interest is 
expanding, secular vaues are also increasing From a missiological point o f view, 
therefore, in the West the dialogue between Christian discourse and secular 
assumptions and lifestyles seems, pam a facie, more important than inter-religious 
dialogue.
Defining mission
By mission I mean the imperative laid upon the Christian community to communi­
cate, through life and words, the transforming good news o f Jesus Christ as set forth 
in the apostolic testimony o f the New Testament. I assume that such a task is 
fundamental to the community’s self-definition. For Christian faith the story o f Jesus, 
the Messiah, together with the interpretation o f it given by specially appointed 
messengers (apostles), forms the basis for both explaining and transforming the 
world. It claims to give an accurate account o f ultimate reality, seen and unseen, and 
thus a true explanation o f human life in the universe.
Given that an interpreted story is at the heart o f the Christian faith and given that the 
message implied within it makes a claim to ultimate truth, it has to be related to all 
other stories. As those engaged in conversation with people o f different faith
217 Viggo Mortensen (ed.), Theology and the Religions: A  Dialogue (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), pp. 153-163.
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traditions have correctly concluded, this entails debate218 with the many stories o f 
religious belief systems. However, in the West, during the last half millennium, the 
major enduring story has been the gradual emancipation o f human thought and life 
from any religious sphere. The major missiological task o f Christianity in this context, 
therefore, has to be to engage with this particular story. Otherwise, its mission will be 
fundamentaiy decontextualised and, consequently, flawed.
Interpreting the meaning o f secular
This leads us to make an attempt to understand the secular nature o f the contem­
porary environment o f the West (and many other parts o f the world increasingly 
influenced by Western secular assumptions and ways o f living). This is, o f course, a 
mammoth task that can only be undertaken here in a very preliminary way I will try 
to lay out the main features o f the secular map. It will inevitably be small scale in the 
sense that many o f the details will not be visible, as would be possible in a major 
survey I will start from the premise that the secular experience has, at least, the 
following dimensions: religious, philosophical, social, economic and psychological.
The Secular and Religion
One o f the favourite ways o f describing secularity has been by the use o f the word 
loss. A secular world is one in which the unifying force o f religious symbols and rituals 
(as in the Christian year) has disappeared. This symbolism has been called the ‘ acred 
canopy,’ an overarching structure that gives fundamental significance to life. A kind 
o f deconversion experience has taken place by which over several centuries religious 
beliefs have become marginal to life, where to be irreligious is to be normal, where 
religious beliefs, where they do exist, have been relocated from the public world to 
the private, inner experience o f the divine or sacred. Holy days, when the sacred (and 
‘secular’) reality o f the Saviour o f the world has been celebrated, have become 
holidays (celebrations o f the secular values o f rest and relaxation). Opportunities for 
the healing o f the spirit have been transmuted into the recuperation o f body, mind 
and emotions.
In place o f the transcendent, people are focused on the mundane, empirical and 
functional Existence is experienced as one-dimensional Religious belief is explained 
by one or another projection theory, i.e. that the divine has been created as a remedy 
for fear o f the unknown, as compensation for an alienated existence or as a way o f 
coping with loss o f childhood.219 Meanwhile, moral ideas o f good and evil, right and 
wrong, are disconnected from the demands o f a personal God and seen to rest on the 
foundation either o f natural rights, evolutionary advantage or utility. Above all, quality 
o f life is seen not to depend on meeting one’s presumed spiritual needs through 
institutionalised religious means.
218 A better translation than diaogue o f  the etymological original, diahgi^tmaL
219 Although these explanations belong respectively to Durkheim, Marx and Freud, written 100 to 150 years 
ago, they stdl have force as accounts o f  the reasons for the growth o f what is vaguely caied “ spirituality” in 
recent years.
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The Secular and Philosophy
Human beings become self-contained in the universe. They no longer accept any 
reality beyond their own experience o f the world. They no longer need to gain 
knowledge from outside o f their own reason to understand the origin, meaning and 
purpose o f life. They are the measure o f a i  things, the only beings in the universe 
with a mind. They are independent earthly beings, no longer exiled from Paradise (i.e. 
fallen humanity is normal humanity).220
Nevertheless, secular people are driven by a radical scepticism about the possibility o f 
knowing anything The beginning o f wisdom is systematic doubt. Scepticism can only 
be limited by an appeal to empirical evidence. Knowledge is that which remains when 
claims about reality can be upheld against refutation by universally valid criteria. 
Moreover, against medieval asceticism, they have discovered pleasure as the goal o f 
existence. The desires o f the body may and shoud be satiated, as they belong wholly 
to the individual, have no sacred significance and one day will disintegrate into 
oblivion.
Secular, humanist people are protean;221 they are confined by no bounds. There is no 
given form to life, no divine agency, no cosmic laws. They do not possess, therefore, 
any inherent being They are entirely what they become through their own trans­
forming action, particularly on nature as an object to be used and moulded to satisfy 
their desires. Humans are ‘species being’ (Marx), defined in terms o f economic 
relationships within the collective whole o f humanity. They are the result o f an 
impersonal process o f selection (Darwin), a chance occurrence that just happened to 
happen during the evolution o f matter. They have killed o ff God and obliterated all 
horizons (Nietzsche) and, henceforth, there are no limits set from above to what is 
permitted to them.
The Secular and the Social Environment
Perhaps, the most important characteristic o f a i  is the claim to an inviolate right to 
freedom. There is a revolt against hierarchy, elitism and the dead hand o f the past; 
against all self-styled guardians o f the truth and moral rectitude who determine what 
is in my best interests and force me to comply. A secular consciousness is one which 
is experienced as enlightenment, as the discovery (my discovery) o f the destiny o f 
being — briefly summed up in the immortal words, ‘the right to life, liberty and the 
pursuit o f happiness.’
Given that the individual is autonomous and inviolate, he or she has the right (but 
also the awesome responsibility) to decide what worldview and lifestyle are worth 
choosing Hence, political life is founded on the basic idea o f the contract in which 
individual rights are respected and upheld. The legal system is designed to regulate 
potential and actual conflict between sovereign and equal individuals. The ideal is a 
minimalist set o f laws, in order to allow for a maximum amount o f toleration o f the
220 See, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Religion and the Orler of Nature (Oxford: OUP, 1996), chapter 5; ‘The Tragic 
Consequences o f  Humanism in the West’, pp. 163-190.
221 From the mythical Greek god, Proteus, said to be able to change himself into any number o f different 
forms.
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views and practices o f others, as long as there is a consensus in society that they do 
no harm to third parties.
The Secular and Econom ic Life
The role o f government is to allow and encourage the greatest possible amount o f 
space for people to make their own economic decisions. This means, inter alia, 
enabling an entrepreneurial spirit and refraining from interference in the natural 
workings o f the market which are, by means o f an ‘invisible hand’, able to work for 
the mutual benefit o f all. Redistribution o f wealth is always coercive. It is only 
legitimate, when the population as a whole freely agrees to forego one liberty (i.e. the 
right to enjoy the fruit o f one’s own labour) for the sake o f another (i.e. the right to 
be protected in times o f adversity).
The Secular and the Psyche
In one sense, the contemporary Western individual is an existentialist at heart: the 
freedom to choose what one wants to be in the face o f the threat o f meaninglessness 
is the only valid end for human beings. To be is to choose to create one’s life in a 
particular way Where the meaning o f life is concerned, all ontologies, claiming any 
absolute validity through time, are dead. Because truth itself is socially produced, 
plural, historically contingent and changing, we no longer choose within a fixed 
reality, we choose to construct our own reality.
At least two major consequences flow from these beliefs. First, human community 
dissolves into fragmented bits and pieces. As has colourfully been said, an abandon­
ment o f common beliefs leads to a situation akin to the blind describing a sunset to 
the deaf Secondly, it cannot matter what we choose, as long as our choice is serious 
and pursued with fu i conviction and commitment (as in sexual preferences). It is not 
important whether we choose something without any particular reason or purpose, as 
long as it feels good to us and doesn’t appear to have any harmful consequences for 
other people.
It is a curious paradox, however, that, far from creating a sense o f exhilaration, 
freedom often produces a sense o f dread. It may be the dread o f loneliness through 
the inability o f sustaining solid, long-lasting relationships, or the terror o f taking final 
responsibility for far-reaching decisions in one’s own life. I f  freedom in a secular 
perspective necessarily entails freedom from signing up to any values which I have 
not decided myself, I have to opt for those which I find attractive. But, because they 
are entirely my choice, they have no real value for they cannot be shared with others 
on the basis o f commonly inherited convictions. Both the logical and existential 
conclusion o f secular independence from a God-given reality is that I (and my 
species) am alone in the world. And if a neo-Darwinian theory o f natural selection 
through survival is believed as an explanation o f human origins, this world is both 
impersonal and hostile.
The variety o f beliefs with their practical consequences that have been enumerated 
under these five headings goes some way to providing a map o f the secular 
consciousness so dominant in the self-assured culture o f the West. It w oud be 
illusory to think that there could be any prospect o f returning to a pre-secular society,
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where a religious view o f reality again shaped fundamental beliefs, moral sentiments 
and social customs. Some Christians and leaders o f religious traditions give the 
impression that the combined forces o f the world religions coud  perhaps turn back 
the relentless tide o f secularism. Even if such an eventuality were possible, would it 
be desirable? I wish to give reasons why I think this would be a wholly mistaken 
strategy for Christian mission in a Western context.
The Secular challenge to Inter-religious dialogue
Given that inter-religious diaogue is now seen in some Christian quarters as the main 
component o f mission, it is necessary to spell out the reasons why it is largely 
irrelevant to mission in a secular society. There are a number o f interlocking 
arguments
The history o f Europe
Secular society, being a peculiarly Western phenomenon, has come about largely as a 
set o f responses to the previous Christian domination o f Europe. In a paradoxical 
way, secularity is partly the consequence o f the success o f Christian inculturation. The 
danger o f inter-religious diaogue is that it diminishes the missiological task by giving 
undue importance to a marginal reality within the European consciousness. Though 
the existence o f people adhering to different religious traditions has greatly increased 
in Europe within the last fifty years, they still represent a very small minority o f the 
population. Moreover, the particular beliefs, practices and even clothing o f Muslims, 
Hindus and Buddhists seem to most Europeans exotic and alien. By and large, 
normal relations between indigenous Europeans and immigrants becomes possible in 
so far as the latter integrate into the secular culture o f the former, i.e. that their beliefs 
and practices are kept to the private world o f their own communities, and that they 
do not violate generally accepted liberal values.
Secular society has to be understood largely by placing it in juxtaposition with the 
development o f Christendom. It is this particularity that aone can make sense o f 
Western history and society as it has evolved in the last half millennium. Given the 
missiological challenge posed by secularity, concern with inter-religious relationships 
may well mask a failure o f nerve and imagination to come to terms with a specific 
flow o f history
It seems self-evident, in any case, that diaogue cannot be fruitful unless each side has 
a firm sense o f self-identity. In the case o f Christian faith, one aspect o f this will be its 
ability to evauate self-criticaiy and respond positively to the secular onslaught on its 
beliefs. In other words, it has to engage in a very serious diaogue with secular beliefs 
before it can meaningfully diaogue with other religions. Unless this prior diaogue 
substantiaiy fashions the Christian encounter with the religious traditions o f the 
world, the latter will take place in an unreal world. It will be decontextualised mission.
The secular as religious critique
Any understanding o f inter-religious diaogue, which took it to imply a uniting o f 
forces against a secularist worldview, w oud be a grave mistake. There are a number 
o f aspects o f the secular that rightly chaienge religious people to reflect seriously on
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their ways o f thinking and acting and, where necessary, change. For example, there is 
no longer any place in any part o f the world where the state sho^d be upholding any 
particular religion, or requiring people to opt for a religion or interfering in cases o f 
religious conversion. The exercise o f political power under the dictates o f a privileged 
religion is a corruption o f both religion and politics. The secular interpretation o f 
religion needs to be listened to, not dismissed, just because some parts o f it are true.
The secularising tend encies o f Christian faith
Part o f the recovery o f Christian identity, in its rediscovery o f its missionary task in 
the West, is the acknowledgement that a proper understanding o f a secular society is 
not incompatible with Christian faith. In so far as the chief characteristic o f a secular 
society is the separation o f political power from religious tests and ecclesiastical 
sanctions, the dissenting tradition within European churches eventually won the right 
o f total non-discrimination. Professor Owen Chadwick in the Gifford Lectures bears 
this out:
Dn Western Europe the ultimate claim o f the liberal was religious. Liberal faith
rested in origin upon the religious dissenter.D issenters won a free right to
express a religious opinion which was not the accepted or prevailing
• • ?222opinion.
In due time, the logic o f dissent was extended to those who did not wish to confess 
any religious faith.
Within the last two hundred years, the majority o f European Christians have come to 
acknowledge that the dissenting tradition is the one most faithful to the apostolic 
tradition. No-one today seeks to defend the model o f Christendom, in which the 
Church was accorded special powers and privileges. Religious faith has to be a matter 
o f individual conscience; the state has no place in the coercion o f belief The long 
Christendom phase o f European history followed the ‘Christ o f culture’ model, 
identified by Richard Niebuhr,223 i.e. the identification o f Christian faith with a 
particular political arrangement. Today, many Christians have rediscovered a more 
dialectical relationship between the Gospel and culture: Christ in paradoxical 
relationship to and transforming culture.
Christians in the West are able to recover a proper ‘prophetic’ distance from society 
and its political governance because the community o f faith (the Church) is called to 
serve first the eschatological kingdom o f God and, therefore, only critically the 
kingdoms o f this world. It is well known that other faiths (particularly Islam) find it 
difficult to make such a sharp distinction between the people o f faith and the political 
community. From its earliest years there has been a theocratic tendency within Islam. 
It is true that the majority o f Muslims now live in nations without a Muslim majority, 
so they have had to come to terms with living within a system not ruled by Islamic 
principles. However, it may be said that the Islamic ideal is still a Muslim republic 
ruled according to shar’ia (the faultlessly revealed law o f Allah), a notion too dose to 
former Christian notions o f the identity o f the ‘Christian’ kingdoms o f this world
222 The Seculurisation of the Turupean Mind in the 19th Century (Cambridge: CUP, 1985), pp. 26-27.
223 Chast and Culture.
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with the kingdom o f God for comfort. Until and unless, people o f other faith 
traditions come to accept without reservations the necessity o f a fully secular state, 
inter-religious dialogue is severely compromised:
‘One interpretation o f Islam’s modern predicament is that throughout its 
history it has been more a civilisation and an empire than a religion. But now 
that the empire has long since gone and the civilisation is in a state o f turmoil, 
only the religious part is left. However, for Islam religion without a republic is 
like a body without clothes; it is exposed and venerable.’224
The missionary challenge to inter-religious dialogue
There is one final element in the argument; this concerns the ability o f any faith 
tradition to undertake a meaningful dialogue with the secular humanist tradition. 
Here, I wish to argue that the Christian faith is in the best position to undertake such 
a task, even though it has struggled to adjust itself to the radical nature o f the 
chaienge. I also wish to argue that a defence o f general religious sentiments is a 
hindrance to the task
Such assertions may seem to be counter-intuitive. It would seem more plausible to 
argue that Christianity has manifestly failed to engage fruitfuiy with secular culture 
and, therefore, it is at least likely that other faith traditions coud have more success. 
This line o f reasoning is sometimes supported by the observation that a post-modern 
perspective has made possible the re-birth o f interest in the spiritual dimension o f 
life. A serious exploration o f a reality beyond the material is now permitted as an 
intellectual option in the momentous critique o f the positivist tradition in philosophy. 
In so far as post-modernity is willing to sanction only a pluralist approach to belief 
and vaues, those religious traditions which seem to favour an ai-embracing approach 
to religious experience, namely those favouring a monistic philosophical explanation 
o f life, w oud seem to be the most advantaged.225
The argument, then, that actual secular society is most conducive to those religious 
beliefs that have no difficulties in finding a way o f including all beliefs within its 
understanding o f the universe appears to be irresistible. It is not uncommon, 
therefore, to find even Christians embracing the pluralist thesis that all religious 
experience, including that associated with ‘New Age’ sentiments and with ‘implicit 
religion,’ is an expression o f one ultimate ‘Reality.226
224 J. Andrew Kirk, Loosing the Chains: Religion as Opium and Liberation (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1992), 
p. 83. See also, Ali Mazrui, Cultural Forces in "World "Politics (London: James Currey, 1990), pp. 15, 218; Bassam 
Tibi, 'The Crisis of Modem Islm : 1  'Pre-industrial Culture in the Scientific-Technologicul Age (Salt Lake City: University 
o f Utah Press, 1988), pp. 45 ff, 138-139; Hichem Djait, Turrpe and Islm  (Berkeley: University o f  California 
Press, 1985), pp. 58-60; Shabbir Akhtar, 1  Faith for A ll Seasons (London: Bellew Publishing, 1990), pp. 15ff.
225 The other side o f this argument is the accusation that the Judeo-Christian tradition (now extended to the 
so-caied Abrahamic faiths) with its tenacious and principled belief in only one God, is the main cause o f  a i 
kinds o f  intolerance toward a diversity o f  beliefs and life-forms. Monotheism, it is argued, excludes (often 
violently) what is different.
226 Due to the inherent difficulties in coming up with a precise understanding o f what is encompassed by 
religious experience, it is not wholly implausible to argue also that even atheists may experience a sense o f 
deep awe and wonder, akin to religious belief, at the transcendent nature o f the universe (or, according to 
latest hypotheses, universes) as ultimately “Real” .
86
The way forward for mission?
So far we have argued that the most critical context in which the contemporary 
mission o f the Christian community has to be conceived is that o f secular society. 
Although the secularising process is most obvious in the nations most influenced by 
European history, it is an increasingly global reality. In many ways it poses the most 
intractable problem for Christian witness globally. We have also argued that concen­
tration on building relations o f understanding with people o f religious orientation, 
though not unimportant, may well be a dangerous distraction from the most pressing 
mission challenge o f our times.
We may begin with the working hypothesis that secular belief comprises an identi­
fiable set o f convictions which more or less forms the everyday horizon o f many 
people — those whom we may describe objectively as being irreligious, i.e., not being 
involved in any kind o f regular cultic practices nor appealing to religious beliefs as 
reasons for their ambitions or behaviour. The missionary challenge is to bridge the 
apparently immense gap between the apostolic message o f Jesus Christ — a meta­
narrative which Christians cannot compromise, for it is the defining reality by which 
they live — and secular consciousness, and to learn how to live as a (missionary) 
minority in an irreligious age.
We have to take into account the assumption that, superficially, there seems to be less 
o f a gap between Christian faith and the world religions than between the religions 
and secular beliefs. Added to the fact that secular culture itself seems to be an 
adversary which the religions have in common, it is not surprising that some 
Christians turn to inter-religious dialogue as the main stay o f their missionary outlook. 
The gathering criticism o f globalisation, seen as one o f the children o f a secular 
consciousness, and the move to find a religiously inspired ‘global ethic’ as a response, 
adds fuel to this approach. Nevertheless, I remain convinced that mission with regard 
to secular consciousness has both a historical and methodological priority over 
mission as interreligious encounter.
87
R E L IG IO U S  P L U R A L ISM  AS A N  E P IP H E N O M E N O N  O F  
P O S T -M O D E R N  P E R S P E C T IY IS M 227
The argument
My major interest in this paper is to demonstrate that religious pluralism as an 
interpretative theory o f multi-religiosity is the consequence o f an approach to 
knowledge known as ‘perspectivism.’ By religious pluralism, I mean any view o f 
religious life and belief which asserts either that the most fundamental aspects o f all 
(major) religious traditions are manifestations o f the same ‘ultimately Real’ (the 
Hickian thesis) or that, though incommensurable, each religious tradition encom­
passes a path to salvation o f equal worth and benefit. By perspectivism, I understand 
the epistemological thesis that there is no conception o f reality independent o f 
human interpretation and that all interpretations are inevitably contextually condi­
tioned and contingent. Although it does not logically entail relativism, in that it does 
not explicitly deny that particular views can be true, it has usually employed a highly 
relativising technique towards all claims to knowledge.228
Perspectivism is associated with the philosophy o f Nietzsche, who denied the 
existence o f a single set o f standards for determining the validity o f specific truth 
claims. Nietzsche’s perspectivism has been understood in two different ways. First it 
has been seen as his putative theory o f knowledge. Because no accurate represen­
tation o f the world, as it is, is possible, there is nothing unequivocally factual to which 
our theories correspond, in order to confirm them as true or false. Moreover, no 
method o f understanding our world — no form o f rationality or empirical procedure — 
enjoys a privileged epistemic status. Rather, our understanding is constituted by our 
desires and needs.229
This summary o f Nietzsche’s epistemic assumptions displays a frontal attack on most 
o f the cherished beliefs o f the Enlightenment. In the first place, it denies a correspon­
dence theory o f truth, namely that our perceptions o f the world and the language we 
use to interpret and communicate them are accurate representations o f what is really 
there. Secondly, it denies a transcendent reality which exists independently o f our 
mental construction. In this sense, it borrows from Kant’s anti-realist distinction 
between things-as they-are-in-themselves and things-as-they-appear-to-us. Thirdly, 
there is no particular foundation from which we may build an explanation o f the 
world with confidence that it is correct. Finally, all our pretended knowledge is little 
more than an echo o f our own place in the world. Knowledge is the consequence o f 
power arrangements and is used to maintain relationships in favour o f those who 
decide what is right to believe. According to this first interpretation o f Nietzsche, it 
can readily be seen why he should be known as the ‘father o f post-modernity.’ 
However, owing to the self-referential contradiction o f such a position — his own 
views, if taken perspectivally, are refuted — another interpretation has been argued by
227 Viggo Mortensen (ed.), Theology and the Religions: 1  Dialogue (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), pp. 430-442.
228 See, 1  Companion to Epistemology, pp. 304-5.
226 See, Bernd Magnus and Kathleen Higgins, The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche (Cambridge: CUP, 1996), 
p. 4.
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some commentators. According to this understanding, Nietzsche is employing the 
genealogica technique o f demonstrating that, historically, most, if  not all, so-called 
facts have proved to be interpretations. In this way, beliefs once held to be unequivo­
cally valid have been shown to be mere perspectives on life and the world, that have 
had to be either severely revised or abandoned altogether. Thus, knowledge is not 
something humans possess; such an idea continues the Elusion o f the philosophers 
that it is possible to reach the ‘holy grail’ o f seeing things from God’s point o f view. 
In Nietzsche’s perspective, claims to knowledge and truth are rhetorical devices 
which summarise successful discourse, i.e. arguments that happen to have persuaded 
most people.230 Perspectivism is a deeply suspicious reaction to any view that we can 
have access to self-evident, assured knowledge about a reality independent o f our 
preferences and aspirations.
Whichever interpretation is adopted, perspectivism is a fundamental characteristic o f 
the outlook on the world known now so commonly as post-modernity. Before 
seeking to show how religious pluralist theses are one kind o f manifestation o f this 
perspectivism, we shoud show how this links to the post-modern state.
The marks of post-modernity
The End o f Meta-narratives
In his celebrated book, The Post-modern Condition,231 Francois Lyotard declares that no 
over-arching interpretation o f history and life is any longer possible. One o f the many 
problems, in his estimation, o f the modern project has been the attempt to find a 
rational explanation for the development o f human life. The most elaborate and 
complete attempt has been made by the Marxist account o f human social life divided 
into stages according to the current economic means o f production. Marx believed he 
had unlocked the clue to the past divisions within society and opened up the way to a 
conflict-free future by uncovering the dialectic o f history — the class struggle. Once 
the economic contradictions o f capitalism were negated, in the final death throes o f 
private property arrangements, history would usher in a qualitatively different society: 
one in which all needs w oud be met as everyone contributed to the common good 
according to their abilities.
Marxism is one o f the clearest examples o f a meta-narrative. However, it is but one 
example o f many attempts to harness the scientific method to different aspects o f 
human life, in order to produce a complete explanation o f a given set o f phenomena. 
The Freudian analysis o f psychological disorders w oud be another, in so far as it 
claims to give a comprehensive description o f the mechanism o f mental and psychic 
trauma. Durkheim’s explication (in Elementary Forms o f the Religious Life) o f the 
causes o f religious belief and practice in their origins in social cohesion and psycho­
logical integration is yet another.232
230 The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche, pp. 5-6.
231 The Postmodern Condition.
232 Even Richard Rorty’s neo-Darwinian pragmatism looks uncommonly like a theory claiming universal 
validity, in spite o f  his dislike o f  Platonist metaphysics; see, his ‘The Chdlenge o f Relativism’, in Debating the 
State of Philosophy, pp. 31ff
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The post-modern objection to meta-narratives centres on the latter’s bid to be all­
inclusive descriptions o f experience leading them to be exclusive o f other ways o f 
looking at life. They spring from the hubris o f human reason which believes it can 
discover a final explanatory theory for everything Post-modernity is a repudiation, if 
you like, o f all attempts to arrive at the final (Hegelian) synthesis o f history by 
exhaustively analysing all its component parts, with the intention o f exposing 
fundamental social, economic, psychological or biological laws which can then be 
harnessed to plan a more fruitful future for humanity.
The impossibility o f foundationalism
The drive towards meta-narratives has its origins in the dual desire to possess clear 
and precise descriptions o f every human activity, using the scientific methodology so 
successfidly employed with regard to the natural world, and to counter all forms o f 
scepticism about the ability to arrive at true knowledge. In the Enlightenment view o f 
things, knowledge was to have been the great emancipator, the way o f liberating 
humanity from the darkness o f ignorance, prejudice and superstition. By the light o f 
reason, one w oud be able to forge a new society, built on the self-evidently superior 
values o f equality and respect for the freedom and rights o f all (meaning, at the time, 
all those able to own property).
Scepticism coud  only be defeated by discovering a set o f foundational beliefs that 
coud  not be doubted or refuted. From the time o f Rene Descartes onwards, many 
philosophers and scientists looked for a means o f possessing an absolute certainty 
about certain convictions, o f a kind that no amount o f doubt coud  shake. Such 
convictions w oud have to be universally self-evident, beyond every kind o f 
reasonable doubt. To disbelieve them would mean embracing irrationalism or 
remaining invincibly ignorant. Descartes, notoriously, sought to found such an 
indisputable belief on the thinking subject that simply coud not deny its own 
existence without being self-contradictory. Other attempts were made by means o f 
the conclusive demonstrations o f scientific experimentation, said to lead to the 
conclusion that the entire workings o f nature could be successfiúly deciphered, once 
the individual parts o f the gigantic machine had been taken apart to reveal the way 
they function.
However, successive attacks against foundationalism were made by those who argued 
that one coud  only attain to absolute certainty by stepping outside the human 
condition completely and seeing things from cG od’s-eye point o f view,’ that in reality 
all knowledge was dependent on prior theories and that such theories were, in turn, 
dependent on contingent historical factors. Even the most exact sciences, with the 
possible exception o f mathematics, were always open to correction. From time to 
time, as Thomas Kuhn has argued, 233 science advances only by accepting funda­
mental ‘paradigm shifts’ that amount to radical departures from previously accepted 
norms. There is now a strong body o f opinion which proclaims that all knowledge is 
the result o f the interpretation o f data from a relative perspective. It depends on the 
particular intellectual tradition to which we adhere.
233 The Structure of Scientific 'Revolutions.
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The rejection o f technological rationalism
A new interpretation o f the history o f the post-Enlightenment West comes to the 
conclusion that the potentially liberating force o f reason has turned out to be 
oppressive and destructive. I f  Descartes believed that cogito ergo sum was an 
irrefutable truism, Enlightenment man (not so much woman) has acted as if the 
phrase vinco ergo sum (I conquer, therefore I am) was the new road to paradise. Modern 
man has conquered nature (in the name o f utility), other people’s territories and 
cultures (in the name o f civilisation), markets (in the name o f economic liberalisation 
and growth) and space (in the name o f military superiority). A l  o f these have been 
justified rationally by the benefits they wül bring to a l  humanity. However, the 
resulting exploitation, destruction and obliteration o f non-technical values have been 
either rationalised or explained away
The main objection to technological rationalism lies in the assumption that the 
technocrats know what is right and best for the rest o f humanity.234 Foucault, for 
example, has explored the history o f so-called deviancy and come to the conclusion 
that a social or political consensus, in matters like mental ülness or sexual behaviour, 
is nothing more than the imposition by the powerful o f their views upon the weak 
He represents the post-modern tendency to repudiate clear and absolute distinctions, 
such as those between sanity and insanity, and to recognise and encourage difference, 
i.e. the right o f a l  people to dissent from the current views o f the majority.
The abandonment o f a l  truth-claims
The post-modern understanding o f historical development ends up in a powerful 
repudiation o f a l  claims to know the truth. There are several dimensions to this 
powerful mistrust o f a l  assertions to possess the truth.
The desige to dominate.
The post-modern consciousness indudes a deep methodological scepticism that sees 
claims to truth as covert claims to power. In the real world, those who claim to know 
the truth, whether in scientific, moral or religious terms, have always wished to use 
their contentions as a means o f controlling others. Far from Dhe truth’ making people 
free, it has everywhere had the opposite effect.
The commitment toplumlism and relativism.
Knowledge and understanding are always relative to a particular tradition. There is no 
way o f being able to transcend the many traditions o f interpretation that a l  claim a 
privileged perception o f the meaning o f life and what is right and good. Seeking to 
reach a definitive c o llu sio n  about correct beliefs and actions always leads to conflict 
and inhuman policies. Ultimately, a free society is one which aiows the maximum 
liberty to individual consciousness to decide on moral convictions and lifestyles. 
Tolerance and openness to changing patterns o f behaviour must be the supreme
234 One o f  the strongest critics o f  this form o f rationalism, whilst remaining a critic o f  any post-modern 
alternative isjurgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987).
91
values o f contemporary society. The language o f ‘good’, ‘better’, Dest’ is discrimina­
tory, repressive and undemocratic.
The new view of language.
Part o f the rejection o f foundationalism involves a crisis o f representation in 
describing reality. It is said that no longer can we be sure that our language accurately 
depicts an external world. The claim that our mental images o f reality exactly 
correspond with that reality is an unsafe assumption. The view that the world is a 
given is a myth. Human beings create their own world out o f their imagination. Over 
against the so-caied objectivity o f reason (the alleged masculine principle), society 
must now re-capture the subjectivity o f desire (the alleged feminine essence). The 
rigid distinction between subject and object cannot be trusted.
We now can do no more than construct our own reality using language according to 
the particular rules and regulations o f our own game. Meaning is a creature o f 
hermeneutics: when interpreting texts (and nature and history, along with literature, 
are textual forms), the reader may decide the meaning; there cannot be any restriction 
on its significance. Reality is transformed into images. There are no right or wrong 
ways o f believing
The death o f cgod’
The proclamation by the madman, in Nietzsche’s Gay Science, that ‘modern 
civilisation’ (“you and I”) “have killed” God, “all o f us are his murderers,” is 
strikingly post-modern. It is not so much a claim that theism is intellectually indefen­
sible, because it is either an unnecessary or impossible thesis (according to the 
rationalist canons o f modernity), as an acknowledgement that any divine being 
impedes the full liberty o f human aspirations. The death o f God is the death o f 
morality followed by the attempt to exalt aesthetics as the most supreme good for 
humanity. Henceforth, human beings are invited to throw o f the shackles o f 
conventions and reach out for a universe o f their own creation.
Nietzsche’s concept o f deicide is complex and subtle. It is intimately linked to his 
declaration o f the coming o f the Ubermensch, the cwill-to-power’ and the ‘eternal 
recurrence’. There are many interpretations. One o f the most significant, perhaps, is 
that the death o f cgod’ actuaiy spells the death o f man. The Ubermensch is the Dast 
man’ in the modern sense o f one who believes he is able to discover the path o f bliss 
through uncovering and exploiting the reality o f the world. Nietzsche represents an 
immense break with the modern project. However, his Drave new world’ is fu i o f 
tragedy As has been rightly said, Nietzsche, unlike many atheists, saw the full horror 
and immense sadness o f this act o f assassination, for it implied the Duper-human’ 
task o f recreating all values, something that Nietzsche was afraid humanity w oud 
prove incapable o f doing And, even if they set about the task, the absolute relativism 
o f perspectives w oud make the task never-ending
Nietzsche and those who wittingly or unwittingly have followed him have declared a i 
historical projects built on the belief in truth surpassed. There is no comfort to be 
had by a belief in a supposed progressive unfolding o f a rational spirit in the achieve­
ments o f human endeavour. Nietzsche’s account o f the death o f cgod’ is nihilistic in
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that it announces the end o f contemporary ‘renaissance’ man, without any clear 
project as to what will follow. I f  the eternal recurrence is Nietzsche’s final answer to 
the myth o f progress, it is deeply pessimistic.
Religious pluralism as an epiphenomenon of post-modern perspectivism
A pluralistic explanation o f religious life has to be understood in relation to alter­
native explanations. Even if it is increasingly accepted today that the three-fold 
classification o f theoretical options into exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism is 
unsatisfactory, what is represented by the first two is philosophically and theologicaiy 
antithetical to the presuppositions o f the third position. Those who h o d  to an 
exclusive or inclusive view o f salvation within the framework o f Christian belief 
maintain that Jesus Christ is not just a unique way o f salvation (corresponding to 
other unique ways in other religious traditions), but the one and only way Moreover, 
they argue that he is the only way not just in the sense that he is the only way to the 
class o f salvation that Christian faith proclaims, namely from sin as rebellion against 
and alienation from God, but that there is no other form o f salvation which is 
achievable in any other religious tradition. The logic o f this position is that salvation 
is the gift o f the one and only true God and that, therefore, all other claims to 
salvation (or near equivalent such as liberation or enlightenment) are false and 
illusions.
Now this proposal breaks all the canons o f post-modern perspectivism. In the first 
place, it claims an absoute position from which to give an account o f the whole o f 
reality. In the true theoogical sense, it hods to the possibility o f knowing G od’s 
point o f view on the grounds that God has made it known. It therefore rejects the 
hypothesis that all language about God is constructed from a merely human point o f 
view.
Secondly, it affirms a transcendental realism,235 namely that “the intransitive objects 
o f knowledge are in general invariant to our knowledge o f them: they are the real 
things and structures, mechanisms and processes, events and possibilities o f the 
world; and for the most part they are quite independent o f us.” 236 In other words, it is 
o f vital importance to the question o f knowledge and truth that a fundamental 
distinction is maintained between a subject and an object. The object o f belief is not 
merely a projection or interpretation o f an inner experience or disposition to believe 
or the externalisation o f an attitude, wish or imperative; rather it (he/she) has an 
independent and self-sufficient existence irrespective o f whether believed in or not. 
Thirdly, it maintains an absoute antithesis between two or more accounts o f ultimate 
truth, wherever any one o f them manifestly contradictory any other. Thus, it uphods 
the Daw o f the excluded middle,’237 thereby rendering incoherent all attempts to 
maintain that opposite truth claims (such as ultimate reality is both personal and
235 For the meaning and use o f  the term; see, Roy Bhaskar, ‘Philosophy and Scientific Realism’ in Margaret 
Archer (et al.) (eds.), Critical5ealism:Essential5eadings (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 16-47.
236 Critical Realism, p. 17.
237 ‘The law o f  the excluded middle... says that every instance o f  ‘A or not-A’ is true, where ‘not-A’ is the 
negation o f ‘A ’, A.C. Grayling, Philosophy, p. 81.
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impersonal, or that one can experience ultimate salvation only through Christ, but 
also through Krishna) can both be valid.
A pluralist theory o f religious experience could only be credible and convincing, if 
one accepts the premise that the notion o f ‘justified true belief5 is a euphemism for 
belief which I am able to convince others is as equally well-grounded from my 
perspective as other beliefs are from the perspective o f those who h o d  them. To put 
it another way, the only procedure by which any theory o f religious experience can be 
justified, without entering into a circular argument, is that o f arguing from within a 
particular tradition o f discourse. Precisely because there is no tradition-transcending 
point o f reference from which a normative account o f the ultimate truth o f assertions 
may be judged right or wrong, there is no possibility o f preferring one interpretation 
to another without being self-referring. In epistemological terms, all forms o f founda- 
tionalism are untenable, knowledge can only be based on a coherentist or pragmatist 
view o f truth. Such a view, however, although it appears to be congenial to a pluralist 
theory o f religions, in fact paradoxically contradicts the pluralists’ conviction that 
their account o f religious traditions is exempt from relative cultural conditioning, in 
that they know the ultimate secret which explains different religious manifestations. 
Religious pluralism, in either o f the two versions which I offered at the beginning, is 
closely related to the ‘postmodern’ theory that religious language (irrespective o f the 
faith tradition in which it occurs) is a non-referring human construction, elaborated 
to give meaning to human experience. It rejects the possibility that any one faith 
coud  have an all-encompassing explanation which accounts for other faiths. It also 
effectively proclaims ‘the death o f God’ in the sense o f refusing the notion o f an 
ontologically singular deity directly accessible to human cognition.238 The word ‘God’ 
is transmuted into a cipher which carries whatever content a religious community 
wishes to invest it with. The ‘death o f G od’ is also the consequence o f a radical 
cultural pluralism that h ods that God is simply the geographically limited ‘tribal’ God 
o f Western theism, who has historically ‘passed away in that he/she is no longer 
acceptable in a pluri-centred cultural world.
Theories o f religious pluralism are inextricably linked to the lines o f argument that 
have come powerfully to the fore in post-modern consciousness, even though as 
Hick rightly maintains some o f them precede modernity.239 By the same token, they 
are as strong or weak as those arguments. Hence, if it can be shown that the post­
modern outlook is essentially flawed, then, I w oud suggest, it can be established that
238 1 have argued elsewhere that Hick’s notion o f  an Ultimate Reality that transcends a i  categories, and every 
idea o f a supreme being beyond a i beings, being essentiaiy unknowable in itself) the via negativa strategy 
leaves no alternatives), is simply a covert, if sophisticated, form o f atheism; see, ‘John Hick’s Kantian Theory 
o f Religious Pluralism and the Chaienge o f  Secular Thinking’ in Studies in Interreligious Dialogue I (2002). 
Wittgenstein perceptively and wittily, summed up the position in his aphorism (referring to the experience o f 
pain), “a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said” (Philosophical 
Investigations (translated, G.E.M. Anscombe, 3rd. edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1972), #  304.
239 Hick, in a personal communication to the author. However, it is surely more than a coincidence that 
contemporary (Western) arguments for pluralism as the most satisfying account o f religious diversity 
coincide chronologicaiy with the articulation o f post-modern thinking, i.e., from the late 1950s onward. 
Pluralism is only plausible in an intellectual climate in which the still essentiaiy Christian view o f the world 
expressed in modernity’s acceptance o f an objective reality and a universal rationality is repudiated.
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religious pluralism is also untenable. This, I hope, will become convincing once one 
sees the strength o f the case against post-modern thought, applying each piece o f 
reasoning to claims made by the advocates o f religious pluralism.
The inherent d efficiencies o f the post-mo d ern outlook
The fundamental reason for speaking about the impossibility o f a post-modern 
culture is its self-contradictory nature. For its own critical stance it is dependent on 
assumptions that are, in turn, undermined by its own critique. For example, although 
it wishes to dismiss claims to truth and absolutes as imperialist and oppressive, the 
critique has to assume that which it wishes to deny First, the critique depends on an 
unarticulated normative framework o f its own, when it condemns unjust and oppres­
sive systems. Moreover, when it denounces universal systems in the interests o f the 
emancipation o f the local and the different, it implicitly assumes the universal right o f 
a i  to be treated uniquely. Secondly, the tolerance that delights in distinctiveness 
cannot be tolerated for those who w oud suppress otherness. Like any perspective on 
human life, post-modernity is bound to limit tolerance in order to remain true to 
itself. Therefore, in practice it poses no radical break with an ethic o f absoluteness, 
whatever it may claim to the contrary. Thirdly, post-modernity to be consistent to its 
own critique requires both an ethic o f ‘responsibility to act’ and an ethic o f 
‘responsibility to otherness.’ A determined commitment to the deconstruction o f 
values threatens to undermine, or at least enervate, this sense o f responsibility. 
Post-modern thought has dismissed the possibility o f encountering truly objective 
reality. Involved in this argument is the implicit assumption that the claim to 
objectivity is false. However, to use the language o f error is in itself a claim to a 
superior grasp o f reality! Likewise, post-modern consciousness attacks the kind o f 
rationality that has come to the fore as a consequence o f the scientific spirit - logical, 
consistent, self-critical o f its own premises, susceptible to evidence and demon­
stration. However, the only way to pursue a negative analysis o f rationality is by using 
the same techniques o f reason as those being dismissed. I f  the dismissal o f meta­
narratives is intended to cover a i  claims to possess true perspectives, it is itself a 
claim to enjoy the status o f global validity.240
In so far as the contemporary self is but the passive product o f language, history, 
culture and society, it cannot maintain a properly dissentient stance against history, 
culture and society, for such a stance is, according to the theory, already a mere 
product o f the transient, ephemeral and mutable forces that happen to exist. It is not 
surprising then that, for example, few feminists are also consistent post-modernists. 
Feminism is a commitment to both an ideological critique which presupposes a
240 Likewise, inevitably, theories o f  religious pluralism have to become, in their endeavour to refute 
alternative theories, substitute meta-religions, which claim to transcend a i  perspectives by giving a “true” 
account o f  a i  religious phenomena. In the case o f  Hick it is not clear to what extent he is propounding a 
mere hypothesis and to what extent a demonstrable conclusion derived from reasoning about evidence. 
However, a mere hypothesis, unless substantiated by valid criteria, does not advance understanding; it 
remains no more than a piece o f  interesting speculation. It is clear that Hick is propounding a theory that he 
believes is “ true” . In contrast to non-realists like Don Cupitt, he stubbornly maintains he is a critical realist 
with regard to the transcendent; see, John Hick, ‘Religious Realism and Non-Realism: Defining the Issue’ in 
Joseph Runzo (ed.), Is God R eal (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 3-15.
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meaningful distinction between a true and false consciousness and to an emancipating 
project. From the perspective o f women seeking to reverse gender discrimination on 
the basis that the two halves o f the human race are equal in dignity and respect, post­
modern rhetoric is seen as deeply conservative politically. Post-modernity, in 
accordance with its own critique, is incapable o f distinguishing valid from invalid 
claims about the right and the good or o f properly using the language o f prejudice, 
inequity, bigotry or unfair discrimination. The most it can do is promote a conser­
vative agenda o f consensus-based attitudes, which equates ‘good in the way o f belief’ 
with pragmatic liberalism.241
In this regard, Hick’s pluralist thesis, which appears to arise from a “ foundationalist” , 
empirical conviction that the ethical teaching and practice o f all the major religions 
are equivalent, requires a non-pluralist, unconditional, non-contextual, unequivocal 
account o f the right and the good. This, in turn, calls for a singular vantage point 
from which to judge. Hence, it w oud appear that the foundation on which he builds 
his pluralist case actuaiy contradicts it.
In contrast, the task o f unmasking certain consensus values as a smokescreen for 
oppressive sectional interests is part o f keeping faith with enlightened, critical- 
emancipatory thought. Hence, post-modernity, under the Elusion o f presenting itself 
as the debunker o f power-strategies in the name o f truth claims, can itself hide an 
oppressive epistemology. Thus, for example, the rejection o f the original meaning o f 
a text in the name o f hermeneutic freedom is nothing but an unacceptable violence 
against the author.
Post-modernity as a cultural theory has shown itself to be remarkably weak as an 
interpretation o f history As an account o f the way in which knowledge is acquired, it 
has no convincing explanation o f scientific methodology nor o f progress in science. 
The tendency to find reasons for scientific ‘success’ in social, political or cultural 
factors rather than in the experimental method which subjects data to confirmation 
or falsification is inadequate. It suggests that the cumulative growth o f science is a 
lottery which, quite by chance, has from time to time been able to give sufficiently 
satisfactory explanations to allow for technological progress. I f  ever there was a case 
o f a dogmatic theory seeking to impose itself on the careful accumulation o f 
evidence, it occurs in the post-modern perspective.
Post-modernity is equally undiscerning when it comes to the all-pervading power o f 
late capitalism to shape the contemporary world. David Harvey has written that, 
because postmodernism
“emphasises the fragmentary, the ephemeral, and the chaotic .w h ile  
expressing a deep scepticism as to any particular prescriptions as to how the 
eternal and immutable should be conceived of, ... it signals nothing more than 
a logical extension o f the power o f the market over the whole range o f cultural 
production” .242
241 See, To Stake a Claim, pp. 45, 49.
242 The Condition ofPostmodemity, p. 116. For a similar critique o f  postmodernism; see, Jim  McGuigan, Modernity 
and Postmodern Culture (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1999).
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Post-modernity easily accommodates the capitalist world-system, for in the last 
analysis its view o f truth, absolutes, identity, the good and the right is oriented to 
consumer-choice in the ream  o f ideas, lifestyles, habits, perspectives and opinions. 
The celebration o f difference may be said to coincide exactly with the global 
manufacture o f multiple false-consciousnesses. As Roger Trigg has cogently 
argued,243 all that we are left with is rhetoric as a mere exercise in the power o f 
persuasion. However, he goes on to say, there is little point in being skilled in the art 
o f persuasion if there is no ultimate right or wrong, truth or falsity left. C oud not the 
same be said for all pluralist theories o f religion? Why should we believe them or 
persuade others to share our views?244 They are manifestly self-refuting. I f  they are 
assumed, as often is the case, as the basis for multi-religious dialogue, they render the 
latter conceptually impossible. Is it not high time to abandon pluralist theories o f 
religion as mere epiphenomena o f a culturally transient, morally dangerous, and ulti­
mately intellectually absurd “condition” , already left behind by real events in time and 
space?
243 Rationality and Science, pp. 164-165.
244 “Too much toleration and even the welcoming o f difference can lead to the view that it does not matter 
which religion one hods, and that can soon be taken to mean that it does not matter whether any religious 
belief is held at ai. Toleration can lead to indifference and that can lead to contempt. I f  there are so many 
religious options on offer, and it does not matter which is adopted, then why, it may be asked should one 
believe any o f them at ai? Truth has slipped totaiy out o f our grasp” , Rationality and Religion, p. 54.
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S U M M IN G  U P: T H E  ST O R Y ; T H E  E N IG M A ; A  S O L U T IO N 245
At the end o f a judicial process, the presiding judge sums up a i  the evidence that has 
been presented in court and then instructs the jury to review the case and come up 
with a verdict. The story that has been presented in these pages is relatively clear. The 
third millennium has dawned among the nations o f the West with a major cultural 
dilemma still unresolved. It concerns the source or sources o f knowledge about the 
natural world and the place o f human beings within it. Is it possible to have a 
justified, true belief about the nature and meaning o f reality and the way we 
experience it?
The story
Most o f the early, modern scientists believed that the new incentives to explore the 
world o f nature, which arose in the 17th century with the development o f experi­
mental methods and more sophisticated instruments, were God-given opportunities 
to consider the benefits that coud  accrue to human beings from a more thorough 
understanding o f God’s creation. It did not occur to the majority that there would be 
any major reason why the knowledge accumulated by means o f the assumptions and 
methods o f science shoud confict with or make redundant knowledge gained 
through studying and applying the history o f G od’s revelation as recorded in 
Scripture. The two books — o f G od’s word and G od’s world — offered separate, but 
complementary, routes to all the knowledge that human beings needed to enjoy a 
fulfilled existence.
However, over a period o f time, an increasing reliance was placed on knowledge o f 
the world, through rational endeavour and empirical research, as sufficient to explain 
the existence o f the world and humans’ place within it. Knowledge, coming by way o f 
the study o f what the dominant Christian tradition o f the West had hitherto regarded 
as the self-communication o f the God who was the creator o f all things, was graduaiy 
questioned and, then, either repudiated, ignored or consigned to the private world o f 
individual belief for those who continued to feel the need for some kind o f 
‘transcendent’, psychological support.
The questioning had both an epistemological and social dimension. First, knowledge 
through revelation was considered to be, at best, inferior and, at worst, dubious in 
comparison with the certainties derivable from systematic rational processes and 
empirical investigation. The claims o f revelation coud  not be justified as true state­
ments, either in the nature o f the case or on the basis o f experimental corroboration, 
by any methods which co^d  command universal assent. Whatever evidence was 
adduced for believing that the book o f God’s word contained useful information 
about reality had to be confirmed by the light o f reason and the knowledge being 
accumulated through discovery o f the book o f the world. An increasing number o f 
people, from the beginning o f the 18th century onwards, became sceptical about the 
plausibility o f the claims o f revelation.
245 The Future of Reason, Science and Faith: Follwing Modernity and Post-modernity (Adershot: Ashgate Publishing, 
2007), chapter 11, pp. 217-229.
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Secondly, the putative truths o f revelation were said to have social consequences 
inimical to a fu i flourishing o f human life. The European nations were divided aong 
the sectarian lines o f Catholic and Protestant confessions. This resulted in (avoidable) 
military conflicts. In most countries, the national church was deeply hostile to the 
basic freedom o f an independent conscience in matters o f religious belief, thereby 
discriminating against the benefits o f citizenship. In general, it was considered by a 
growing number o f educated people that the institution that claimed a special 
authority in the affairs o f state on the basis o f revelation was a major hindrance to 
both academic and political liberties. Rather, the authority o f the individual’s 
conscience and rational faculty should be allowed increasingly to determine 
acceptable social behaviour. The individual’s rights shoud be protected against the 
interference o f the state, whose unquestioned rule was often legitimised and upheld 
by the Church.
The final nail in the coffin for theistic belief seemed to be the remarkable explanation 
given by Charles Darwin for the origin o f life and the diversification o f species. 
Building on the materialist explanations o f the cosmos put forward by the 18th 
century encyclopaedists, Darwin assumed and elaborated on a mechanism o f evolving 
life that was self-generating. There was no longer any need, apparently, for the 
hypothesis o f God. Another perfectly plausible explication o f the seeming evidence 
for design and purpose in the functioning o f nature was now available: the gradual 
adaptation o f living organisms and beings to their environment through a long 
process o f sm ai mutations. The engine for natural selection was survival This 
explanation was to be preferred as one that had good scientific credentials and 
fulfilled the methodological criterion o f Occam’s razor, i.e. o f not multiplying un­
necessary hypotheses. From henceforth, for a number o f people, atheism became 
intellectually both acceptable and satisfying246
In the heady atmosphere o f freedom from the constraints o f unverifiable beliefs and 
intolerably unprogressive institutions, the considerable difficulties with attempting to 
establish genuine knowledge apart from reliance on theistic belief were either not 
recognised or not acknowledged. Only towards the end o f the final century o f the 
second millennium did the inherent contradictions o f the rationalist undertaking o f 
the modern project become apparent. The chickens o f the long tradition o f human 
autonomy, begun in the Renaissance, came home to roost. When humanity starts 
from itself in a universe closed to any possible external influence it has no grounds 
for making some o f the most basic assumptions necessary for knowledge to be 
possible: that there is a fundamental distinction between an external reality and an 
internal perception o f it; that the universe is intelligible to the human mind; that there 
are legitimate and illegitimate ways o f reasoning; that the scientific enterprise has an
246 Indeed, apologists for atheism, like Richard Dawkins, eloquently and uncompromisingly argue that, given 
the ‘blind, pitiless indifference’ o f  the natural world, theism is simply an irrelevance; see, River Out of Eden: 1  
Darwinian View of Life (New York: Basic Books, 1995), chapter 4. However, having acknowledged that human 
consciousness is imbued with an insatiable curiosity about the purpose o f things, he has no explanation for 
this state o f  affairs. All he can say is that we are mistaken to have this inquisitive attitude, for many questions 
about purpose are inappropriate. This is hardly a satisfactory or satisfying conclusion. To say that there is no 
explanation is not an explanation, for the question remains.
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intrinsic value; that the universe operates in stable, consistent and predictable ways; 
that there are inherent moral values binding on a i  people, irrespective o f history and 
culture; that there is an overall meaning to being human and purpose for being alive. 
The early scientists w oud, I think, have been most perplexed, had they been able to 
foresee a future in which many o f their successors would have thought it either 
necessary or worth-while to trade the very foundations that make knowledge 
intelligible for a narrow, putative certainty about facts o f the natural order and a 
complete freedom for beliefs o f any other brand. They would have been inclined to 
view freedom as an inevitable balance between recognising a given reality and 
exploring openly the immense variety o f components and opportunities deposited 
within that reality. Adherence to the truth o f God’s word was not only not inimical to 
discovering the truth o f the (God’s) world it was a necessary supposition.247 
When the massive cracks began to appear in the intellectual edifice erected by the 
modern project, the scholarly and erudite strata o f Western societies did not do the 
intelligent thing, retrace the steps that had wandered away from the promising 
synthesis o f reality, faith and reason to see how knowledge coud  once again be 
reintegrated into an intellectually satisfying and purposeful unity. Instead, many o f 
them exacerbated the dichotomy by appealing to the confused notion o f temporally 
and contextually relative truths. I f  modernity had sought to emphasise the objective, 
universal, impartial and neutral nature o f knowledge, post-modernity responded by 
calling attention to its subjective, local, prejudiced and revisable characteristics. On 
the one hand, immense claims were made for a rather limited field o f understanding 
On the other hand, considerable doubts were being expressed about the possibility o f 
coming to any sure understanding at all.
In reality, both modernity and post-modernity, in making human experience in a 
closed system o f material cause and effect the measure o f what can be known, come 
close to some form o f solipsism. The problem is to bridge the gap between individual 
perceptions and interpretations o f objects and events and an external reality that 
exists independently o f thought about it. The difficulty is compounded by epistemo- 
logical uncertainty about the content o f other people’s minds: might it not be that 
everyone sees things (phenomena, ideas) in quite distinct ways. I cannot be sure that 
there is correspondence between my outlook and that o f others. Once such doubts 
begin to raise their head, even inter-subjective agreement, let alone confidence in the 
accessibility o f a truth that has the power to make us change our perceptions, 
becomes dubious and indeterminate.248 Vacillation, mistrust and suspicion, if  not 
deep scepticism, would seem to be a logical conclusion. This appears to be the price 
o f an intellectual freedom that will not concede any constraints on the enterprise o f 
reasoning
Needless to say, real scepticism rarely follows. In order to be able to conduct normal, 
daily business, we have, at the least, to suspend our doubt-inducing epistemological 
theories. This is most obvious in the area o f moral judgement. As a matter o f fact, in
247 The arguments are set out in chapter 2 o f  The Future of Reason.
248 See, the discussion in Roger Trigg, Reality at Risk: A  Defencc of Realism in Philosophy and the Sciences (London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989/2), pp. 21ff.
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practice, every human being hods to some notion o f moral absoutes. In the context 
o f drawing boundaries between what is permissible and what can never be legitimate, 
human beings, whatever their epistemoogical theories, demonstrate a robust realism 
and h o d  on to the notion o f a truth that exists externally to their individual feelings 
and desires. One might say that, in having to make assumptions which their 
theoretical beliefs do not alow, they are cheating normal rational argument. As a 
necessary strategy to live by, many have to make moral assertions for which they do 
not have proper warrant.
A good example o f this dilemma comes in the arguments advanced by John 
Mackie.249 He discusses a number o f basic premises. First, there are no objective 
moral values. By objective he means ‘ art o f the fabric o f the world’.250 It is true, 
nevertheless, that moral judgements appear to be objective that is they purport to be 
propositions about life, capable o f being true or being false. Second, their objectivity 
has mainly (but by no means only) been founded on the belief in an absoutely good 
divine being who governs the universe according to his perfect will. Third, as no such 
being exists (Mackie was an avowed atheist), one o f the main arguments for objective 
morality is removed:
“The objectivist may have recourse to the purposes o f G o d .. .I concede that if 
the requisite theoogical doctrine could be defended, a kind o f objective ethical 
prescriptivity could be thus introduced. Since I think that theism cannot be 
defended, I do not regard this as any threat to my argument.”251 
Fourth, then, he argues for an ‘error’ theory o f morals:
“although most people in making moral judgements implicitly claim, among 
other things, to be pointing to something objectively prescriptive, these claims 
are a) false.”252
If  there were moral facts, they w oud by their very nature be prescriptive. However, 
such an intrinsic prescriptive quality is incompatible with a naturalistic view o f the 
world. Here he introduces his argument from queerness:
“ I f  there were objective vaues, then they w oud be entities or qualities or 
relations o f a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the 
universe. Correspondingly, if we were aware o f them, it w oud have to be by 
some special faculty o f moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our 
ordinary ways o f knowing everything else.”253 
It is also inconsistent with a view o f morality that emphasises contingency, personal 
motivation, choice and desire. Therefore, fifth, moral values are dependent on 
coiective human choice:
“morality is not to be discovered but to be made: we have to decide what 
moral views to adopt.” 254
249 J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Harmondsworth, 1977).
250 Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, p. 15.
251 Ethics, p. 48.
252 Ethics, p. 35.
253 Ethics, p. 38.
254 Ethics, p. 106.
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They are ultimately no more than attitudes and policies with regard to conduct that 
people happen to find useful in a particular society at a particular time. Nevertheless, 
sixth, it so happens that most people have internalised moral judgements in such 
away that they appear to have the force o f categorical imperatives. In other words, 
morality works because o f human beings overwhelming propensity to believe in 
absolute right and wrong, good and evil. This does not unduly concern Mackie, as he 
argues for a strict distinction between first and second order views o f morality. He is 
not rejecting moral judgements as such. He is a moral sceptic only in relation to the 
first order proposition that, to be valid, moral vaues have to be objective. Even 
without objectivity, there are good grounds, he believes, for moral concern and 
action.
This view appears to be akin to a conventionalist account o f the moral life whereby 
people implicitly agree to live together in society on the basis o f a series o f rights and 
obligations, in order to keep ‘active malevolence’ and ‘selfish ends’ in check From 
early childhood people are educated into a set o f moral disciplines that a particular 
society imposes as proper, expected and propitious for the well-being o f the whole 
community. It would appear, in other words, that human life works to its optimum, 
when people can be persuaded to believe that ethical norms are built into the warp 
and w oof o f the natural order.
The problem with this account o f ethics is threefold. First, a general realisation that 
there is nothing intrinsically right or wrong about behaviour is likely to produce an 
unstable society. Once people see through the deception that there is no truth in the 
supposed truth o f absolute standards they are likely to question the legitimacy o f all 
forms o f morality. I f  they can no longer be persuaded to go along with the myth, they 
may have to be compelled to believe. Morality then becomes arbitrary, what society as 
a whole is prepared to condemn, accept or tolerate. Second, the nature o f rights and 
obligations, as it has no ontological backing, is likely to be decided by the play o f 
power. Morality will be decided by an intricate interaction between so-caied 
progressive and traditional forces, not necessarily in the direction o f what is good and 
right, but what is agreeable to the majority. Third, as a matter o f fact, morality has 
been based on the firm conviction that the idea and content o f the good is entirely 
independent o f the propensity o f human beings to make morality fir their desires and 
goals in life.
Mackie is incorrect in his statement that for values to be objective they w oud have to 
be entirely different from anything else in the universe. On what grounds is moral 
realism different in kind from scientific or theistic realism? Each, in its own sphere o f 
knowledge, states that there are entities that exist independently o f any perception, 
belief or desire that we might have about them.255 Certainly moral facts are ,by 
definition, prescriptive. So too are prudential ones: for example, if we are aware that 
the snake in front o f us is deadly poisonous, we tell ourselves not to pick it up. Thus, 
he is also wrong in making sweeping statements that consciousness o f such objective 
values coud  only come through perceptions or intuitions completely different from 
the means we use to know anything else. The two claims, that together constitute his
255 For a general discussion o f  theistic realism; see, God and Realism.
102
‘argument from queerness,’ seem to reflect a narrow positivist interpretation o f 
human experience.
So, I am arguing that Mackie’s refusal to entertain an objective moral order, his view 
that a second order defence o f moral values is nevertheless self-validating, his belief 
that the purpose o f morality is to solve the problem o f conflict and the absence o f 
beneficial cooperation — ‘the basic general structure o f the human predicament, and 
this does not change’256 — adds up to a meagre and inadequate groundwork for 
serious ethical reflection and action. His stance Hlustrates once again the paucity o f 
intellectual resources open to those who dismiss the belief that we live in a 
theistically-shaped universe.
The enigma
This is a summary o f the story so far. The clash between modern and post-modern 
ways o f looking at the world continues into the third millennium, although other 
cultural forces are also on the ascendency 257 The enigma is that normally intelligent 
people w oud, on a massive scale, be willing to sacrifice the possibility o f a consistent 
and unified explanation o f the whole o f life for an intellectual autonomy which aiows 
the reasoning subject independence from an intrinsic reality to invent their own. The 
enigma is deepened by the observation that, as matter o f fact, scientific exploration 
and experimentation is dependent on the supposition that the material world is a 
given: in its regular workings, demonstrable in reliable laws, the scientist has a fixed 
point o f reference in which she can have absolute confidence. To suppose that we are 
free to construct a natural world how we might like it to be would completely con­
found scientific research. Belief is constrained by the givenness o f our environment. 
It is, therefore, a huge mistake to pit freedom against order. Freedom is only possible 
within order. However, in the case o f moral, social and cultural norms, there is plenty 
o f room (freedom) to debate which ‘order’ is true. Without such a point o f reference 
for other aspects o f life, human existence is, in the grand scheme o f things, quite 
meaningless.
Attempting to avoid the dichotomy between the pursuit o f material facts and 
intangible values by investing life with our own meaning (or borrowing it ‘o ff the peg’ 
from someone else) does not work, for, although one may deny that there is any 
given meaning to human aspirations and desires, sooner or later, one will ‘bump into’ 
reality unexpectedly. Many contemporary Western people are, apparently, prepared to 
run the risk They have calculated that autonomy is a good which outweighs the harm 
caused by the conflict between their beliefs and reality. Such a choice will probably be 
rationalised by reference to the unacceptable consequences which have often 
accompanied commitment to theism. Many have testified to the sense o f liberation 
which abandoning belief in God has brought. However, if the matter is considered
256 Ethics, pp. 122-123.
257 One account o f  the poly-centred nature o f dominant, living cultures is given in Samuel Huntington’s 
celebrated and controversial book, The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order (London: Simon 
and Schuster, 1997). Part o f his thesis is that the hitherto ascendant culture o f the West is declining across 
the globe. It will be fascinating, though unpredictable, to see how the apparently increasing hostility between 
religious and secular interpretations o f  reality are played out in the future.
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carefully, as we have tried to demonstrate in this study, the cost o f autonomy is great. 
Most muddle through life, unaware perhaps o f the inconsistencies o f their beliefs and 
way o f life, somehow adjusting choices to the exigencies o f their context. It is an 
enigma, nevertheless, how any thoughtful person can experience human autonomy as 
intellectually (or, for that matter, emotionally) satisfying
Another option is not only possible, but intellectually and existentially compelling. 
The theistic explanation o f life gives a complete account o f all that we humans either 
do know or may wish to know. O f course, the fact that it does provide such an 
explanation does not automatically make it true. It is still possible that life is, in 
reality, completely meaningless, but that, in order to cope with the angst that such a 
state o f affairs w oud engender, human beings create a theory which aims to rescue 
existence from incomprehensibility and pointlessness. No doubt, one or another 
projection theory will remain part o f the armoury o f theistic detractors until the end 
o f time. The problem with them is that, because they do not do justice to theistic 
belief, they are inadequate in explaining reality. They fall a long way short o f being a 
good explanation, let aone the best.
A solution
My hope is that this study will have produced sufficient evidence and reasons for 
establishing the thesis that the contemporary world o f the West, in its long historical 
trajectory, does not have to choose between the assumptions o f the modern project 
and those associated with the condition o f post-modernity, or try to live on the basis 
o f a trade-off between the two. The theistic option is rationally available. It does not 
require one to commit any kind o f epistemological self-immolation. In fact, the West 
has a marvellous opportunity to recover a lost heritage, whose abandonment is in 
danger o f contributing to an increasingly destructive moral and intellectual confusion. 
However, theism has to be taken on its own terms. It would be no solution to 
attempt to reinterpret theism within the parameters o f either modernity or post­
modernity.258 The theistic case rests on certain non-negotiable assumptions. The first 
is that the divine creator o f all that is acts within his creation: that which is non­
material can determine events within the material Divine causality, and therefore an 
open universe, is assumed. This has to be the case, if  one is to propose an alternative 
to the naturalistic story o f the uninterrupted evolution o f inanimate matter into 
animate. Theism does not stipulate a detailed account o f the mechanisms whereby 
God interacts with his world. It does, however, draw a distinction between his 
ordinary and extraordinary activity. The former is encompassed by upholding the 
normal workings o f the natural order, so that the regular order o f nature’s structures 
and procedures remain in place. The latter occurs as exceptional actions, when it is 
necessary to accomplish a result not possible by the usual mechanisms. In theological 
parlance, these events have been called miracles. They are usually associated with
258 As a number o f individual theologians and philosophers o f  religion have attempted: for example, Mark C. 
Taylor, Erring: 1  Postmodern A/Theology (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1984); G. Kaufman, In Face of 
Mystery (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); D.Z. Phillips, Wittgenstein and Religion (London: 
Macmillan, 1993); William Drees, Religion, Sciencc and Naturalsm  (Cambridge: CUP, 1995); John Hick, The Fifth 
Dimension: A n Explomtion of the Spiritual Realm (Oxford: One World, 1999).
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G od’s will to restore humanity to its full and effective working in communion with 
himself: in other words, events in the history o f salvation.
Theism assumes this ability o f God to take the initiative, so that the closed circle o f 
human experience reflecting upon itself can be broken into. It is crucial to theism that 
God is not the creation o f faith, in the sense o f being the object o f human aspira­
tions, needs or mental processes. Rather it is G od’s speaking and acting within the 
material world, human history and human lives that creates faith. G od’s independent 
existence as a self-sustaining, self-explanatory being is the predicate o f any true 
knowledge that we may have o f him. His relation to the universe presupposes his 
ability to cause human beings to know him through listening to his word and seeing 
him in action.
For some people this portrayal o f theism is enough to make the whole thesis inadmis­
sible. For them there w oud be a fundamental contradiction between the word and 
the world o f God, just because the world does not admit any irregularities to breach 
the uniform, unvarying processes o f the natural world. The advocate o f theism, there­
fore, has to be able to give a compelling account o f God’s extraordinary activity in 
the world. She might begin by pointing out that the most celebrated argument against 
miracles (that o f David Hume) appears to be circular in character. He assumes that a 
miracle is the equivalent o f an event that has never been observed in any age or 
country.259 His argument is that there coud not be, in principle, any evidence 
available that shoud be sufficient to persuade us that a miracle has occurred. 
However, this is to beg the question. It is not good reasoning to rule evidence out o f 
court before it has been examined. He then goes on to his second main point:
CA miracle is a violation o f the laws o f nature; and as a form and unalterable 
experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the 
very nature o f the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can 
possibly be imagined.’260 
This assertion is also to assume what the argument is supposed to demonstrate. It is, 
therefore, as dogmatic as the claim that a miracle has taken place, whatever the 
evidence may be. The whole discussion ought to be on the basis o f a thorough inves­
tigation o f whatever purports to be a miracle, i.e. it ought to be conducted on the 
basis o f empirical evidence, not on the basis o f a priori metaphysical commitments. 
Although, to ensure the integrity o f scientific methodology, the burden o f proof may 
well be on the witness to a miraculous event, the proof cannot be dismissed out o f 
hand prior to its being assessed. The notion o f uniformity has to be assumed, but it 
cannot be made to exclude, whatever the evidence, some counter-instances, otherwise 
uniform experience becomes the experience o f only those who have discounted the 
possibility o f miracles. We could only know that the experience against miracles is
259 ‘On Miracles’ in An Enquiry csnceming Human Understanding (Tom. L. Beauchamp, ed.) (Oxford: OUP,
1999), p. 172.
260 An Enquir, p. 173.
105
uniform, if we already knew that all reports o f them are false, and that is special 
pleading261
O f course, it is imperative that a miracle is carefUly defined to distinguish it from 
what cannot, on current scientific theories, be explained. Otherwise, we are entrapped 
within the God-of-the-gaps dilemma. Most theists approach the subject from two 
different points o f view. First, taking seriously the integrity o f scientific method, they 
wish to defend the propriety o f scientists being obliged to trace natural causes for 
events in the world. This is the normal work o f science, based on the supposition that 
in general there is a causal closure o f mechanisms working in the natural order and 
these can be described in terms o f regular laws. It is important for theists to defend 
the cohesion o f science, because they wish to encourage the inquisitive and reflective 
exploration o f the whole o f material existence. Secondly, however, experience points 
to the fact that not every event or phenomenon can be encompassed within a more 
or less deterministic framework The notion o f scientific law is more open today than 
in the past:
Dt is very clear from the science o f unpredictability in non-linear dynamic 
systems (including the human brain) that it is inconceivable that the behaviour 
o f a real-life system involving human beings coud  be the subject o f a totally 
comprehensive scientific explanation.’262 
What is required is a theory which allows different types o f explanation to operate 
freely at different levels o f reality. Each description is complete at its own level, with 
no gaps at that level for other perspectives to fill The natural sciences are 
marvellously competent at the level o f their capacity. They cannot, however, do all 
the work o f explanation. To attempt a total explanation produces the fallacy o f 
scientism, for example in the attempt to reduce the non-material human mind to 
neuronal events in the brain. As has been cogently pointed out, the resulting 
behaviourism commits a number o f fallacies in the processes o f reasoning263 
The claim that miracles occur is an affirmation that there are events in the natural 
world that can be investigated using the tools o f science, but whose explanation will 
be found to transcend an explanation in purely scientific terms. To do justice to the 
event in question requires other sources o f elucidation. In an open system o f 
inference to the best explanation, a wider view o f causality is required. Scientists, who 
are also theists, are working with ideas like top-down causality as a theoretical 
instrument to account for events so improbable that a comprehensive explanation 
necessitates the input o f an intelligent, outside agency Miracles are only an embar­
rassment to those who wish to save metaphysical naturalism at all costs. This, 
however, can lead to a kind o f Dcience-of-the-gaps’ whereby explanation is always 
postponed in the hope that some day some naturalistic theory might emerge to 
account for the phenomenon. There is a sense in which, contrary to the usual 
argument, theism becomes the most parsimonious explanation both o f ordinary and
261 See, Norman Geisler, ‘Miracles and the Modern Mind’ in R. Douglas Geivett and Gary R. Habermas, In 
Defence of Miracles: A  Comprehensive Case for God’s Action in History (Leicester; Intervarsity Press, 1997), pp. 77­
78.
262 See, God, Humanity and the Cosmos, p. 264.
263 See, Philosophy Matters, 79-82,115-122.
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extraordinary events, whilst naturalism has to resort to ad hoc conjectures to try to 
save its dogmatism.
It has often been argued that the traditional theistic ‘proofs’ are no longer tenable. 
N ot all agree necessarily.264 However, even supposing that the ontological, cosmo­
logical and teleological arguments are defective in terms o f what they are supposed to 
achieve, namely to make non-belief in a supreme being rationally incomprehensible, 
this does not exhaust the ability o f theism to advance a cogent case for acceptance. 
As one might expect, attention has been turned to a consideration o f ordinary human 
experience as the channel for reconsidering the cogency o f theistic belief Here, as we 
have argued at some length, we have a perfectly plausible explanation for the normal 
experience o f reality, for the accurate fit between human mental processes and the 
processes o f the natural world, for the fact that we cannot do without the notion o f 
truth as correspondence, for the intuition o f moral absolutes, for the meaningfulness 
o f aesthetic appreciation, for human consciousness and emotions, for imagination 
and creativity, for the fact that there wül always be an unbridgeable giúf fixed 
between human beings on one side and animals and the most sophisticated machines 
possible on the other.
The theist does not employ the language o f ‘proof,’ any more than it is normally used 
in the scientific world today She rests her case on two complementary lines o f 
reasoning: (a) theism is the best explanation for all our present and conceivable future 
knowledge, alternative explanations just fail to explain; (b) even those who reject 
theism, have to live at crucial points in their lives as if theism were true. Probably, in 
epistemological terms, the methodological approach which leads to theism as the best 
explanation acts as a moderate foundationalism. The foundation is that the existence 
o f the God revealed in the natural world, in jesus Christ (God’s word made a human 
being), and in the testimony o f Christ’s first disciples to the meaning o f his life 
affords the best possible explanation for the whole o f reality as we experience it. It is 
foundational in the sense that it is basic and, as a premise, does not need further 
beliefs to justify it. At the same time, it is corrigible, in that it is open to challenge, 
revision and even refutation, does not claim to be immediately self-evident or 
immune from the need to provide reasons in open debate.
The method is, moreover, both faith-explicit and yet not enclosed in its own web o f 
tradition.265 Very specifically, it claims to be commensurable with other possible 
hypotheses explanatory o f some o f the evidence, in that it is rationally consistent and
264 See, the compelling discussion in God, Reason and Theistic Proofs, passim.
265 It is not possible to discuss here whether it is compatible with Susan Haack’s ‘ oundherentism’. It is not, 
however, congruent with the ‘Reformed’ epistemology o f  Plantinga, Wolterstorff and Mavrodes which 
appears to reject foundationalisms o f a i  colours and replaces them with an epistemology o f  properly 
warranted basic beliefs and cognitive proper functioning;’ see note 213. The link to the kind o f  moderate 
foundationalism that I am advocating is broken by Reformed epistemology in not accepting that justification 
is needed for knowledge to be asserted. The problem with foundationalism, according to this perspective, is 
that it does not alow  sufficiently for the effects o f  sin on noetic performance. However, I believe that this 
case w oud only be compelling for an extreme interpretation o f foundationalism; see, the discussion o f the 
relevant issues in Paul Helm, Faith and Understanding (Edinburgh: University o f Edinburgh Press, 1997), pp. 
177-191.
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evidentialist.266 Therefore, in principle, there are criteria held in common for deciding 
between competing explanations. In the last analysis, a Christian moderate founda- 
tionalism w oud claim that not all alternatives are either equally consistent internally 
or able to give as comprehensive a clarification o f reality in its widest extension.
Then, it is able to do justice epistemically to both a common-sense account o f 
knowing and the most sophisticated scientific theories. We touch reality because it is 
there in ordinary, everyday experience and in the work o f scientific discovery. It is 
there, because it has been put there in the act o f personal divine creation and 
recreation. We also know it is there because o f the impossible consequences o f 
denying its reality.
Finally it brings together belief and action in the process o f establishing the truth as 
something not only discovered in abstract thought, but in living reality. Indeed, the 
final test o f the truth o f theism is its ability to explain the intricacies o f ordinary 
human activities, behaviour and conduct. This is not surprising given the theistic 
belief that the most basic truth about human beings is that they exist in the image o f 
God. That is why it is perfectly possible to start with human experience and conclude 
that theism is the best explanation for all the knowledge we have.
The Christian theist concludes that the situation o f fragmented knowledge that has 
come about in Western societies as a result o f failing to pay equal attention to the two 
books o f God as valid sources o f understanding o f the whole o f reality has been a 
tragic and unnecessary incident in the cultural history o f one continent. One o f the 
main contributions that Christian faith can make, therefore, to the endless challenge 
o f cultural renewal is the exciting prospect o f being able to overcome the destructive 
consequences o f the false epistemological dichotomy that has so marked the modern 
and post-modern projects and to help Western people to experience a hitherto 
unimagined, reinvigorated world.
However, unlike previous Christian attempts to influence society, this one has to 
proceed without any pretensions to capture political or social influence for the 
institutional expression o f the faith. Moreover, it is not possible, following modernity 
and post-modernity, to assert beliefs with the authority o f an unquestioned dogma. 
Christians are obliged by the cultural context in which they live to advocate their 
views by appeal to the plausibility o f the evidence they assemble, knowing they will be 
chaienged by many other opposing interpretations. It would seem that contemporary 
societies are irretrievably pluralist. People, rightly, are not afraid to question a i  meta­
narratives. Adulthood implies being fully convinced in one’s own mind and taking f J l  
responsibility for one’s own decisions. That is why the kind o f debate or diaogue that 
I have attempted in these pages has to be an integral part o f the Christian 
community’s conversation with non-Christians. The task is to make out the best case
266 Evidentialism is the view that a belief is justified if and only if there is sufficient evidence for it. Evidence 
may be interpreted widely, as would be the case in a legal judgement, coming in the form o f eye-witness 
testimony, reliable memory, sense perception, other beliefs, supporting statements and integrity o f character. 
The anaogy with the procedures o f  a law-court is Hluminating in that, in order to b creditable, evidence must 
be able to withstand rigorous cross-questioning Sufficient evidence is that which satisfies ‘a i  reasonable 
doubt.’ Evidentialism rules out any approach to knowledge that relies on the internal self-justification o f 
beliefs, as in some forms o f ‘ deism.’
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possible for considering the book o f G od’s self-revelation to be the most convincing 
explanation o f the book o f the human experience o f life.
In addition, the message itself constrains Christians to engage in the task o f 
persuasion. Like the early Church in the hostile and indifferent Roman Empire, one 
o f whose spokesmen asked the fundamental question W hat is Truth?’ with cynical 
intent, the contemporary Christian community bears witness, in weakness and with 
many imperfections, to the reply o f its founder and head, ‘G od’s word is truth.’267 
The encounter between the apostle Paul and King Agrippa268 is a paradigm o f the 
type o f witness we are talking about. Paul was accused by Festus, the Roman 
governor, o f allowing too much learning to drive him insane. Paul replied that he was 
not out o f his mind, but was speaking the sober truth. Moreover, he appealed to the 
king’s own knowledge o f the facts and his own convictions as a basis for believing 
the truth o f Paul’s message. Agrippa’s response was to ask whether Paul was hoping 
to persuade him so quickly to become a Christian. Paul’s final reply was to urge all 
listening to his witness to share his experience o f God. From the point o f view o f the 
tension between beliefs and power it is worth noting that Paul at the time o f the 
encounter was a prisoner in chains. Thus we conclude that testimony to the truth, in 
chastened theory and in peaceable practice, as it is displayed in jesus, the Christ, is the 
whole o f the Christian community’s mission.
267 The diaogue betweenjesus and Pilate is recorded in the Gospel o f  John, chapter 18, verses 33-38.; see, 
alsojohn, chapter 17, verses 14-19. A central aspect o f  the ‘trial’ o f  Jesus, as recorded in this Gospel, is the 
conflicting understandings o f the meaning o f  power. A decisive contrast is drawn between the power o f 
truth, manifest in the life and teaching o f Jesus, and the power o f religious and political authority and 
dominion. Tragicaiy, the Church, a i  too frequently, has got them confused.
268 Recorded in The Acts of the Apostles, chapter 26.
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T H E  E P IS T E M O L O G IC A L  P R E D IC A M E N T  O F  T H E  W E ST , 
D IA L O G U E  A N D  I N F E R E N C E  T O  T H E  B E S T  E X P L A N A T IO N
Testing the metho d
So far, I have tried to lay a firm basis for offering, from a Christian perspective, a 
rational framework to test the conjecture that a Trinitarian theistic reality is the best 
explanation for the f J l  complement o f human experience. However, an assessment 
o f the claims still needs to be made. At this juncture, I can only point in a summary 
fashion to some o f the areas o f life in the world where such an examination can take 
place. For the purposes o f this study, we identify two important ones (although there 
are more).
The operation o f the sciences
As often pointed out,269 science cannot explain itself using the methodological 
procedures that are strictly speaking inherent to its own working In other words, in 
order for there to be an explanation o f why science is able to discover the true 
workings o f the natural world and derive from the discoveries technological appli­
cations (such as the use o f the microchip in my PC) science has to rely on extra- 
scientific hypotheses about the nature o f reality.
Scientists are dealing with a world that is as it is. In other words, it is a given world, 
whose workings they are seeking to describe, understand and harness for the benefit 
o f human life. They can, o f course, intervene and alter the operations o f natural 
processes, but only within certain limits — the limits that those natural processes 
allow, even if (as in the case o f the anticipated use o f stem cells in repairing dys­
functional parts o f the body) the results may appear to us sensational 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the majority o f scientists assume a realist view o f 
the external world:
“objects and their properties, whether observable (e.g a rose bush) or not (e.g 
God or quarks), exist independently o f human thought about them. 
Irrespective o f the way in which humans may experience or reflect upon them 
subjectively, entities are there in an objective sense, such that an appeal may be 
made concerning the truth about them against human interpretations. This 
means that it is always possible, in principle, to correct perceptual errors about 
them by reference to the entity itself. It has generally been assumed that 
scientific method is predicated on a realist construction o f the world, such that 
scientific theories are to be interpreted literally, i.e. what they state about the 
world is true.”270
269 See, for example, Roger Trigg, Rationality and Religion (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), pp. 77-78, 80-83; Victor 
H. Fiddes, Science and the Gospel (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1987), pp. 38-42; Keith Ward, ‘The 
Limits o f  Science’ (chapter 9) and ‘The Explanation o f  Everything’ (chapter 10), in Pasccl’s Fire: Scientific Faith 
and Religious Understanding (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2006).
270 The Future of Reason, p. 238. This view has been chaienged by an anti-realist perspective within the 
phriosophy o f  science, most notably by Bas Van Frassen in his elaboration o f  ‘constructive empiricism’. The 
arguments on both sides o f  the debate are too complex to elaborate here, see, for example, Alexander Bird, 
Philosophh of Science (Abingdon: Routledge, 1998), pp. 121-161; James Ladyman, Understanding Philosophh of
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It is probable that most scientists accept the assumptions that have to be true, if 
science is going to be able to attain its goals, without undue consideration o f their 
implications. However, questions about the nature o f reality, o f why the world is as it 
is, how it has come about that human beings are able to understand its mechanisms 
and why we should be interested to know the answer to these questions are part o f 
our legitimate curiosity that cry out for explanations. IBE  allows us to consider that 
the existence o f an infinite, personal God in continuous contact with a world he has 
created out o f nothing is the most plausible explanation o f the most fundamental 
issues that are thrown up by the successes o f science.
This hypothesis is quite distinct from the one that avows that the existence o f God 
can be demonstrated by attending to the evidence o f the natural world.271 In other 
words, it is not attempting to prove the existence o f God, but to state that, given all 
we know about our experience o f the external world and our relationship to it, the 
best explanation o f how things have come to be as they are is the existence o f God. 
Thus, among other things, the creative activity o f a personal-infinite God perfectly 
accounts for intelligibility, the anthropic principle, the reason for existence rather 
than non-existence, order rather than chaos, and contingency Let us look at each o f 
these briefly in turn.
I f  it were not such a fact o f built-in everyday experience, the ability o f the human 
mind to understand the complexity o f the universe in minute detail might be 
astonishing Why sho^d our environment be comprehensible and transparent to us? 
“Time and again we have found that the physical theories which fit the facts 
are characterised in their formulation by the unmistakeable quality o f 
mathematical beauty...There is a marvellous congruence between the working 
o f our minds (the mathematical reason within) and the workings o f the 
physical world (the scientific reason without)... Science does not explain the 
mathematical intelligibility o f the physical world, for it is part o f science’s 
founding faith that this is s o .T h e  meta-question o f the unreasonable 
effectiveness o f mathematics insists on being answered. A coherent and 
elegant explanation would lie in the theological claim that the reason within 
and the reason without are linked together by their common origin in the 
Rationality o f the Creator.”272 
N ot only is this a coherent and elegant explanation, it also puts itself forward as the 
best possible (or at least the best available) explanation.
The anthropic principle
Science (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 185-192. It suffices for our discussion to observe that a realist view o f 
encounter with external objects is the one that predominates amongst practitioners o f  science and has 
survived a i attempts to chaienge it within the phriosophy o f  science; see, Michael Devitt, Reagsm and Truth 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 284; On Truth and Meaning, pp. 79-87.
271 The distinction lies in the difference we noted earlier between induction and explanation.
272John Polkinghorne, 'Reason ad 'Reality: 'The relltionship between science and theology (London: SPCK, 1991), p. 76.
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For life to exist as we experience it today, including ourselves, an incredibly finely- 
tuned set o f initial circumstances and continuing environment was and is required for 
it to have come to fruition:
“The Anthropic Principle suggests that quite small variations in any o f these 
fundamental specifications o f our world would have rendered it anthropically 
s te r ile .I t  is important to emphasize that these delicate balances needed for 
anthropic fruitfuness are required at a i  stages o f cosmic process.”273 
Alternative explanations, such as the theory o f multiple universes or multiple 
conditions for intelligence, are not explanations o f reality as we know it. They are 
speculations o f what might be or might have been the case. The argument, that the 
only reason we are here and asking these kinds o f questions is because the universe is 
the way it is, is not an explanation but an observation. Again, we may conclude that, if 
we want an explanation that is rationally sound and in accordance with the evidence 
we have, then the claim that the universe has been carefully constructed by its 
Creator, in order that, in due time, it would produce creatures that could appreciate 
the universe as a personal creation is certainly the best (if not the only) ‘ how in 
town’.
Existence mther than non-existence
In attempting to give a coherent answer to the question o f being - why the universe 
exists and how have human beings come to be as they are - it w oud be perfectly 
possible to duck the issue altogether, by affirming that it is simply the way it is; there 
is no reason, and we should not spend time and energy on metaphysical speculations. 
However, it is an instinctive part o f human nature to be inquisitive. We appear to be 
hard-wired to seek answers to matters that concern our nature, identity, origin and 
purpose. N ot least we are curious about why it should be that human beings are the 
only living creatures that ask these questions.
There appear to be only two possible answers to the problem o f being rather than 
non-being The first is that mass, energy and motion just are. They are the basic given 
that makes all o f life possible. At some point, a series o f actions and reactions took 
place spontaneously that set in motion processes that have led over millions o f years 
to the universe we now know. There is nothing else behind this event. It is wholly 
impersonal and has no meaning There simply is no overall explanation o f why the 
universe is here and why we are here to debate the question. Stephen Hawking and 
Leonard Mlodinow, in a recent book, argue that
“M-theory predicts that a great many universes were created out o f nothing 
Their creation does not require the intervention o f some supernatural being or 
god. Rather, these multiple universes arise naturally from physical law. They 
are a prediction o f science.” 274 
On the other hand, John Lennox 275 points to the fallacy o f the proposition:
273 Reason and Reality, p. 77.
274 The Grand Design: New Approaches to the Ultimate Questions o f7 fe  (London: Bantam Press, 2010), pp. 8-9.
275 Professor o f  Mathematics in the University o f Oxford and author o f  God’s Undertaker: Has Science buried 
God0 (Oxford: Lion Hudson, 2008).
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“ Contrary to what Hawking claims, physical laws can never provide a complete 
explanation o f the universe. Laws themselves do not create anything; they are 
merely a description o f what happens under certain conditions. What Hawkins 
appears to have done is confuse law with agency ..T h a t  is a confusion o f 
category. .The laws o f physics could never have actually built the universe. 
Some agency must have been involved.H aw king’s argument appears to me 
even more illogical when he says that the existence o f gravity means the 
creation o f the universe was inevitable. But how did gravity exist in the first 
place? Who put it there? And what was the creative force behind its birth?” 276 
Michael Martin277 argues that it is illegitimate to draw the conclusion that, because 
there is no grand plan for the universe, life is without value and absurd and that 
nothing matters. He finds it hard to argue that there is any kind o f general purpose 
built into the reality we know that is discoverable by us, what we might call a general 
meaning for our place in the universe and general goals that we are in the world to 
fulfil I f  human life has come about by a chance process, as the result o f sufficiently 
numerous throws o f the dice, then it is quite impossible to write any intention into 
the system. Purpose, intention and goals presuppose rational calculation and will 
However, the existence o f such in terms o f a naturalist assumption about existence is 
ruled out implicitly. Martin, therefore, is left only with the option that value and 
meaning are created on the basis o f what seems to be best in the way o f living They 
do not correspond to an independent teleology built into the warp and w oof o f the 
cosmos; they are based on functional calculi. In other words, meaning and purpose 
have not been created for us; we create them ourselves for ourselves.
Thus, we may, by observation and introspection, come to the conclusion that the 
purpose o f human life is, biologically speaking, to survive and pass on our gene pool 
to the next generation in as good a state as possible. Therefore, we will seek to lead as 
healthy a life as possible in order that our offspring are not disadvantaged by our 
recklessness.278 Or, we may decide that, because we enjoy beautiful objects, the 
purpose o f life is to maximise our enjoyment o f them. Or it may seem logical to us 
that, because we applaud a reasoned life and condemn irrationality, beauty and reason 
are worth pursuing for their own sake. There is undoubtedly some merit in this 
approach, if one’s presuppositions have ruled out a personal, intelligent beginning to 
the universe. There really is no alternative to creating meaning for ourselves. How­
ever, such a conclusion, whilst it may inject a semblance o f purpose into individual 
lives, does not deal with the underlying problem o f absurdity, given that there is no 
particular value to life that exists as its intrinsic property. Human beings, beginning 
with their experience o f the world, cannot know whether there may be a reality which 
shapes existence towards an overarching goal Without this knowledge, it is just as 
reasonable to conclude that life is absurd as it is to create arbitrary reference points 
for creative living, and possibly more consistent.
276 Article written in M ail Online, 3 September 2010.
277 See, Atheism, Morality and Meaning (New York: Prometheus Books, 2002), pp. 185-235.
278 Any notion o f  natural selection o f those fittest to survive w oud seem to lead logicaiy to a policy o f 
eugenics. It would be surprising, therefore, if, given purely naturalistic assumptions, eugenics was rejected as 
moraiy unacceptable.
113
Somehow, the attempts o f atheists to derive meaning from an existence that is wholly 
fortuitous seem futile, when an alternative account o f reality does a wholly satis­
factory job. The alternative does not, o f course, amount to a demonstration o f its 
truth. Its cogency, however, as an explanation has led some279 to conclude that, even 
if it is not true, it is more conducive to human flourishing to treat it as if  it were true. 
And, if humans do indeed prosper most fidly by believing what theism tells them is in 
fact true, this may turn out to be good evidence o f its truth.
Order rather than chaos
It has often been remarked that science, though dealing wholly with the natural 
world, has to assume a metaphysical framework280 It begins from the supposition 
that the reality with which it deals is coherent and consistent. Scientists can make law­
like generalisations that they know will h o d  across time and across the universe:
“ It has to be taken for granted that the world as investigated by science is 
ordered and structured. This is not a fact that can be discovered through 
science, since we need a philosophical assumption about the similarity o f the 
unknown to the known.. .Apparent order may in the last resort be illusory. We 
still need a basis for our confidence that the discoveries o f science can be 
applied in different times and places with confidence. The applicability o f 
mathematics to the physical world itself ülustrates how an underlying rationale 
appears to be built into the fabric o f the world.”281 
How does one account for this ordered world? Surely, to say that this is just the way 
things happen to be is not convincing To ensure the utmost stability for the scientific 
enterprise, it is good to know that the mechanisms o f the natural world are secured 
on permanent foundations. That this is the reality cries out for explication. The 
likelihood o f matter p u s energy assembling themselves by chance into such intricate 
patterns as have been uncovered by scientific exploration are statistically so im­
probable as to be discounted. This w oud be an explanation, but hardly a good one let 
done the best:
“A more substantial one is provided by the view that reality is like that because 
God made it like that .T h e  rationality which mathematics appears to capture 
may itself be an expression o f the rationality o f the mind o f the Creator.” 282 
This, surely, is the kind o f explanation that Peter Lipton would refer to as the 
loveliest. The fact that it is not an explanation that can be demonstrated by scientific 
means does not detract from it one iota. The only reason for not recognising it as a 
credible and persuasive explanation would be the claim that science ultimately wül be 
able to explain all things within its own terms. Such a claim, o f course, is made on 
metaphysical not scientific grounds.
279 For example, Anthony O ’Hear, Beyond Emlltion: Human Nature and the Eimits of the Evvgilionaiy "Explanation 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 201.
280 See, for example, Roger Trigg, Rationality and Religion, pp. 80-81.
281 'Rationality and 'Religion, p. 81.
282 'Rationality and 'Religion, p. 82.
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As well as having to assume that the natural world is exquisitely ordered, scientists 
also have to taken for granted its contingency The world does not have to be as it is. 
I f  it was a wholly necessary world, scientists would not have to resort to observation 
and experimentation to discover what kind o f world it actually is, but they w oud be 
able to reason from first principles through logic to what it must be. Why shoud the 
world be contingent? And, why shoud a contingent world be ordered?
“As we have seen, the rational order found in the world is contingent, and 
theism can explain this through reference to the free creative activity o f God. 
He was not bound by iron laws o f necessity but was able to choose one kind 
o f ordered creation rather than an o th e r .It  becomes reasonable to look for 
order, but not to anticipate the kind o f order that we might find.”283 
This, again, is not an argument from the nature o f the world to the existence o f a 
creator God. Rather, it is an argument from the existence o f a personal, infinite 
creator to the reality o f our experience o f the world: if the God o f theism exists, this 
is precisely the kind o f world that one w oud expect this God to have brought into 
being and sustained.
In terms o f some o f the most fundamental aspects o f the whole enterprise o f science, 
IBE  works well with regard to the claims made by theists about the origin and nature 
o f the universe. As Roger Trigg says, in concluding his discussion o f science and 
theism,
“ It may be that the idea o f a Creator can give confidence to those undertaking 
a scientific investigation into physical processes. Indeed, science, it may be 
claimed, cannot gain proper legitimation in any other context.” 284 
It is not surprising, therefore, to know that modern science has its origins in a period 
o f history when the Christian theist worldview was still accepted as true.285 One o f the 
main reasons why modern science was able to begin to flourish was the breakdown o f 
the dominance o f a cosmology derived from Aristotle. And the principle objection to 
the Aristotelian theory was its “denial o f God’s complete sovereignty and freedom in 
ordering the universe and the consequent belief that God was subject to forces 
greater than himself.” 286
Practical rationality
In the last analysis, all intellectual work shoud have as its end product answers to the 
question, how shoud we then live? What is good behaviour and action for human 
beings to follow? By what means do we discriminate between right and wrong vaues 
and conduct? From where do we derive our moral sensibilities? Many explanations 
have been and continue to be given to the question o f how one shoud interpret the 
good life. The argument o f this thesis is that the Christian theistic account, rightly 
understood,287 is the best explanation for the existence o f conscience, and the best
283 'Rationality and 'Reason, p. 83.
284 'Rationality and 'Religion, p. 83.
285 See, ‘An Enquiry into the Origins o f Modern Science’ in The Future of Reason, pp. 29-40.
286 'The Future of Reason, p. 31.
287 Unfortunately, anti-theistic accounts o f the Christian basis o f  ethical discernment are often polemical and 
easily descend into gross misrepresentation. This is certainly the case o f A.C. Grayling, What is Good? The
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grounds for defining moral responsibility. It performs this task in part by analysing 
the adequacy, or otherwise, o f the alternatives.
One fruitful way o f approaching the discussion is to consider the consequences for 
ethical judgement o f both a naturalistic and a non-naturalistic interpretation o f the 
origin o f life. Another way is to look at the current alternative reasons given for 
acting morally. I will follow both approaches briefly.
The origin of ethics
As already argued, it w oud seem logical to affirm that the universe began either as 
the result o f the creative act o f a personal, infinite being who exists outside o f time 
and space or that it has come about as a spontaneous, but wholly fortuitous event in 
which by sheer chance certain chemical reactions set in motion a chain o f other 
events. We can postulate, therefore, either a universe that has been created by an 
entity existing outside o f the material or a universe that has created itself. Either way, 
over an extensive period o f time the incredible complexity o f macro and micro 
organisms that humans recognise today in their surroundings and the sophistication 
o f the rational, aesthetic, moral and spiritual processes that they are aware o f in them­
selves have developed from a singular origin. Which o f these two options can best 
account for the irreducible and eradicable sense o f moral obligation that humans 
experience? Which can provide the best reason for the birth o f a sense o f right and 
wrong action?
I f  the universe is the result o f impersonal forces that just happen to have produced 
the universe as we know it, then there are no guiding principles, intrinsic ends or 
rational processes that have at any stage shaped the stages o f life. According to these 
basic premises, the existence o f ethical intuitions has to be explained on the basis o f 
an absolutely consistent evolutionary materialism:
“The evolutionary ethicist may not move one foot from a purely empirical, 
descriptive procedure without calling into question her assumptions.” 288 
The basic empirical data adduced is co-operation or altruism in the interests o f 
survival Such success can only happen when organisms agree not to compete but to 
share those resources which aid survival and the reproduction o f a healthy next 
generation. On this view, somehow the evolutionary process (nature) has 
programmed us to believe that co-operation is an obligation:
“We think that we ought to help, that we have obligations to others, because it 
is in our biological interests to have these th ou gh ts.w e are moral beings 
because our genes, as fashioned by natural selection, ffl us full o f thoughts 
about being m oral” 289
Search for the Best Way to Live (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2003). His chapter, ‘The Ordinances o f 
G od’ is prejudiced and dogmatic in the extreme. WM accusations and many false statements litter his 
discussion. One might have supposed that an academic would have tested his statements against a 
sophisticated case for the Divine Command theory, thus helping to eliminate the many distortions o f which 
he is guilty. One might have though that one aspect o f  what is good is to represent others’ opinions fairly and 
correctly.
288 The Future of Reason, p. 183.
289 Michael Ruse, ‘The Significance o f Evolution’ in Peter Singer (ed.) 1  Companion to Ethics (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1993), p. 504.
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This theory attempts to account for our belief that we should act morally towards 
others, i.e. it is basically descriptive. Its nature is hypothetical, not demonstrable. The 
theory is demanded by the premises o f a purely naturalistic account o f the origin o f 
life, in the sense that no other conventional account o f ethics could be derived from 
the original premises. The justification for moral action is reduced to the necessity to 
survive, which is the overriding intent o f the evolutionary process. In order to 
conform adequately to this end, we have no option but to act altruistically:
“ Our moral beliefs are simply an adaptation put in place by natural selection, in 
order to further our reproductive ends; that is an end to it. Morality is no more 
than illusion fobbed o ff on us by our genes for reproductive ends.” 290 
If, however, the universe had a personal beginning, was created for specific ends, was 
so designed that rational beings w oud come into existence and was so proposed and 
fashioned that one particular way o f being moral is the necessary precondition for 
human flourishing, then we have a totally different account o f ethical behaviour. The 
justification for holding to certain values and rejecting others is the nature o f reality as 
purposefully created by a transcendent being, according to his own inherent 
character. How we know the content o f the morally good life will be discussed in the 
next section.
In one sense, the theistic explanation o f the origin o f ethics is also descriptive. It, too, 
is hypothetical and follows from its own original premise, namely that the universe is 
the result o f a personal creation. It is demonstrable only in the way in which we have 
been conducting the argument so far, namely that it is an inference from experience 
to the best explanation. It is certainly more coherent than the naturalistic evolutionary 
explanation, for the latter, to make any sense o f moral obligation, is obliged to 
smuggle in a principle o f purpose into an utterly random and contingent biological 
process. The very notion o f survival appears to impart to purely biological processes 
a teleology o f its own. However, survival is not an objective built into evolution; it is 
merely a description o f what has happened to some species. There is no overarching 
necessity for anything to survive, if the whole business o f life in the universe is totally 
adventitious from beginning to end.291 Nor, can nature be conceptualised as a subject 
that somehow drives the processes on, as though it was a kind o f causal agent. Nature 
is simply the sum total o f the environment in which we live. It is here by an entirely 
haphazard, and one might say serendipitous process.
The theistic explanation for the origin o f ethics appears to be superior in the sense 
that ultimately it is able to give a justification that is not based on the naturalist fallacy
290 ‘The Significance o f  Evolution’, p. 506. A full account o f attempts to derive a basis for ethics from the 
data o f evolution is given by Neil Messer, Selfish Genes and Christian Ethics: Theologicsl and Ethicsl 'Reflections on 
Evvldtionaíy Biology (London: SCM Press, 2007).
291 Eric Chaisson, Epic of Evolution: Seven Ages of the Cosmos (NY: Colombia University Press, 2006), passim, p. 
436, maintains that “we have an obligation, a moral responsibility, to survive, especiaiy if we are aone in the 
Universe. The great experiment that intelligent life represents must not end in failure,” quoted in Willem B. 
Drees, Religion and Sciencs in Context: A  Guide to the Debate (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), p. 143. The latter 
author responds by saying, “any transition from facts to vaues, from ‘is’ to ‘ought’, has been deemed a 
naturalistic faiacy, and rightly so. Any idea that there is a moral obligation to survive and thus continue the 
history o f  intelligent life in the universe does not come from science but is a vale articulated in the context o f 
current scientific understanding,” pp. 143-144.
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that moral obligation can be derived from a descriptive hypothesis. John Mackie, for 
example, recognises that, if the God hypothesis were true, objective moral norms 
would have a substantitive basis, and that without belief in God objective moral 
principles woUd be inexplicable. Mackie, however, was an atheist and, therefore, did 
not have recourse to the theistic foundation for ethical practice. He was left with the 
dilemma o f how it is possible to derive an intrinsic prescriptive quality from a 
naturalistic view o f the world.292 In other words, he demonstrated in the field o f 
ethical reflection just the kind o f epistemological predicament that this thesis has 
been tracing The predicament w oud be resolved, if it were true that moral obligation 
ultimately is derived from the demand that we live according to the way we were 
created and the reasons for which we were created. This takes us on to consider what 
we may know about the foundations for ethics.
F  oundations for ethics
Given the acceptance o f a non-theistic explanation o f the origin o f the universe and 
life within it, and therefore unable to appeal to a theistic account o f the origin, nature 
and justification o f objective moral values, what other foundations for justifiable 
ethical belief and action can be suggested? Here, I w oud like to assess one alternative, 
which claims to be able to offer a non-theistic grounding for a belief in moral facts. It 
is known as ‘The Ideal Observer Theory’293 (henceforth IO). This view has the 
advantage o f attempting to give a coherent rationale for a meta-ethics, i.e. a funda­
mental principle by which ethical judgements coud be rightly considered true or 
false. Other ethical theories, such as intuitionism or consequentialism do not give us 
any basic reason for thinking that we may come to know ethical values; they deal 
more with methods o f discerning how we may evaluate different moral options.294 
The IO Theory is based on the supposition that an IO, a hypothetical being whose 
two main characteristics would be the possession o f full information concerning any 
situation that demanded moral choice and complete impartiality between divergent 
opinions about the matter, can be appealed to as an objective standard for making 
moral judgements:
“ In order to be rationally justified in one’s ethical judgements about some 
action or event one must base these judgements on one’s estimate o f the 
reaction o f an Ideal Observer.” 295 
The criterion by which one knows whether an action is morally right or wrong is the 
feeling o f approval or disapproval with which the IO would react to the action in 
question.
According to the theory, the IO does not have to exist in reality. Moreover, one 
shoud not construe the concept o f ideal in an ethical sense:
292 See, J. L. Mackie, Inventing Right and Wrmg (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977) and the discussion o f 
his views in Atheism, MorrHty and Meaning, pp. 36-39 and The Future of Reason, pp. 220-222.
293 1 will follow the version o f it presented by Michael Martin in Atheism, Morrlitj and Meaning.
294 See, The "Future of Reason, pp. 184-187.
295 Atheism, M orl^y and Meaning, p. 51.
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“an Ideal Observer’s properties o f being fidly informed and being completely 
unbiased are in principle reducible to empirical properties and are not ethical 
ideals on a par with being completely just or fiúly benevolent.”296 
In spite o f such an assertion, it is interesting to note that what most people w oud 
regard as one o f the highest o f ethical ideals, compassion, is added to the theory in 
order to make it more credible; for the IO as depicted seems utterly devoid o f any 
empathetic virtues. Nevertheless, the theory still maintains that compassion is not to 
be interpreted as a moral virtue but as the attribute o f a moral judge, necessary for the 
most desirable procedures that appertain in deciding ethical questions. Presumably, 
then, other attributes such as total honesty, justice, and non-vindictiveness would also 
apply.
It is not obvious that making a distinct between moral virtues and moral attributes 
adds clarity to the whole discussion about ethical decision-making; rather, the issue 
seems to become more confused. These attributes are irrelevant unless they are 
morally right. Martin seems to acknowledge this when later he speaks about a torturer 
generating moral outrage and indignation, because he acts out o f hatred and twisted 
values. Why isn’t expressing (moral) indignation against gratuitous hatred and cruelty 
a moral virtue? In this instance, the theory massively begs the question as to why 
these attributes are deemed important.
The theory also seems deeply flawed in making a basic distinction between ethical 
feelings and ethical beliefs. How is it possible to have the first without the second? If 
the ideal ludgement is based on an impartial, omniscient observer being known to 
have feelings o f approval and disapproval, on what are these based? To take the 
example o f the torturer, the IO may know intimately all the circumstances o f the 
case, how though is this going to help a moral verdict, unless one knows, in advance, 
that torture is morally wrong? And if the IO is completely impartial, how is this 
relevant to the situation o f torture? Does she have to be able to empathise equally 
with both the perpetrator and the victim, in the process o f considering that 
arguments in favour o f torture may be equally valid as those that are against? Full 
information about a situation as is possible to achieve and a willingness to consider 
the facts o f a case without partiality may be admirable qualities in the processes o f 
making ethical decisions; they do not, however, constitute grounds for believing that 
some actions are right and some wrong
As the IO does not exist, but is only imaginary (a kind o f thought experiment), the 
ordinary human being (not being ideal in the sense described) stül has to decide what 
the IO w oud approve or disapprove of, for the latter cannot communicate its 
feelings. This being so, how does this theory escape the accusation that it merely 
projects the subjective feelings o f the ordinary human on to a hypothetical (ideal) 
figure. In the last analysis, the IO is a fiction; the one who decides is not the ideal 
Observer, but the ordinary observer who decides what is to be approved or dis­
approved. The whole theory confuses means and ends. It simply does not answer the 
question about how we know that the feelings o f the IO are rightly expressed. In 
other words, omniscience and impartiality do not constitute the source o f ethical
296 Atheism, Morrlitj and Meaning, p. 50.
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values; they merely tell us something about optimum conditions for exercising good 
moral judgements. For moral approval or disapproval to have any purchase, moral 
rightness or wrongness must be assumed. However, the IO is not the source o f this 
knowledge.
There are other objections to the theory, which cannot be rehearsed in detail here. 
For example, it has not overcome the naturalist fallacy o f trying to derive moral 
obligation from observation o f the facts o f a case, for natural facts do not constitute 
moral facts. It imports illegitimately into the nature o f the IO moral virtues, such as 
its “loving nature.”297 It lacks a proper moral ontology, namely that it has no basis for 
warranting a metaphysics o f personhood and its intrinsic dignity or value — this, on 
the basis o f a consistent naturalism, can hardly be a natural property. There is no 
proper defense against the approval o f morally objectionable consequences — Martin 
argues that the IO might approve o f cruelty in certain circumstances on the grounds 
o f its consequences,298 thus making ends justifying means an acceptable moral 
principle. The combined weight o f these objections seems to sink the theory as a 
plausible account o f moral reasoning It is an attempt to suggest that a plausible natu­
ralistic foundation for moral discernment can be envisaged.
Perhaps, in terms o f our debate about the predicament o f epistemology in the West, 
the fundamental reason for rejecting the theory as inadequate is that the theistic alter­
native already possesses all the positive attributes o f the theory, without at the same 
time sharing its failures. The IO might, at first sight, be mistaken for a god-like figure, 
except that it is impersonal and hypothetical, whilst God is personal and exists. The 
IO is credited with moral virtues, even though the theory does not allow this, whilst 
God is the very expression and fount o f all moral virtues: he is the very definition o f 
goodness, compassion, justice, etc. The IO cannot communicate her approval or dis­
approval — this has to be extrapolated by the imperfect human person — whilst God is 
alleged to have communicated his will and laws to humanity.
A theistic account o f both the origin and foundation o f moral values seems, there­
fore, to be the best explanation. However, serious objections have been made to the 
theistic interpretation on the grounds that the so-called divine command theory o f 
moral obligation is seriously flawed. We need, therefore, briefly to review these objec­
tions and determine whether they can be resolved.
Opposition to the Divine Command Theory
The theory normally asserts that “the standard o f right and wrong is constituted by 
the commands and prohibitions o f God.” 299 This may be further explicated by adding 
that the will o f God is the standard for measuring the goodness or badness o f moral 
judgements and actions. This coud  mean that the ethical quality o f any system o f 
values depends in the last analysis on whether they conform to, or veer away from, 
whatever it is that God decrees.
297 Atheism, M orUy and Meaning, p. 87.
298 Atheism, M orUy and Meaning, p. 94.
299 Janine Marie Idziak, ‘Divine Command Ethics’ in A  Companion to Vhilosophh of Religion, p. 453.
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One obvious problem with the theory is that the existence o f God is assumed. For an 
atheist, the theory can be immediately dismissed on the grounds that for her “there 
are no good reasons for the belief that a theistic God exists.. .There are (however) 
good reasons for believing a theistic God does not exist.” 300 If God does not exist, 
then there is no God to will and command. However, the reasons given for not 
believing are usually conventional: a summary dismissal o f the so-called arguments 
for God’s existence; the existence o f evil in the world; the number o f those who fail 
to believe; the putative incoherence o f God’s various attributes; the inadmissibility o f 
miracles as acts o f God.301
This is not the place to discuss these well-worn paths, except perhaps to point out 
that those who reject miracles do so by making themselves totally immune from falsi­
fication, for they have decided never to allow any evidence that transcends the 
bounds o f the scientificaiy demonstrable to be considered. In effect, they have ruled 
miracles out o f court a priori, and they have done so on grounds that do not spring 
from proper scientific considerations. This arbitrary presumption in favour o f 
naturalism means that the weight o f evidence in favour o f theism is never properly 
assessed.302
There are, nevertheless, serious arguments against the divine command theory, even 
when theism is acknowledged as probable. They arise from the two commonest state­
ments o f the theory, sometimes given the names o f theological objectivism (TO) and 
theological subjectivism (TS). In the first case,
“ God approves o f right actions just because they are right and disapproves o f 
wrong actions just because they are w rong”
In the second case,
“Right actions are right just because God approves o f them and wrong actions 
are wrong just because God disapproves o f them.”303 
Now, the difficulties with these statements are almost immediately obvious. I f  TO  is 
correct, then there is a standard o f morality that exists independently o f God’s 
commands. And, if TS is correct, then morality is quite arbitrary, since God has the 
power to approve or disapprove any course o f action. He might, for example, 
command human beings to torture babies. Moreover, this w oud not be a genuine 
moral theory, since people w oud not act on the basis o f spontaneous moral virtue, 
but out o f fear o f punishment or in hope o f gaining merit or receiving a reward. 
Thus,
“the one theory. .gives God everything to do with what turns out not to be 
morality, while the other theory preserves the essence o f morality at the cost o f 
giving God a walk-on part that could easily be written out o f the play”304
300 Atheism, Morrlitj and Meaning, p. 115.
301 Thus, Atheism, Morrlitj and Meaning, pp. 115-118.
302 See, the careful and sophisticated case assembled on b eh a f o f  theism in Paul Copan and Paul K. Moser, 
The 'Rationality of Theism (London: Routledge, 2003), passim.
303 Norman Kretzmann, ‘Abraham, Isaac, and Euthyphro: God and the Basis o f  Morality’ in ThUosophh of 
Religion, p. 421.
304 ‘A b ra h a m .,’ p. 424.
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As a result o f this dilemma, theists have postulated a modified divine command 
theory. God can command or will only what conforms to his nature. As, by 
definition, God is absolute goodness, justice and loving-kindness, he coud  only 
desire human beings to follow whatever those supreme ethical virtues demand. Thus, 
“his commands — far from being arbitrary — are in accordance with that 
nature.”305
O f course, the dilemma may be pushed one stage further back by asking whether 
G od’s nature is good, just and loving because it is God’s character or is it assumed to 
be G od’s nature because it is good, according to independent sources. The main 
answer has to be that there simply are no other independent sources o f morality (par­
ticularly if one adheres to a naturalist philosophy). Morality is either grounded in the 
perfectly good character o f God, and this is the definition o f goodness (self-sufficient 
and self-explanatory), or morality is invented for purely pragmatic purposes (to 
contain self-destructive forces and promote survival). In the latter case, it ceases to be 
morality for the same reason that a bare command theory is not moral, namely that 
the intrinsic virtue o f performing the good, just because it is good, is absent.
The revised dilemma still appears to commit the error o f assuming that God has 
moral obligations to some external moral standard. But this is not so. There could not 
be anything that impinged on God to impel God into a certain course o f action. God 
is entirely free o f external constraints. God is only constrained by God’s own nature. 
God cannot act or command others to act against the way God is. So, in the last 
analysis, everything hinges on the way God has revealed himself, for the corollary to 
any divine command theory is that human beings have access to the nature, purposes 
and will o f God, so that we may know who he is and what he is like.
There are other arguments employed against the divine command theory, which are 
o f lesser weight (although they have to be part o f the debate about the episte- 
mological and ontological basis o f moral values). First, we cannot know what God 
wills, for we cannot have good reasons for choosing between different versions o f 
God (religious plurality is said to throw an epistemological spanner into the works o f 
recognising only one valid set o f truths about God). This is a complex issue. 
However, I believe that there are criteria by which we may assess truth-claims, not 
least the argument from inference to the best explanation. One o f these w oud be 
precisely the question o f moral value. What does each religion say that God 
commands and forbids and how do these compare? On what points o f moral value 
do they disagree (e.g the nature o f punishment, the status o f women in society or the 
legitimation o f violence), and what do the differences say about the religion’s concept 
o f God?306
Secondly, there is the argument that human beings possess moral sensibilities 
irrespective o f whether they believe that God exists; whereas, if  God does not exist, 
then on the basis o f the divine command theory, morality would not exist, everything 
would be permitted. That human beings who, for example, profess atheism possess
305 Paul Copan, ‘The Moral Argument’ in The Rationality of Theism, p. 166.
306 I have myself attempted one kind o f comparative analysis between the Christian and Muslim faiths with 
regard to the use o f force and the place and purpose o f suffering; see, J. Andrew Kirk, Civilisations in Conflict0 
Islam, the West and Christian 9 aith (Oxford: Regnum, International, 2010).
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moral feelings cannot be denied. However, the atheist still has difficulty in explaining 
why they exist and whether, on her presuppositions, they shoud exist. Moreover, the 
fact o f moral feelings does not explain the sense o f moral obligation, nor give any 
account o f why moral obligation is a superior moral category to self-interest, indeed 
the very nature o f morality in itself. The only defense against the-everything-would- 
be-permitted-argument is consistency: namely that I shoud always treat others as I 
wish them to treat me. This is a rational argument, but it does not respond to the case 
o f those whose religion, philosophy or ideology tells them that they are ontologicaiy 
superior beings who, therefore, do not adhere to the ‘golden rule.’ Only an ontology 
that tells them categorically that no human being is superior to another can ground 
‘the golden rule’ adequately. Is there any other ontology, apart from theism, that 
provides such a foundation?
In this section we have attempted to show how IBE may work with reference to the 
theory and practice o f ethics. We come to the preliminary conclusion that a case can 
be made out for considering that a theistic basis gives a more coherent, more com­
prehensive and more rationaiy satisfying account o f the whole human experience o f 
making moral judgements than any naturalistically-based alternative. We deduce, 
therefore, that we are justified in believing the adequacy o f the theistic view. 
However, the case falls short o f indicating that the view is true. We shoud finish our 
discussion, therefore, by considering the status o f IBE as a method o f dialogue with 
reference to Christian mission in the context o f the epistemological predicament o f 
the West.
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C O N C L U S IO N
Engaging the West’s epistemological pre d icament
In this thesis, I have set out the case for a particular way o f engaging in dialogue with 
the main assumptions o f secular Western humanism regarding the fundamental 
questions o f epistemology. I have argued that this is an authentic aspect o f Christian 
mission and therefore is to be located academically in the discipline o f missiology. As 
dialogue with people who h o d  different views about how ultimate reality is to be 
understood is generally recognised as a significant part o f the calling o f Christian 
communities, this subject is justified as a focus for missioogical discourse.
I have discussed the meaning o f epistemoogy as referenced in mainstream philo­
sophical literature, accepting the provisional opinion that it concerns the search for 
justified true belief about the whole o f human experience. I have continued by 
outlining why it is safe to say that Western culture is in the midst o f an episte- 
moogical crisis. It springs from doubt about having sure access to knowledge that 
matches the total human experience o f existence, covering both the external reality o f 
the natural world and the internal reality o f thought, consciousness, conscience, 
aesthetic appreciation, language and the yearning for transcendence.307 
The predicament can be understood in terms o f a series o f questions, many o f which 
can be answered satisfactorily by the natural sciences, but some o f which remain 
beyond their scope to supply answers to. I f  there are answers to questions about the 
uniqueness o f the human experience o f being human, they have to be sought beyond 
knowledge that can be gained by empirical investigation alone. In other words, there 
is a marked divorce in the current state o f epistemoogical discussion in the West 
between well-grounded, and largely confirmed, knowledge o f the natural world and 
knowledge o f other matters that are intrinsically not open to empirical verification.
I have argued that the main consequence o f the epistemoogical predicament, charac­
teristic o f Western societies, is the loss o f a unified field o f knowledge.308 Science has 
its authentic methodoogies, which are valid and fruitful in describing the workings o f 
the physical environment in which human beings are enmeshed. It cannot, however, 
within its own terms account for the deeply human needs that are common to the 
human species. The question remains, therefore, whether there is any hope o f finding 
a reliable, alternative source o f knowledge, complementary to the discovery o f the 
sciences, that can give plausible answers to these needs.
Historically, Western societies have been shaped by the belief that the universe is the 
inventive work o f a personal divine being who has made all that is by a series o f un­
conditional creative acts, and whose crowning achievement was to form a being like
307 In the article ‘Christian Mission and the Epistemoogical Crisis o f the West’, I have argued that the 
Western crisis o f  knowledge manifests itself as inconsistency, either within a particular intellectual tradition 
or, even more evidently, between moral reasoning and practical living I stated there that “ inconsistency 
degrades and debilitates the meaning o f human existence” , whilst “ to think coherently and to be able to 
make one’s actions harmonize with one’s thinking is to enhance the dignity o f  human life” ; see, To Stake a 
Claim, pp. 166-167.
308 This reflects the cognitive aspect o f  human experience. From a more existentialist perspective, the 
consequence can be seen as the failure to achieve a fully satisfied life, namely the capacity to make sense o f 
every aspect o f  existence by understanding how the different parts fit into a satisfactory, explanatory whole.
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himself. It has also been assumed that this same (uncreated) being has made himself 
known through speciaiy chosen messengers, culminating in a personal appearance at 
a very specific point in time. This self-revelation has, until relatively recently, been 
accepted as an authentic account o f the origin and nature o f the whole o f existence. 
Unfortunately, those to whom the trusteeship and interpretation o f the story o f 
G od’s acts in time and space have been entrusted have fought one another, in order 
to gain the exclusive rights to God’s ‘memoirs’. The struggle for ascendency within 
Europe has cast doubt upon the claims being made by those bodies (the churches) 
which have attempted to maintain their prerogatives by decidedly non-spiritual 
means.
Gradually European peoples have become disHlusioned with the spiritual hegemony 
that churches (often in alliance with political vested interests) have sought to impose. 
They have turned, therefore, to what has promised to offer an alternative under­
standing o f the origin and function o f the universe and the place o f human beings in 
the cosmos. The natural sciences, through a multiplicity o f research projects, have 
accumulated a vast store o f knowledge, well tested, and demonstrated to be in 
accordance with a natural order governed by consistent law-like operations. However, 
they are not able to answer those very distinctive questions which only human beings 
ask, and which consequently set them apart as a special species.
Nevertheless, because o f the success o f the sciences in discovering the true nature o f 
the physical universe, the methodology by which they operate has rightly become the 
standard one.306 Henceforth, all claims to knowledge have to resonate with both the 
methodology and the findings o f the whole scientific venture. Here, however, we see 
the current epistemological predicament. Rationally, we can only give credence to 
knowledge that has been gleaned through scientific processes. However, the 
knowledge thus acquired does not tell us anything o f value about our own inner expe­
rience o f ourselves and the environment about us. What I am proposing as a missio- 
logical procedure for the Christian community is to take a proven scientific method 
o f discovery (IBE) and apply it to those ‘thick’ issues (to use Hilary Putnam’s 
language), which evade dissection by the normal practices o f the physical sciences.
I am also proposing that, missiologically, the Christian community treats this process 
as an instance o f dialogue. It is necessary to see it in this way, because it is the case 
that consistently secular forces have arrived at the conclusion that the physical 
sciences will be able to arrive ultimately at a f J )  explanation o f everything The 
purpose o f dialogue is to increase the circle o f knowledge and understanding, not by 
accepting agreement at a low level o f explanation, but by witnessing to and arguing
306 There are objections, most notably in post-colonia discourse, to the ‘coercive’ appeal to scientific 
methodology as a cover for Western intellectual imperialism, whether in its Christian or Enlightenment 
dressing This also seems to be part o f the agenda o f the ‘radical orthodox’ school o f theology. The 
accusation surfaces again, coincidental in the context o f the science/religion debate, in an article written by 
F. Gironi, ‘Turning a Critical Eye on Sciencc and Religion: Theological Assumptions and Soteriological 
Rhetoric’ in Method and Theory in the Study of Religion, 22 (2010), pp. 37-67. His complaint seems to be that 
Christianity has defined humanity in an idiosyncratic way, which is particular, limited and local and which 
builds on a synthesis o f modernity and Western theological categories. This is not the place to respond to his 
critique, except to say that a diaogical method using IBE, as a method o f  exploring alternative inter­
pretations, should avoid his criticisms.
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for the most convincing explanation o f the greatest possible range o f evidence. In 
other words, the dialogue proceeds by way o f garnering the evidence and then setting 
out the various alternative cases that may be able to explain the phenomena under 
discussion.
I have attempted to demonstrate the enormous advantages o f this method: the two 
main ones are that it uses the same rationality as the sciences and that it successfuiy 
unifies the whole field o f human experience. I have sought to demonstrate how the 
method would work as an explanation o f the ability o f scientific research to uncover 
the nature o f the material world and as a reliable indicator o f the ultimate source o f 
moral knowledge. I f  space had permitted, it w oud have been possible to have 
demonstrated its functioning in the case o f religious belief systems. I have attempted 
to give reasons why I consider diaogue with a post-Christian, secular culture should 
have first priority for missiological engagement in the West. Fundamentally, it is a 
question o f the most appropriate form o f contextualising the Gospel in current 
Western culture. I have stated my belief that a secular culture is not necessarily an 
irreligious one. Yet, its religiosity (or ‘spirituality’) takes on a unique form in the West, 
just because o f the distinct history o f Christianity in the last four hundred years or
310so.
This means that, in the West at least, diaogue can only be meaningful in the context 
o f an understanding o f the Christian heritage embedded in its history So, I w oud 
argue that the arcane, highly personalised religiosity o f peoples who have imbibed 
Western culture, exhibited in many surveys conducted throughout the continent, 
shoud not be assimilated to a general interpretation o f religious life and experience 
borrowed from other parts o f the globe; it should be understood as a response to 
very particular circumstances. I have also argued that a pluralist theory o f religions 
shoud be perceived as the outcome o f European intellectual history, particularly in its 
most recent post-modern manifestations. It suffers, therefore, the same fate as its 
post-modern counterpart, which although it rightly contests any arrogant, autocratic 
belief system, cannot avoid the inconsistencies o f its relativistic perspective on reality. 
So, the well-chronicled upsurge in spiritual practices among some Western people has 
to be understood as a unique phenomenon, to be interpreted within its own particular 
terms o f reference.
In one way or another, the articles collected for the purpose o f this dissertation seek 
to engage missiologically with the epistemological predicament o f the West as a 
cultural issue. They argue that, within the parameters recognised as acceptable for a 
discussion o f the philosophical issues that are raised, there is no solution. The secular 
premises which prevail, so amply and cogently displayed by Charles Taylor, preclude 
a solution to the predicament. It is necessary to take a step back to the time in 
European intellectual history when knowledge was treated as a unitary whole, when 
the two principal sources o f knowledge, the word and world o f God were considered 
compatible and complementary. However, in order to deal with the dichotomy that 
we have been tracing here, and the assumptions on which it is based, it is necessary to
310 Following Charles Taylor, 1  Secular Age, I take the Reformation to be a decisive watershed between two 
different ways o f  conceiving the interaction between God, the church and society
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find and argue for an approach to the question o f knowledge that, within the context 
o f the epistemological split, has not yet been given the attention it deserves.
I have attempted to set out the advantages o f the method (IBE), especially for a 
context dominated by the philosophical underpinnings o f the scientific method. First, 
the method is easily recognisable within both the natural and social sciences. Hence, a 
theistic approach to reality does not have to engage in special pleading, appealing to 
the categories o f faith or experience o f the transcendent as somehow exempt from 
the normal critical processes involved in seeking to establish the truth about the 
whole weight o f human experience. For this reason, the method disputes all forms o f 
fideism, understood as an approach to the knowledge o f the transcendent that is self­
contained within its own self-authenticating world o f belief Fideism rejects the need 
for independent rational or evidentialist support for the claims that are made for 
religious convictions. It is likely, therefore, to treat with some suspicion a method that 
exposes itself to comparative critical engagement, free from claiming some privileged 
epistemic path to knowledge. At the same time, fideism w oud find it hard to 
establish mutually acceptable criteria that w oud make the kind o f dialogue we have 
been envisaging possible.311 A non-evidentialist approach to faith seems to be 
committed to saying that faith has its own esoteric reasons for believing, but these are 
not open to normal rational scrutiny It w oud seem to follow from this premise that 
mission as dialogue, o f whatever kind, w oud become entirely problematic, for there 
would be no common ground for the initial conversation to get started.
Secondly, the method appears to confirm a common-sense view o f knowledge. If 
knowledge is justified true belief, then the justification for believing something to be 
true is that the evidence for the belief is strong The answer that most people would 
give to the question, why sho^d I believe, is, because the evidence warrants it. The 
famous axiom enunciated by William Clifford that “it is wrong always, everywhere 
and for everyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence” 312 is intuitively 
correct. The positive corollary to the statement is then applied, for example, in a 
court o f law, where a person is considered innocent until and unless there is sufficient 
evidence to bring a conviction. I f  the evidence is insufficient, the case is declared 
unsafe and the prosecution dismissed.
Clearly, Clifford’s maxim begs a number o f questions: what counts as evidence? 
Under what conditions does a body o f evidence support a particular belief? What 
does it mean for someone to possess evidence? In the dialogical engagement with 
contemporary secular assumptions, it needs to be established that evidence cannot be 
confined to sensual observation and controlled experimentation, for then there w oud 
be no evidence for making such a reductionist proposition. It also includes reasoned 
discourse, historical analysis, memory and testimony The sharp separation made by 
some contemporary atheists between empirical demonstration and faith is, therefore,
311 See the discussion in Terence Penelhum, ‘Fideism’ i n i  Companion to Philosophy of Religion, pp. 376-382, and 
‘The Confusion o f Epistemology’, Tyndale Bulletin, 55.1 (2004), n. 57, p. 152.
312 'Lectures and Essays (London, 1876).
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invalid. In a legal case, admissible evidence goes beyond the merely forensic, and can 
legitimately be used to come to a verdict ‘beyond a i reasonable doubt.’313 
From a missiological point o f view the method is non-imperialistic, non-intrusive and 
non-violent. It works through persuasion, on the basis o f the cogency o f the case, not 
through coercion in the form o f inducements, constraint or intimidation. Perhaps, 
without stretching the matter too far it is a way o f returning to the original New 
Testament understanding o f dialogue (dialegomai), meaning to conduct a discussion,314 
to argue a case, debate or convince. In the second half o f the Acts o f the Apostles, it 
had become a semi-technical term for Paul’s method o f teaching in the synagogues, 
being translated by the NRSV as “argue,” “have a discussion,” “h o d  a discussion,” 
“talk,” “dispute,” and “discuss” (e.g Acts 17.2, 17; 18.4, 19; 19.8f.; 20.7,9; 24.12, 
25).315 It seems legitimate to conclude, therefore, that, in the quite specific context o f 
the epistemoogical predicament o f the West, mission as diaogue with a post­
Christian, secular culture can best be fufilled through adopting and adapting the 
methodoogical tool o f IBE.
I find that over the years that these articles cover, there is a certain consistency in the 
convictions followed. I have been accused o f operating within the general framework 
o f modernity, “unable to cope with the new environment o f uncertainty, complexity, 
and ambivalence that anthropoogist David Scott ascribes to postmodernism.”316 This 
is partly true, and partly false. It is true, in so far as I affirm strongly the universal 
rationality o f scientific research and repudiate a) post-modern attempts to locate its 
methods and discoveries within the contingencies o f social intercourse.317 It is false, 
in so far as I contest modernity’s unfortunate and unnecessary turn to rationalism and 
empiricism. As far as post-modernity is concerned, I have dealt at considerable length 
in various publications with what I consider both its strengths and its weaknesses. 
Suffice it to say here that the ‘uncertainty, complexity and ambivalence’ o f the post­
modern condition is largely o f its own making, the result o f the inadequate premises 
which have led to its proposals.
The judgement that IBE coud possibly prove a fruitful heuristic device in the missio­
logical task o f engaging with the contemporary epistemoogical predicament manifest 
in Western culture has been there from the time in the early 1990s when I first began 
to focus on this area as a missioogical challenge. However, at the beginning, the
313 Further on the methodological advantages o f inference to the best explanation as a procedure for 
establishing the knowledge o f any affirmation, see The "Future of Reason, pp. 125-126, 204-205, 226-228.
314 See, Arndt and Gingrich, 1  Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Litemture 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1957), p. 184.
315 See, Colin Brown (ed.), Dictionary of New Testament Theology (Vol. 3# (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1992), p. 
821.
316 Rosemary Dewerse, summarising Jorgen Skov Sorensen, Missiologiccl Mutilations — Prospective Paralogies: 
Language and Power in Contem p^r Mission Theor (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2007) in Mission Studies 27 (2010), p 
100. I have not had access to this work, so am not able to ascertain how the author has come to this 
conclusion, or on the basis o f which o f my publications. He will not, for example, have had access to my 
extended treatment o f modernity and post-modernity in The Future of Reason (published two years after his 
research was completed). However, the implied critique is general in tone, and can also be answered 
generaiy.
317 Rosemary Dewerse notes the irony o f “ Sorensen’s bid for a postmodern paradigm in mission theory, 
conducted within the expectations o f a tightly reasoned, rigorously researched, and “modern” PhD format.”
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intuition was barely formed and quite unfocussed. In the intervening years it has 
become more definite and convictional The present study, therefore, is the fruit o f 
nearly 20 years work, interspersed with attention to other concerns. I admit that it is 
probably still more o f a potential theory than o f proven practical worth. The difficulty 
is that, although Christians may speak enthusiastically about dialogue, the value o f its 
practice can only be measured, if and when there are dialogue partners willing and 
eager to be engaged around the kind o f issues raised in this piece o f research.
M ission as d ialogue: the ends and means in question
This thesis, then, is a multi-faceted approach to the perennial calling o f Christian 
believers to bear witness to the truth as it is in jesus Christ. This implies the commu­
nication o f an interpretation o f the reality o f human life whose source exists beyond 
the musings o f human reason reflecting on the inner and outer worlds o f human 
experience. Such an interpretation assumes that there is knowledge, as justified true 
belief, o f the reality and meaning o f life that is available outside o f empirical 
investigation. The calling to mission also implies a particular context. This thesis 
assumes that the principll context for mission in the West is the unresolved episte- 
mological predicament and its consequences, which we have described in the 
Introduction and further expanded on in the various articles.318 The noetic parameters 
o f Western culture present a very particular challenge and opportunity for Christian 
witness.
I argue that probably the best form o f witness in this situation is diaogue. Dialogue 
has a number o f component parts that need to be honoured, if the conversation is 
going to be fruitful It assumes that the partners in diaogue have basic beliefs that are 
distinguishable in principle from contingent, cultural forms o f them, that there are 
points o f contact between different belief systems that enable a genuine intellectual 
engagement to take place, that the parties to the diaogue respect one another and 
believe that they may have something to learn as well as to give in the exchange, that 
the opinions we do not share are fairly represented, and finaiy that the issues under 
discussion are significant matters not only for theoretical considerations, but also in 
daily living319
I argue, further, that probably the best form o f diaogue is to work through together 
the principle o f IBE  as a method o f arriving at the probable truth about the whole 
reality that we human beings experience. Its advantages are manifest in a culture 
inclined to put its trust in scientific experimentation and outcomes. First, it is based 
on evidence that can be rationaiy assessed and empiricaiy tested. Secondly, it is open 
to a universal discourse, from which nobody in principle is excluded. Thirdly, it 
commands the widest possible acceptance as it is applicable throughout many 
disciplines — each o f which are in engaged in the task o f explanation. Fourthly, when 
rightly applied, it avoids begging questions about prior beliefs. So, it is not tradition-
318 Hence the argument in the article, ‘Christian Mission in Multi-Faith Situations,’ that interreligious dialogue 
in the post-Christian, secularised environment o f  Western culture may be a diversionary tactic. I am not 
arguing that it is intrinsicdly misplaced; only that it is contextudly o f secondary importance.
316 Further on the subject o f  diaogue, see J. Andrew Kirk, ‘Mission as diaogue: the case o f  secular faith’ in 
Mission under Scrutiny (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2006), pp. 26-45.
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dependent in the sense that diaogue can only begin when different traditions are 
judged to be commensurate; rather basic beliefs are brought in as explanations as a 
second stage hermeneutical exercise. Fifthly, it is essentially a discussion about the 
nature o f reality in its variety o f forms, a reality that to one degree or another every­
one is part of.
I f  the apprehension o f truth is the most fundamental issue in epistemology, then IBE 
is concerned to offer the most comprehensive and intellectually and existentially 
compelling evaluation o f the realities o f existence. Its pragmatic value lies in its ability 
to distinguish between truth and error and fact and fantasy There is no question that 
lies outside its purview. It is, therefore, equally applicable to scientific research, moral 
debate and religious claims, each o f which, in its own way, appeals to a transcendental 
realism.
In spite o f the scepticism o f post-modern thinking, human beings need to situate 
their lives within a discourse that offers a meta-interpretation o f their experience. 
This has been called a grand narrative, an account o f life that links together all the 
fragmentary parts into a plausible whole. Human beings can be seen to f  ourish best 
when they can make sense o f the past, present and future. In the West, there are still 
only two major grand-narratives that offer this kind o f interpretation: modernity in its 
current form o f liberal, secular humanism and Christian faith.320
I argue that liberal secular humanism gives an inadequate account o f reality in a 
number o f crucial areas. It is unable to account for the conditions necessary for the 
scientific enterprise to function. It cannot offer adequate grounds for knowledge to 
be possible — the total coherence between subject and object, the observer and the 
observed. It is forced to be reductionist in its attempts to explain the rich experience 
o f human life, failing on the basis o f a naturalist, evolutionary account o f the rise o f 
human life to account for the existence o f consciousness, the self, rationality, the 
inherent dignity o f the human species, moral duty and aesthetic appreciation. In a 
meaningless world, it is hard pushed to offer an explanation as to why human beings 
wish to invest their lives with meaning This w oud seem to suggest a poor adaptive 
strategy, since there is an apparent incoherence between reality (senseless) and what 
human beings long for (significance and value). A neo-Darwinian evolutionary 
account o f the history o f the universe makes the world both impersonal and hostile. 
Secular humanism is committed to continuing the myth that the worlds o f science 
and faith have to be confrontational. It appears to operate on the basis that they are 
incompatible alternatives. As a result, it converts itself into a kind o f pseudo-religion: 
methodological naturalism translates into metaphysical naturalism.
What may be achieved in this form o f mission?
320 I acknowledge that there are a number o f other grand-narratives represented today in Europe — Islam, 
Buddhism, Hinduism, the remnants o f  Marxism and the resurgence o f Fascism. I also am aware o f the fact 
that adherents o f  a post-modern reading o f culture disclaim any notion o f grand-narrative. In the former 
cases, other religious or ideological beliefs do not have the same impact yet on Western culture, although 
most o f  them certainly offer alternatives to the two main protagonists, and may take centre stage later if the 
epistemological predicament develops into a deep cultural crisis. In the latter case, Post-modernity cannot 
escape so easily from the accusation that it too offers a grand-narrative, for, in spite o f  its relativistic rhetoric, 
it certainly stands for a number o f  fundamental vaues.
130
Up to this point, I may have seemed to have presented IBE  as a kind o f methodo­
logical trump card or panacea that will solve all the epistemological difficulties, with 
which able minds have grappled over hundreds o f years. I need to redress the balance 
and admit that there are limitations to what the method may accomplish with regard 
to the acquisition o f justified true belief Three particular difficulties have been raised. 
First, there is the question o f under-determination. By this is meant the lack o f 
sufficient evidence to be able to make proper inferences from inductive reasoning:
“ Inductive inference is ...a  matter o f weighing evidence and judging proba­
bility ..T o say that an outcome is underdetermined is to say that some 
information about initial conditions and rules or principles does not guarantee 
a unique solution.“321
IBE  is evidence based. However, the evidence for the explanation may be too sparse 
for any reliable conclusion to be drawn. Thus, in the case o f seeking to gauge the best 
explanation for a particular crime, the evidence adduced by the prosecution may rest 
far too heavily on circumstantial and indirect incidents and events, such that inference 
to a particular perpetrator w oud produce an unsafe verdict. The only conclusion 
warranted w oud be to suspend judgement, unless and until more conclusive evidence 
came to light.
Secondly, there is the problem that, not being omniscient, human beings do not have 
access to a i  possible explanations. They only have recourse to the explanations that 
are to hand or, if these seem to be unsatisfactory, to others that they may be able to 
imagine given the availability o f data at a particular moment o f time. Now, one o f 
these explanations may possibly prove to be the best, and yet not correct, for there 
may yet be another as yet unknown explanation waiting in the wings. It w oud, then, 
also be unsafe to rely on one explanation, about which there will be doubts, even 
though it can be shown to be the best on offer. Again, the wise course would be to 
suspend judgement, in the expectation that a more satisfactory conclusion will turn 
up at a later date. This problem, as has often been pointed out, affects theistic expla­
nations on the suspicion that we are always dealing with a god-of-the-gaps type o f 
argument. Given time and accumulated knowledge o f the world, the sciences will be 
able to come up with a satisfactory explanation that does not need to appeal to extra­
terrestrial first causes. Such explanations possess the merit o f simplicity and 
parsimony
Thirdly, even if theistic explanations provided accounts o f existence that it was justi­
fied to believe, because they are plausible and elegant, it is hard to see how they coud 
be shown to be true. I f  it were possible to demonstrate the truth o f the explanations, 
people w oud have little or no excuse for not believing Hence, although a theistic 
believer is warranted in believing certain hypotheses about God’s action in the world, 
and may be convinced in her own mind that these point correctly to the reality o f the 
case, she cannot claim that they are demonstrated beyond all reasonable doubt. In 
other words, we cannot move much beyond a probabilistic defence o f theistic expla­
nations. The definition o f knowledge would then change from justified true belief to 
‘justified probably accurate belief’ . When we ask what is the probability that a
321 Inferencc to the Best Explanation, p. 5.
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particular hypothesis explains a particular sequence o f events — in the case o f our 
interests, the arrival o f the highly original mammal called homo sapiens — we may 
rephrase the question in terms o f propensity:
“the propensity theory..takes probabilities to be primitive propensities o f 
particular situations to produce given results.” 322 
Now, if this discussion is applied to arguments about the causal events that have 
produced homo sapiens (as we know ourselves), the best explanation becomes the one 
that has the propensity to give a more probable solution to the question. And, if this 
is then cast in the form o f the likeliest originating set o f circumstances, then we may 
adduce theism as the most probable explanation o f the anthropic principle, which in 
turn has set the necessary conditions for the emergence o f human beings. I f  the 
theistic explanation is correct the chance o f human beings coming into existence is 
100%, because the will o f the creator will be accomplished. If, on the other hand, the 
naturalist explanation is correct, the chance is greatly reduced (almost to zero), for the 
probability that the events necessary for human beings to have shown up out o f the 
evolutionary process is almost inconceivable; only the slightest, minutest variation in 
the initial conditions and subsequent developments w oud have had to change for the 
process to finish up being utterly sterile.323 This does not equate to demonstrating the 
truth o f the theistic hypothesis, but makes it extremely probable.
In answer to these difficulties in applying the theory o f IBE to the question o f a 
theistic or non-theistic universe, one can readily admit that there cannot be as great a 
degree o f conviction about the truth o f the matter as is the case o f scientific 
investigation. The evidence is o f a different class. This is in the nature o f the case, for 
as we have maintained from the beginning we are dealing here with two kinds o f 
reality, and therefore two kinds o f knowledge: the external world and the internal 
world o f the human experience o f being human. In the latter case, the observer 
becomes the observed and, therefore is highly engaged in a personal and subjective 
exploration o f her own sense o f being and identity. The challenge o f being entirely 
honest about questions that affect one’s own self-understanding is immense. How 
does one begin to stand outside one’s own formation as a human being in order to 
have an impartial and unprejudiced vantage-point?
Fortunately, it is precisely this heuristic means o f arriving at the greatest possible 
approximation to the truth that can overcome subjective partialities. IBE  is a rational 
consideration o f all claimants to know the ultimate reality that lies behind the 
experience o f being human. No claim to know the ultimate meaning o f life is 
excluded a- initio. All can be part o f the dialogue, which proceeds by way o f testing 
the claims against one another and against the stubborn facts o f human life in the 
world. Naturally, there is no final human arbiter. Each person or group has to decide 
for itself how far its intuition, common-sense, philosophy o f life (home-spun or 
borrowed), ideology or religion is best able to make sense o f the widest spread o f the 
reality o f life. The process is one o f advocacy in which alternative explanations are
322 David Papineau, ‘PhHosophy o f Science’ in The Blackwell Companion to Thilosophh, p. 315.
323 In a recent article John Polkinghorne sets out some examples o f recent discoveries that offer strong 
confirmation for the theistic hypothesis concerning the origin and development o f life; see, ‘God and 
Physics’ in God is Great, God is Good, pp. 65-77.
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promoted, discussed and judged. It is assumed that where there are conjicting claims, 
they cannot both be valid.
W hen it comes to knowledge in the ream  o f human self-awareness, this is am ost 
certainly the best way o f arriving at an understanding o f how and why things are as 
they are. This is a non-dogmatic, bottom -up approach. If  alternative explanations are 
treated fairly, on the basis o f considering the opinions o f others as one would wish 
others to consider one’s own, the m ost favourable condition for arriving at a 
knowledge o f the truth can prevail.324 The method, in its application to the episte­
m ologica predicament o f the West, can heal the breach between knowledge o f facts 
and mere opinions, between public truth and private beliefs.
It is exemplified in a recent book by Keith Ward,325 in which he concludes by arguing 
that, as an explanation o f human experience in the universe, materialism as an alter­
native to theism is deficient in its ability to explain a num ber o f ultimate questions: 
the final basis o f matter, consciousness, moral sensibility, the universal longing for a 
sense o f purpose, the commitment to rational thinking and the existence o f the 
universe. These are precisely the questions, and there are others (such as aesthetic 
appreciation and the intrinsic dignity o f human beings), which are unanswerable, 
given the present epistemological predicament.
It is curious, however, that a theistic world-view (rejected by metaphysical materi­
alism) gives a perfectly adequate, rational explanation o f each one o f these questions. 
It is, perhaps, not surprising that some atheists are prepared to concede that, although 
in their opinion theism is false, human beings nevertheless function better on the 
supposition that it is true. This, o f  course, though not a demonstration o f its truth, 
may be a reliable indication.
324 Habermas, The Theoty of Communicctive Action (trans. Thomas McCarthy) (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984) 
offers an analysis o f  the conditions necessary for inter-personal communication to be governed by the ideal 
o f rational discourse, such as sincerity, truth-telling and rational warrant. He refers to this as “an ideal speech 
situation”. He hoped that these rules w o u d  enable people to conduct the discussion o f disagreements in a 
way m ost likely to prom ote understanding o f a i  the issues involved; see, also, The Collapse of the Tactl&aloe 
Dichotomy,pp. 113-117.
325 The God Conclosion: God and the Western Philosophicul Trrdition (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2009), 
chapter 11, ‘Materialism and its Discontents.’
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SU M M A R Y
This thesis begins with the assumption that dialogue is an intrinsic part o f the mission 
o f the Christian community. This supposition has been well established in missio- 
logical thinking for a num ber o f decades . In large part the dialogue in question has 
been directed towards conversation and sharing with people o f different religious 
traditions . However, the W orld Council o f Churches has included within its portfolio 
dialogue with contemporary ideologies (largely referring to various forms of 
socialism). In this thesis I take up the challenge o f extending the dialogue to various 
kinds o f secular thinking in the W estern world. In pursuing this objective, I 
concentrate on one aspect o f secular belief: the way the fundamental question of 
epistemology, or theory o f knowledge, is handled.
I argue that epistemology, from a secular perspective, is now in crisis, due to its 
failure to achieve a unified theory o f knowledge . Following a generally accepted split 
between reason and revelation, deriving from intellectual shifts at the time o f the 
Enlightenment, human beings are in the curious position o f having ample under­
standing o f the mechanisms o f the natural world (their external environment), whilst 
being largely unable to answer crucial questions about themselves . The history, nature 
and consequences o f this dilemma have been traced in numerous publications, not 
least in the extensive literature dedicated to exploring the relation between science 
and faith. In this thesis I outline some o f the issues that have come to the fore, and 
that continue to be debated.
As reflection on some o f the m ost fundamental questions about human existence in 
an almost inconceivably vast universe abhors a vacuum — for, as a species, humans 
long for and strive to attain satisfactory answers — some scientists with a philo­
sophical bent are postulating the belief that knowledge gained through observation of 
the natural world (including the physical mechanisms o f the human brain), by means 
o f controlled experimentation, will be sufficient to explain the sum total o f human 
experience . This belief derives from what has been called ‘scientific expansionism,’
i. e . the conviction that science wül be able to encompass all the knowledge required 
to give a full account o f human life on earth . Such an idea appeals to the simplest 
explanation, i. e . the one that needs to postulate the lowest level o f rational complexity 
or to introduce the least num ber o f auxiliary hypotheses in order to make sense of 
experience .
I argue that knowledge that it is entirely derived ‘from below, that is by inference 
from data acquired from material sources, is intrinsically incapable o f discovering the 
whole truth about what it means to be human . W hat is required, in addition to 
knowledge ‘from below,’ is knowledge ‘from outside’ . Just as science operates within 
the framework o f a given material reality, so, in order to complete the circle o f 
knowledge, there needs to be another reality available, which tells us what otherwise 
we co u d  not know . Within the Christian tradition o f thought, this is called revelation 
or divine disclosure .
I proceed in my argument by seeking to answer the fundamental epistemological 
question, what is required if we are to obtain justified true belief about matters that
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cannot be settled by appeal to empirical data alone? I put forward the thesis that the 
heuristic device, known as Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE), may serve as a 
fruitful tool for concluding what is the ultimate truth o f the matter . The best 
explanation is, irm a  Jacie, unlikely to be the simplest explanation, just because the 
latter tends to reduce complexity to what can be handled by unaided human reason, 
and as a result ignores substantial pieces o f evidence on methodological grounds . 
However, when the simplest explanation does not explain, a more comprehensive 
one, if available, has to be sought.
IBE works by comparing alternative explanations o f the data o f experience . 
Inherently, it incorporates into its m ethod o f working any evidence that seems to be 
germane to the case . Nothing is ruled out o f court airiori. In the case o f the diaogue 
I am proposing, the Dest’ explanation is, at one and the same time, the explanation 
m ost warranted by all relevant evidence and the one that would, if true, provide the 
best understanding I claim that this heuristic device is the m ost adequate way of 
engaging in a diaogue between the Christian faith and the epistemological 
predicament o f secular, post-Enlightenment culture . I further argue that in this sense 
it amply fulfils the criteria for being a missiological project.
Before citing instances o f the way in which IBE can work in the context o f the 
diaogue with the epistemological predicament o f the West, I deal with criticisms o f 
the m ethod itself and the observation that it is not the purpose o f Christian faith to 
give explanations . I then seek to demonstrate how the diaogue may proceed by use 
o f this m ethod . I endeavour to show that science is unable, in its own terms, to give 
an adequate explanation o f the success o f its own procedures, but that Christian faith 
(understood as Trinitarian theistic realism) produces a refined explanation that does 
justice to the question, why is the scientific m ethod so profoundly able to do its job? I 
also turn my attention to the origin and justification o f moral sentiments and 
judgements, asking whether it is possible to derive intrinsic prescriptive demands 
from a naturalistic view o f the world. I look at the theory o f ethics known as the 
Impartial Observer (IO) and also seek to understand how the genesis o f moral vaues 
co u d  be possible on the basis o f a non-theistic account o f evolution. I compare and 
contrast these attempts at giving a foundation for the moral life with the Divine 
Command theory, looking particularly at the m ost common objections that have been 
raised against the latter.
In a couple o f chapters, I seek to show the importance o f epistemological consider­
ations in the case o f a three-way diaogue between naturalistic secularism, Christian 
faith and other religious traditions . The purpose o f introducing the inter-religious 
dimension here is to demonstrate the versatility o f the IBE method. For example, by 
its means, it is, in my judgement, possible to show that the account o f religious 
diversity known as pluralism is epistemologicaiy invalid . Also, I argue that, at least in 
the West, non-Christian religions, if they wish to engage with a culture that histori- 
caiy has largely excluded them, will also have to attend to the epistemological 
predicament. This latter may be a peculiar outworking o f a local set o f historical 
circumstances, or it may have global ramifications .
In the final analysis, this thesis will have achieved its aim, not so much by 
demonstrating that Christian, Trinitarian theism is the Dest’ explanation for the full
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range o f human experiences o f the world and o f themselves, but by confirming the 
hypothesis that IBE is an excellent tool for engaging in dialogue with the episte- 
mological predicament o f the West, and that dialogue is an essential part o f the 
Church’s missiological task Its potential fruitfuness is seen in the fact that it is an 
accepted means o f testing scientific hypotheses, and also implicitly undergirds a way 
o f reasoning used by the first generation o f Christians in their encounter with the 
Gentile world o f their time . By extension, it should be possible to employ its m ethod 
in other fields o f enquiry, such as issues o f economic justice . Such an application, 
however, w o u d  require another thesis.
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S A M E N V A T T IN G
D it proefschrift begint met de aanname dat dialoog een intrinsiek deel is van de 
missie van de christelijke gemeenschap . Deze aanname is voldoende onderbouwd in 
de missiologische theorievorming gedurende de laatste decennia. Voor een groot deel 
had deze theorievorming betrekking op dialoog met andersgelovigen . De Wereldraad 
van Kerken heeft echter ook de dialoog met de hedendaagse ideologieën (met name 
verschillende vormen van socialisme) op de agenda gezet. In dit proefschrift wil ik die 
theorievorming uitbreiden naar de dialoog met diverse vormen van seculier denken in 
de Westerse wereld. O m  dit doel te bereiken richt ik mij op een aspect van het 
seculiere geloof, namelijk de wijze waarop wordt omgegaan met de fundamentele 
vraag van de epistemologie o f kentheorie .
Ik beargumenteer dat de epistemologie zich vanuit een seculier perspectief in een 
hachelijke situatie bevindt omdat ze niet in staat is gebleken to t een geïntegreerde 
kentheorie te komen. In aansluiting bij de intellectuele verandering die uit de 
Verlichting voortkomt, wordt de scheiding van rede en openbaring thans vrij 
algemeen aanvaard. Maar daardoor verkeren mensen in de merkwaardige positie dat 
ze wel een goed inzicht hebben in hun natuurlijke omgeving, maar dat ze niet in staat 
zijn fundamentele vragen om trent hun eigen bestaan te beantwoorden. De 
geschiedenis, de aard en de consequenties van dit dilemma zijn behandeld in talrijke 
publicaties, niet in de laatste plaats in de omvangrijke literatuur die is gewijd aan de 
exploratie van de relatie tussen wetenschap en geloof In dit proefschrift bespreek ik 
een aantal onderwerpen die in dit debat naar voren gekomen zijn, en die nog steeds 
voorwerp van discussie zijn.
Mensen verlangen en streven naar bevredigende antwoorden op de meest funda­
mentele vragen van het leven. Ze gruwelen van het afschuwelijke vacuüm in het 
begrip van het bijna onvatbare menselijke bestaan . Sommige wetenschappers met een 
filosofische inslag geloven in de kennis die verkregen is door observatie van de 
natuurlijke wereld (inclusief de fysische mechanismen van het menselijke brein). Ze 
gaan ervan uit dat de kennis die verkregen is door middel van gecontroleerde 
experimenten voldoende zal zijn om de som van menselijke ervaringen te verklaren. 
D it geloof komt voort uit wat genoemd wordt ‘wetenschappelijk expansionisme’, dit 
wil zeggen, de overtuiging dat wetenschap in staat zal zijn om alle kennis te vergaren 
die nodig is om menselijk leven op aarde te bevatten . D it idee doet een beroep op de 
eenvoudigste verklaring, namelijk de verklaring die het laagste niveau van rationele 
complexiteit aanneemt en uitgaat van een gering aantal hypothesen om ervaring te 
begrijpen.
Ik beargumenteer dat kennis die totaal van ‘ nder-op’ vergaard is, dat wil zeggen, die 
afgeleid is van gegevens die verkregen zijn uit materiële bronnen, intrinsiek niet in 
staat is om de gehele waarheid te ontdekken over wat het betekent mens te zijn . Als 
aanvulling op kennis van ‘ nder-op’ is kennis van ‘ uiten-af nodig N et zoals 
wetenschap functioneert in het kader van een gegeven materiële werkelijkheid, zo ook 
m oet er, om de cirkel van de kennis te complementeren, een andere werkelijkheid zijn
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die ons vertelt wat we anders niet kunnen weten. Binnen de traditie van het 
christelijke denken wordt dit openbaring o f goddelijke onthulling genoemd.
Ik vervolg mijn redenering met een poging de fundamentele epistemologische vraag 
te beantwoorden wat nodig is wanneer we een beargumenteerd waar geloof willen 
verkrijgen over zaken die niet verhelderd kunnen worden met een beroep op 
empirische gegevens alleen. Ik verdedig de stelling dat het heuristische ontwerp dat 
bekend staat als Inference to the Best Fxplanation (IBE) een geschikt instrument is om te 
beslissen over wat de uiteindelijke waarheid is over de kwestie . De beste verklaring is, 
prima facie, in tegenstelling to t de eenvoudigste verklaring. Deze laatstgenoemde 
reduceert de rationele complexiteit to t wat zonder h u p  bevat kan worden door de 
menselijke rede . E n bijgevolg negeert ze wezenlijke stukken van bewijsvoering op 
epistemologische gronden . Echter, wanneer de eenvoudigste verklaring niet verklaart, 
m oet een meer omvattende verklaring gezocht worden .
IBE functioneert door het vergelijken van alternatieve verklaringen voor ervarings­
gegevens . De methode neemt iedere evidentie die relevant is voor de kwestie in 
ogenschouw . Niets wordt a priori van de bewijsvoering uitgesloten . De beste 
verklaring is de verklaring die gewaarborgd wordt door alle relevante evidentie en die 
tegelijk, indien ze waar is, het beste begrip geeft. Ik beweer dat dit heuristisch 
instrument voor christelijke gelovigen de beste manier is om  een dialoog aan te gaan 
m et de epistemologische crisis van de seculiere cultuur van na de Verlichting, en dat 
dit waarlijk een missiologisch project is .
Voordat ik voorbedden geef van de manier waarop IBE kan functioneren in de 
context van de dialoog met de epistemologische crisis in het Westen, behandel ik de 
kritiek op de methode zelf en het commentaar dat het niet het doel is van het 
christelijke geloof om verklaringen te geven . Daarna laat ik zien hoe de dialoog met 
gebruikmaking van deze methode gestalte kan krijgen. Ik tracht te laten zien dat 
wetenschap niet in staat is, op eigen kracht, een adequate verklaring te geven voor de 
successen van zijn eigen procedures, maar dat het christelijk geloof (verstaan als 
Trinitarisch, theïstisch realisme) een verfijnde verklaring produceert die recht doet 
aan de vraag, waarom de wetenschappelijke methode zo goed in staat is zijn taak uit 
te voeren. Ik vestig ook de aandacht op de oorsprong en de rechtvaardiging van 
morele sentimenten en oordelen, en vraag me af o f het mogelijk is intrinsiek 
prescriptieve eisen af te leiden uit een naturalistische kijk op de wereld. Ik bekijk de 
theorie van ethiek die bekend staat als de Impartiaa Observer theorie en probeer te 
begrijpen hoe het ontstaan van morele oordelen mogelijk zou kunnen zijn op basis 
van een niet-theïstisch verstaan van evolutie . Ik vergelijk en contrasteer deze 
pogingen om een fundering te geven voor het morele leven m et de Divine Command 
theorie, vooral kijkend naar de meest algemene bezwaren die geuit zijn tegen deze 
theorie .
In een aantal hoofdstukken probeer ik het belang aan te tonen van epistemologische 
overwegingen in de context van de drievoudige dialoog tussen naturalistisch 
secularisme, christelijk geloof en andere religieuze tradities . H et doel van het 
introduceren van de inter-religieuze dimensie hier, is de brede toepasbaarheid van de 
IBE methode aan te tonen. D oor gebruik van deze methode is het volgens mij 
bijvoorbeeld mogelijk aan te tonen dat het verstaan van religieuze diversiteit in
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termen van pluralisme epistemologisch gezien niet valide is. Ook toon ik aan dat niet- 
christelijke religies die een dialoog wülen aangaan met de cultuur die hen historisch 
gezien grotendeels heeft uitgesloten, in ieder geval in het Westen moeten ingaan op 
de epistemologische crisis . D it laatste kan een specifieke verwerking zijn van lokale 
omstandigheden, o f kan een globale omvang hebben .
Uiteindelijk gaat het mij er niet om  aan te tonen dat het christelijke, trinitarische 
theïsme de beste verklaring biedt voor een reeks van menselijke ervaringen van de 
wereld. D it proefschrift heeft haar doel bereikt als de hypothese bevestigd is dat IBE 
een uitermate geschikt instrument is om een dialoog aan te gaan met de epistemo­
logische crisis in het Westen, en dat die dialoog een essentieel onderdeel is van de 
missiologische opdracht van de kerk De potentiële geschiktheid van IBE wordt 
bevestigd door het feit dat ze een geaccepteerde methode is voor het testen van 
wetenschappelijke hypothesen, en dat ze impliciet ook ten grondslag ligt aan een 
manier van redeneren die gebruikt werd door de eerste generatie van christenen in 
hun ontmoeting met de wereld van ongelovigen in hun tijd. Daar komt bij dat het 
mogelijk m oet zijn om deze methode te gebruiken in andere onderzoeksgebieden 
zoals kwesties van sociale rechtvaardigheid. Z o’n toepassing zou echter een ander 
proefschrift vergen.
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